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Abstract 
The 2012 Freedom House Report reveals that only 12 percent of Sub-Saharan African 
countries are totally free or democratic compared to 71 percent in the Americas and 85 in 
Western Europe (see figure 1, Chapter 1). This descriptive statistic shows how poorly most 
countries in Africa are doing when it comes to embracing democratic culture. Free, transparent 
and fair elections; respect for human rights; protection of the rights of minorities; majority rule; 
separation of powers; and elimination of systemic corruption constitute major tenets of 
democracy. In many African countries, basic human rights are often violated and abused. In most 
cases, both the economic and political powers are confiscated and held in the hands of small 
groups of corrupt elites who through the use of force preside over the destiny of their countries. 
Since the adoption of multiparty systems in some African countries in the 1990s, most elections 
have been marred by violence and/or boycotts by political opponents who continue to question 
not only the fairness and the transparency of such elections but also the validity of the electoral 
systems of their countries. Is it legitimate to say that among the various types of electoral 
systems, one particular type is more prone to conflicts than the other systems? (Staffan 2005, 
Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman 2005, Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman 2002, Boix 2002, Reilly and 
Reynolds 1999). Addressing such a question requires a thorough discussion of the consequences 
of electoral systems for elections and electoral behaviors in Africa. 
In this dissertation the author hypothesizes that (H1): In Africa, countries that use 
majoritarian electoral systems are more likely to experience post-election conflicts than are 
countries that use proportional electoral systems, (H2): In Africa, countries that use majoritarian 
electoral systems are more likely to experience post-election conflicts than are countries that use 
mixed electoral systems, and (H3): In Africa, countries that use mixed electoral systems are more 
likely to experience post-election conflicts than are countries that use proportional electoral systems. 
These hypotheses will be tested by using both primary qualitative and secondary 
quantitative data analyses in order to answer the research question: “In Africa, why do some 
countries tend to experience post-election conflict while others do not?” This dissertation focuses 
on the first twenty years (1990-2010) of the move to democracy in Africa. With elections as the 
unit of analysis, and using the dataset on African electoral violence and the Cingranelli-Richards 
(CIRI) Human Rights dataset, this dissertation intends to use a most different systems design on 
six countries included in the Afrobarometer studies: Benin, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Togo, and Senegal. Among these six countries, Ghana and Togo use a majoritarian electoral 
system, Benin and Guinea-Bissau use a proportional representation electoral system, and Guinea 
and Senegal use a mixed electoral system 
If these hypotheses are sustained, the results would indicate that reforming the electoral 
system to accommodate the needs of the populace in countries with frequent electoral conflicts 
would be the one way not only to cope with current post-election conflicts, but also to help 
prevent future ones. Other implications include, but are not limited to, identifying ways to help 
promote substantive and representative democracies in Africa based on the findings of both the 
quantitative and qualitative phases of the study.  
 
Keywords: Election, Democratization, Human Rights, Africa, Electoral Conflicts, Election 
Management, Electoral Systems 
 
 
 
A Preventive Approach to Post-Election Conflicts in Contemporary Africa                           Edoh Agbehonou 
 
vii 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
I am very indebted to all the members of my dissertation committee: Drs. Richard Vengroff, 
Nurudeen Akinyemi, Oumar Diop, and Tamara Powell for their guidance and unshakable 
support during my dissertation journey. Each of them reminded me of the importance of getting 
the dissertation done given that many Ph.D. candidates tend to lose focus after they defended 
their proposals. I took such an advice very seriously, and it became a stimulus, which excited me 
to work on my dissertation every day. Their comments and suggestions as well as their attention 
to every little detail in my project have helped me not only to address all aspects of my research 
question but also to grow as a scholar and a writer. I would like to thank my Chair, Dr. Vengroff 
for his course, Elections and Electoral Systems Design, which helped me to develop my interest 
in this topic. I am also thankful for his experiences in Africa and expertise in comparative 
politics in general and comparative electoral systems in particular for they have served me well 
in the analysis and interpretation of my data.  
 
I would like to thank both Dr. Akinyemi and Dr. Diop who played a paramount role by providing 
me with critical but constructive feedbacks that challenged me to write an engaged literature 
review and a solid theoretical foundation. Additionally, I owe an unquantifiable debt of gratitude 
to Dr. Akinyemi for mentoring me during my undergraduate, graduate, and postgraduate studies. 
He also went beyond and above his advisory duties and responsibilities and helped me find an 
opportunity to help fund my project when my INCM Program’s stipend dried up.   
 
Working with Dr. Powell for a year as a research and teaching assistant was both a pleasure and 
a life changing experience. Her willingness to serve on my dissertation committee boosted my 
ability to provide a well-written research project for she would push me to “think outside the 
box.” My deepest appreciation goes to her because her prompt feedbacks and three to five days 
“turn-around” editing policy helped speed up the completion of my dissertation.  
 
I am so thankful to international conferences and conventions such as the Association for the 
Study of Middle East and Africa (ASMEA) in Washington, D.C; the International Study 
Association (ISA) in Irvine, San Diego and San Francisco; and the International Conference on 
Africa and Its Diaspora in Athens, Georgia; where I received useful constructive feedbacks that 
certainly helped me strengthen many arguments in my work.  
 
I would like to thank Dr. Amy Buddy who devoted her time to help me prepare for my 
comprehensive exam. I would also like to acknowledge the contributions of Drs. Akanmou 
Adebayo, Jessie Benjamin and Jeff DeWitt who accepted to serve on my comprehensive exam 
defense committee and allowed me to move forward with the dissertation proposal process.  
 
My acknowledgement also goes to Drs. Thierry Leger, Linda Johnston, Samuel Abaidoo, David 
Schmidt, and all my professors from Kennesaw State University who one way or the other 
contributed to this milestone achievement.   
 
I have greatly benefited from the advice, moral support and encouragements of Drs. Agnes and 
Benn Bongang who hosted me in their house in Savannah for six months while I was still 
A Preventive Approach to Post-Election Conflicts in Contemporary Africa                           Edoh Agbehonou 
 
viii 
 
working on this Ph.D. project and teaching at Savannah State University as a Full-Time 
Temporarily Faculty. I am very appreciative of their hospitality.   
 
To all my friends and colleagues who encouraged me in this endeavor, I sincerely say thank you.  
 
Finally, I dedicate this dissertation to my wife, Akoua and our children, Godwill and Faith for 
their love, support, patience, and sacrifices.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Preventive Approach to Post-Election Conflicts in Contemporary Africa                           Edoh Agbehonou 
 
ix 
 
ACRONYMES AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AAEA: Association of African Electoral Authorities 
AC: Ayawaso Central  
ADDI: Alliance of Democrats for Integral Development 
ADS: And Defar Senegal  
AFP: Alliance des Forces Progressives (Alliance of Progressive Forces)  
AJ-PADS: And Jëf -African Party for Democracy and Socialism  
ALLIANCE: Democratic Alliance for the Fatherland  
ANC: African National Congress (South Africa) 
ANC: Alliance Nationale pour le Changement (National Alliance for Change) (Togo) 
APG: Accord Politique Globale (Global Political Accord) 
APJ-JJ: Alliance for Progress and Justice- Jëf-Jël  
ASMEA: Association of the Studies of Middle East and Africa  
AU: African Union 
BCP: Basutoland Congress Party  
BIT: Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation  
BNP: Basotho National Party  
BRT: The Bounded Rationality Theory 
BV: Block Vote 
CAR: Action Committee for Renewal   
CBDH: Beninois Human Rights Commission 
CDD: Centre for Democratic Development   
CDPA: Democratic Convention of African Peoples  
A Preventive Approach to Post-Election Conflicts in Contemporary Africa                           Edoh Agbehonou 
 
x 
 
CEI: Commission Electorale Independente (Independent Electoral Commission) 
CENA: Commission Electoral Nationale Autonome (Autonomous National Electoral 
Commission)  
CENI: Independent National Electoral Commission  
CEPRODEG: Centre for the Promotion of Democratic Governance  
CIA: Central Intelligence Agency 
CIPI: Center for International Policy & Innovation  
CIRI: Cingranelli Richards 
CNDD-FDD: National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of  
Democracy 
CPDM: Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement  
CPI: Consumer Price Index 
CPP: Pan-African Patriotic Convergence  
CRC: Convergence for Renewal and Citizenship 
CREDHR: Civil Rights Education for Democracy and Human Rights    
CSO: Civil Society Organization 
CSRC: Civil Society Centre  
CUD: Coalition for Unity and Democracy 
CUT: Comité de Unité Togolaise  
DA: The Democratization Approach 
DDialogue: Dialogue on Democratic Decentralization    
Dom.: Dominant 
DQ: Droop quota   
A Preventive Approach to Post-Election Conflicts in Contemporary Africa                           Edoh Agbehonou 
 
xi 
 
DRC: The Democratic Republic of Congo  
DRD: Democratic Renewal Party 
DYAMA: Dyama party  
EC: Electoral Commission 
ECOWAS: Economic Community of the West African States 
Eff_Ns: The effective number of seats  
Eff_Nv: The effective number of votes 
EFI: Ethnic Fractionalization Index 
EGLE: Every Ghanaian Living Everywhere   
EISA: Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa  
EMB: Election Management Body 
EMC: Election Management Commission 
E. pl.: Extreme pluralism 
EPRDF: Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front  
EU: The European Union 
FCG-SD: Guinean Civic Forum-Social Democracy   
FLING: Front for the Liberation and Independence of Guinea  
FNL: Forces Nationales de Liberation (National Liberation Forces)  
FPI: Front Populaire Ivoirien (Ivorian Popular Front) 
FPTP: First Past The Post 
FRUD: Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy 
FSD-BJ: Front for Socialism and Democracy-Benno Jubël 
GDP (y): Gross Domestic Product  
A Preventive Approach to Post-Election Conflicts in Contemporary Africa                           Edoh Agbehonou 
 
xii 
 
GSDRC: Government and Social Development Resource Centre 
HAAC: High Authority for Audiovisual and Communication  
HIIK: The Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research 
HQ: Hare quota 
ID: Identification 
IDEA: Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
IDEG: Institute for Democratic Governance  
IFES: The International Foundation for Electoral Systems  
IIAG: Ibrahim Index of African Governance 
IPA: Interim Political Authority  
IPU: Inter-Parliamentary Union  
IRIN: The United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks 
LCD: Lesotho Congress for Democracy  
LD-MPT: Democratic League-Labour Party Movement  
List-PR: List proportional representation system 
LRM: Largest Remainder Method  
LSq: Least Squares index 
MA: Majoritarian electoral system 
MATAP: Ministry of Territorial Administration and Political Affairs  
MDC: Movement for Democratic Change  
MDD: Democratic Movement of Dahomey  
MDMH: Mean district magnitude of the house 
MI: Mixed electoral system 
A Preventive Approach to Post-Election Conflicts in Contemporary Africa                           Edoh Agbehonou 
 
xiii 
 
MISSANG: The Angolan Military Mission in Guinea-Bissau 
MLP-PMSD: Mauritian Labor Party-Mauritian Social-Democratic Party  
MMM: Multi-member majoritarian system 
MMM-MSM: Mauritian Militant Movement-Mauritian Socialist Movement  
MMP: Multi-member proportional system 
MOE: Election Observers Mission  
MP: Member of Parliament 
M. pl.: Moderate pluralism 
MRDS: Reform Movement for Social Development  
NCP: National Convention Party  
NDC: National Democratic Congress 
NEC: National Elections Commission  
NIP: National Independence Party  
NP: National Party  
NPP: New Patriotic Party  
NSD: Norwegian Social Science Data Services  
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares  
OPR: Organization of the People of Rodrigues  
OS: Okaikai South  
OSIWA: Open Society Initiative for West Africa 
PAI: African Independence Party  
PAIGC: African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde 
PCD: Democratic Convergence Party  
A Preventive Approach to Post-Election Conflicts in Contemporary Africa                           Edoh Agbehonou 
 
xiv 
 
PDU: Dahomeyan Unity Party  
PDG: Democratic Party of Guinea 
PDG-RDA: Democratic Party of Guinea-African Democratic Rally  
PDS: Parti Democratic Sénégalais (Senegalese Democratic Party) 
PHP: People’s Heritage Party  
PIT: Independence and Labor Party  
PLS: Senegalese Liberal Party  
PM: Prime Minister 
PNC: People’s National Convention  
PND: National Democratic Party 
PND: Dahomey Nationalist Party (Benin) 
PPC: Party for Progress and Citizenship  
PPP: Purchasing power parity 
PR: Proportional Representation electoral system 
PRD: Democratic Renewal Party  
PRD: Republican Party of Dahomey (Benin) 
PRP: The People’s Rally for Progress  
PRP: Party of Renewal and Progress (Guinea) 
PRPB: Benin People's Revolutionary Party  
PRS: Social Renewal Party  
PS: Parti Socialiste (Socialist Party) 
PSA: Authentic Socialist Party 
PTP: Parti Togolais Du Progrès  
A Preventive Approach to Post-Election Conflicts in Contemporary Africa                           Edoh Agbehonou 
 
xv 
 
PUP: Party of Unity and Progress  
PUSD: United Social Democratic Party 
RDD: Dahomeyan Democratic Rally  
RDT: The Relative Deprivation Theory 
RES- Les Verts: Rally of the Ecologists of Senegal-The Greens  
RGB-MB: Resistance of Guinea-Bissau- Bafatá  
RGP: Rally of the Guinean People 
RM: The Rodrigues Movement  
RND: National Democratic Rally 
RPG: Rally of the Guinean People  
SADC: Southern African Development Community  
SCAD: Social Conflict in Africa Database  
SCPST: The Social Cleavages and Party System Theory 
SMCs: Single-member constituencies  
SMP: Single-member plurality 
TDS: Takku Defaraat Senegal  
TI: Transparency International 
TRS: Two-Round System  
UCPN: Union of Chiefs and Populations of the North  
UDA: The Union for a Democratic Alternative  
UDD: Dahomeyan Democratic Union 
UDPT: Union Démocratique des Populations Togolaises   
UDS-R : Senegalese Democratic Union-Renovation  
A Preventive Approach to Post-Election Conflicts in Contemporary Africa                           Edoh Agbehonou 
 
xvi 
 
UFDG: Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea 
UM: Union for Change   
UN: The United Nations 
UNAMI: United Nations Mission for Iraq 
UNDP: The United Nations Development Programme 
UNP: National Patriotic Union  
UNPG: National Union for the Progress of Guinea 
UNR: Union for the New Republic  
UPG: Union for the Progress of Guinea 
URD: Union for Democratic Renewal 
ZANU-PF: Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front  
A Preventive Approach to Post-Election Conflicts in Contemporary Africa                           Edoh Agbehonou 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. A Brief Background 
 By the 1960s, most of the African countries gained their independence from the European 
colonial powers, including Great Britain, Belgium, and France. A little window of democratic 
opportunity that was opened with decolonization was sabotaged by the rise of military coups as 
well as authoritarian civilian regimes that suppressed all opposition and established one-party 
states across the continent. Military coups not only were the norm, but also remained the only 
mechanism that guaranteed regime change in Africa. However, in the 1990s, many African 
countries previously under autocratic rule experienced what Huntington (1993) called the “Third 
Wave of Democratization.” Political liberalization was initiated in those countries. Political 
oppositions began to emerge, and multiparty systems—that were previously forbidden after the 
decolonization—were once again re-established.  
 The process of moving from one-party systems to multiparty systems was facilitated by 
strategic coordination by opposition parties. The learning that went into developing such 
coordination often took the experience of three or more elections.  According to Freedom House, 
a democratic country is a country that holds free, transparent, and fair elections; respects human 
rights; and protects the rights of minorities. Not only is a democracy ruled by majority, but also it 
must adhere to the principle of separation of powers and elimination of systemic corruption. 
Unfortunately, these necessary—but not sufficient—conditions for the emergence and 
consolidation of democracy are not respected in many African countries. With the exception of 
Mauritius, the Economist Intelligence Unit’s 2011 Democracy Index classifies the few so-called 
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African democracies, including Cape Verde, South Africa, Botswana, Mali (before the 2012 
military coup), Lesotho, Namibia, Zambia, Benin, Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania, Tunisia, Senegal, 
Uganda, Liberia, Mozambique, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Mauritania, Niger, Burundi, and Egypt, as 
flawed democracies for their overall democracy score ranging between 8 and 3.95.1 The 
remaining African countries that have a score less than 3.95 are classified in the category of 
authoritarian regimes. The overall democracy score is based on indicators of democracy, 
including electoral process and pluralism, functioning of government, political participation, 
political culture, and civil liberties and ranges from 10 to 1 (Economist Intelligent Unit 2011).  
 Since 1990, however, many elections in Africa had been marred by acts of violence. The 
most palpable examples of African [violent] post-elections violence include, but are not limited 
to, the 1998 and 2005 Togo presidential elections, the 2007 Kenya elections, the 2008 Zimbabwe 
elections, and the 2010 Cote d’ Ivoire presidential elections (Straus and Taylor 2012). As of now, 
in spite of the mediation of good offices by both the regional and international actors, viable 
solutions have not been found to these conflicts. Preventive approaches to post-election conflicts 
will potentially provide long lasting solutions. This thesis proposes to contribute to finding ways 
and means to effectively prevent post-election conflicts in contemporary Africa.  
 Because of the complexity of current conflicts in Africa, and in order to actually address all 
the facets of the research question, this study will use a mixed method approach, a combination 
of cross-national quantitative methods and in-depth comparative case studies. Should the 
hypotheses put forward in this study be supported, the results would indicate that reforming 
                                                           
1
 These scores are the averages of the five indicators of democracy listed below. Each indicator ranges from 10 to 1, 
the higher the score the better the level of democracy. The instrument used here to analyze the types of regimes in 
the world ranges from 10 to 1 with 10 indicating a more democratic regime and 1, a non-democracy. Based on that 
instrument and according to the Economic Intelligence Unit, any country that falls within [{10, 8}, {8, 3.95}, and 
{3.95, 1}] is considered a full democracy, flawed democracy, and authoritarian regime, respectively.  
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electoral system in each of these countries would be one way not only to cope with immediate 
post-election conflicts but also to help prevent future ones.  
 This major approach of the study is similar to that employed by Mozaffar and Vengroff 
(2001)’s “whole system approach.” Those authors view “institutional change in democratizing 
countries as the outcome of strategic decisions about structurally configurative and operationally 
interconnected rules by actors seeking to promote their interests in multiple arenas” (p. 612)2.  
Such an approach has been used successfully in Senegal (Mozaffar and Vengroff 2001); in 
Mexico (Craig and Cornelius 1995); in Taiwan (Chao and Myers 2000, Solinger 2001, Tien 
1996); and in South Korea (Juan 2000, Lee 1999, Mo and Brady 1999). In each of these 
democratizing countries, electoral reforms were incrementally implemented at all levels as part 
of a nested game not only to accommodate the needs of all political actors including the political 
oppositions, but also to ensure political stability, regime legitimacy, and “credibility of the 
electoral process at home and abroad” (Mozaffar and Vengroff 2001: 612). The next section 
presents the problem and the reasons why Africa is selected as the main continent, and Benin, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, and Togo as areas (countries) of concentration of the 
study.   
 
1.2. Statement of the Problem  
 The 2012 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG)—a quantitative measure of good 
governance—shows that Africa is underperforming when it comes to good governance. The Mo 
Ibrahim Foundation’s measures of good governance include safety and rule of law, political 
                                                           
2
 Strategic decisions are decisions that affect the whole political system, resources and actors involved, as well as the 
interaction between both protagonists and antagonists. 
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participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunity, and human development. 
According to the IIAG, a score above 70 is an indicator of a country that has good governance.  
 Africa’s overall good governance score of 51.2 indicates that the continent is still lagging 
behind. However, there is some degree of variation among African nations. For example, while 
Mauritius has a good governance score of 82.8 out of 100, Somalia scores less than 10. Even 
though the continent scores moderately on safety and rule of law (53.3) and on human 
development (56.7), its low scores on political participation and human rights (47.6) and 
sustainable economic opportunity (47.3) reveals a clearer picture of African democracy (Mo 
Ibrahim Foundation 2012).  
 Since 2007, there has been a substantial decline in African political participation and a drop 
in the number of full “electoral democracies” in Sub-Saharan Africa from 24 in 2005 to 19 in 
2012 (The Economist 2012) (see for example, Freedom House 2012). The numbers provided by 
the IIAG and Freedom House are disturbing and alarming given that free and fair election 
process, civil liberties, functioning of government, political participation, and political culture 
are the major tenets of democracy (Economist Intelligence Unit 2012, Mo Ibrahim Foundation 
2012, The Economist 2012).  
 During the last two decades, many African countries including Burundi, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, 
Lesotho, Madagascar, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan (before the secession and formal division 
into the present day Sudan and South Sudan),Togo, and Zimbabwe have been experiencing post-
election conflicts (Straus and Taylor 2012). These conflicts have been characterized by varying 
degrees of intensity and frequency across the continent.  
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 While some electoral conflicts were violent, others were not. For example, since 1990, 
countries such as Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, and Zambia never had high levels of 
electoral violence. However, while high levels of electoral violence occurred occasionally in 
countries such as Burundi, Cameroon, Comoros, Lesotho, to name a few, some other African 
countries, including Cote d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Sudan, Togo, 
and Zimbabwe usually experienced high electoral violence since the adoption of multiparty 
democracy in 1990 (Straus and Taylor 2012). For example, the most recent post-election 
conflicts in Africa occurred in Cote d’Ivoire after the 2010 presidential elections. Within a period 
of only six months after the elections there were “serious violations of international law 
including potential war crimes against humanity by armed forces on both sides. Scores of women 
were raped during the post-election period, and the death toll is estimated to be at least 3000” 
(Human Rights Watch 2011). There were also involuntary displacements of thousands of people 
and destruction of physical materials, including roads and buildings. In addition, towns and 
villages were burned (Rousselot 2011). 
 Because of the gravity of crimes committed in the aftermath of the 2010 elections, the former 
president, Laurent Gbagbo, was arrested and is now on trial in The Hague for crimes against 
humanity. The Ivorian post-election conflicts erupted not only as a result of electoral 
improprieties, such as fraud, and manipulation of elections’ results by both the Ivorian 
Independent Electoral Commission and the country’s Constitutional Court, but also because of 
unresolved and deep-rooted issues, such as identity, citizenship (Ogwang 2011, Badmus 2009), 
and land (Peifer 2008, Bruhwiler 2003). Many African conflicts escalate into violence because of 
these and other underlying issues, such as unemployment and dire living conditions (Kingdon 
and Knight 2007, Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000). 
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 In South Africa, despite the two recent elections of 2004 and 2009, which were believed to 
occur with minor irregularities and conflicts, the 1994 and 1999 parliamentary elections were 
recorded as occurring with large-scale electoral violence, including violent harassment and 
violent repression (Straus and Taylor 2012). The 2011 estimate shows that unemployment 
remains very high (24.9 percent) (CIA 2013). The country is still struggling to deal with the 
long-term legacy of apartheid that is the lack of empowerment of the disadvantaged people. In 
spite of such problems, South Africa remains one of the few democracies in Africa and enjoys a 
Freedom House political rights score of 2 and a civil liberties score of 2 (Freedom House 2012). 
However, the disproportional use of force by security forces on August 16, 2012 on miners, who 
were fighting for their rights at Marikana Platinum Mine in the northern part of the country, 
raises serious concerns for the future of democracy in South Africa. The death toll of the August 
2012 horror was estimated at 44 (Amnesty International 2012) or 34 dead and 78 wounded 
(Freedom House 2012). The occurrence of this non-election-related violence and the existence of 
other factors, including high unemployment rate and lack a growing middle class in the country 
show how fragile the South African democracy is.  
 Apart from electoral violence and political instability, another critical intervening variable 
that needs to be looked at when studying post-election conflict is the types of electoral systems. 
Electoral systems are crucial in determining how the political system must function within a 
particular country. Farrell (2011) contends that “electoral systems determine the means by which 
votes are translated into seats in the process of electing politicians into office” (p. 4). Politicians 
in this context include both candidates from political parties3 and independents. Electoral 
                                                           
3
 According to GSDRC (2012), political parties are one of the primary institutions/tools for ensuring political 
competition, democratic accountability and distribution of both political and economic powers in a country. Political 
parties play a paramount role in linking civil society and state. They are critical in shaping both domestic and 
foreign policy debates within a country. Above all, political parties are main drivers of democracy. 
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systems basically determine who is elected and who is not; which political party gains power and 
which does not (Reynolds, Reilly, and Ellis, 2008). In fact, they are mechanisms set up to 
convert individual preferences into representatives or some forms of decision-making groups. 
 The existing literature on electoral systems suggests the existence of four main electoral 
system families: plurality/majority systems, proportional representation (PR) systems, mixed 
systems (Mixed), and other systems (Reynolds, Reilly, and Ellis, 2008) or five types of electoral 
systems: single-member plurality (SMP); majority electoral system, which includes the two-
round systems and the alternative vote; the list systems of proportional representation; mixed-
member systems; and the single transferable vote (Farrell, 2011). In order to put an emphasis on 
their outcomes this thesis classifies electoral systems into three main types—majoritarian (MA), 
proportional representation (PR), and mixed systems (Mixed).  
In majoritarian electoral systems, either the candidate with the highest votes wins the election 
(plurality system) or the candidate with the absolute majority (greater than 50% of the votes) 
wins elections (majority system). They aim at maintaining and enhancing stable government, 
stable political systems and what Lindberg (2005) calls “stable legislative majorities” (p. 44). 
These systems are designed to favor bigger parties at the expenses of smaller ones.  
Theoretically, the majoritarian system leads to a two-party system in which elections are viewed 
in terms of zero-sum game where the winner takes all. However, there are some few countries 
that use the majoritarian systems but have more than two major parties. For example, Canada has 
three major parties plus a regional component. Whenever parties start viewing elections strictly 
in terms of competition, they are open to anything including post-election political instability.  
In addition, the implementation of this system in any countries (especially in divided 
societies) leads to a lot of wasted votes for minorities’ votes are not translated into seats. This 
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situation makes it very difficult for small parties to be represented with the exception that they 
are concentrated in one region or constituency. However, in a two round system smaller parties 
can participate in the first round then strategically use their support in the final round. This 
strategy often operates at the presidential level. An example of this strategic voting occurred in 
the 2010 presidential elections in Cote d’Ivoire. 
 Proportional representation systems are assumed to decrease the disproportionality between 
the percentage of votes and the percentage of seats gained by a party in parliament. 
Theoretically, with the exception of South Africa where a single party (the African National 
Congress [ANC]) has been winning sizable majority since the end of the apartheid regime, PR 
distributes parliamentary seats in proportion to the percentage of votes won.4 The distinguishing 
characteristic of PR systems is that they use multi-member districts: the higher the district 
magnitude (size), the greater its proportionality (Reynolds et al. 2008). It is also determined by 
the number of competing parties.  
To ensure the representativeness of their population, countries using PR systems reserve 
seats for minorities, including racial groups, ethnic groups, religious groups, and women. A 
common practice in many of these countries is that a minimum threshold is established to allow 
smaller parties some representation while at the same time exclude extremist parties or radical 
groups. For example, in Germany’s Bundestag, the threshold of representation is five percent and 
in Turkish parliament, this threshold is ten percent. However, not all countries that have PR 
systems use a threshold to allocate seats in parliaments. The good example is South Africa. 
Lindberg (2005) terms the practice of PR a “representative justice” (p. 45). The ultimate goal of 
                                                           
4
 For example, out of 400 parliamentary seats, the ANC won 252 seats in 1994, 266 seats in 1999, 279 seats in 2004, 
and 264 seats in 2009. See African Election Database. (24 February 2011). Elections in South Africa. African 
Election Database. Accessed 22 September 2013, from http://africanelections.tripod.com/za.html 
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such systems is the reduction of conflicts by seeking inputs from different groups and parties and 
possibly allowing them to be partners in a coalition government. 
Reynolds et al. (2008) argues that “proportionality is often seen as being best achieved by the 
use of party lists, where political parties present lists of candidates to the voters on a national or 
regional basis” or “voters rank-order candidates in multi-members districts” (p. 29). The point of 
rank-ordering candidates on a party list is that, based on the percentage of votes won—with the 
understanding that voters will cast their ballots for the party and not the individual candidates—
which determines the number of seats in parliament. The members of parliament (MPs) are then 
chosen according to their place on the list (e.g. Israel).  For national elections, the number one on 
the list is assumed to be the Prime Minister (PM) candidate. 
 Mixed systems are often used in emerging democracies. It is the combination of some 
elements of both the majoritarian systems and proportional systems. In these systems, the PR 
element plays an important role in compensating a potential disproportionality that emerges as a 
result of using the majoritarian systems.  
 In this dissertation, the selection of six cases—Ghana, Togo, Benin, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, 
and Guinea—are based on the level of electoral violence. The focus is particularly on extreme 
cases of countries with low/never high electoral violence (Benin and Ghana) or usually high 
electoral violence (Togo and Guinea-Bissau). These countries either use the majoritarian 
electoral systems (Ghana and Togo), the proportional electoral systems (Benin and Guinea-
Bissau), or the mixed electoral system (Senegal and Guinea) (African Election Database 2011). 
While Guinea experiences high electoral, Senegal experiences low electoral violence. 
 In post-colonial Africa, Togo was the first state to undergo a military coup. In addition, the 
country was one of the many African countries to experience a bloody and failed democratic 
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transition in the 1990s. Since then, Togo has been experiencing post-election political violence 
(Bekoe 2012, Straus and Taylor 2012). Political violence in Togo is a result of the fact that the 
country is “still in the grip of an autocracy, with the incumbent regime holding on tenaciously to 
power and denying other political parties the space for political actualization” (Adejumobi, 
Hambok, Nordlund, Rukambe, and Dowetin 2007: 19).  Consequently, there is a gap in the 
representation of the Togolese political opposition in the National Assembly, the country’s 
legislative body. Despite the death of the long term dictator, President Eyadéma Gnassingbé, 
who ruled Togo for 38 years (1967-2005), his ruling party is still holding on to the presidency. 
This state of things hinders any prospects of a democratic alternation in the country. 
 Another country with a high level of electoral violence is Guinea-Bissau. Guinea-Bissau had 
its first multiparty and free elections in 1994, and President Joao Bernado Vieira was 
democratically elected to serve a five-year term (African Election Database 2012). However, in 
1998, the country was embroiled in a civil war that ousted President Vieira in 1999 (CIA World 
Factbook 2013, African Election Database 2012). Since then, because the country has been 
experiencing frequent military coups, not a single president of Guinea-Bissau served his full 
term. The most disturbing political development that will mark the history of the country was the 
2012 military coup that occurred at the height of the presidential elections. This coup prevented 
Guinea-Bissau from holding the second-round of the presidential elections. In addition to its 
governance overall score of 39.8 out of 100, the country scores very poorly (40.0) when it comes 
to its handling of political participation and rights (IIAG 2012). Guinea-Bissau also uses the PR 
system to translate votes into seats or policy preferences.  
 After 40 years under the rule of the Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste), Senegal is often cited as 
being among Africa’s “most stable democracies” (CIA World Factbook 2013). The election of a 
A Preventive Approach to Post-Election Conflicts in Contemporary Africa                           Edoh Agbehonou 
 
11 
 
longtime opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade in the 2000 presidential elections marked a positive 
step in the country’s prospect for democracy. However, during his second term in office and 
through legislative actions, President Wade amended the constitution of Senegal several times in 
order to weaken his political opponents and hold on to power for a third time (Mbow 2008). This 
act provoked discontent in the Senegalese population, which not only took the matter to the 
streets but also voted him out in the 2012 presidential elections (CIA World Factbook 2013). The 
death toll in the 2012 violent street protests in the country was estimated at six people (BBC 
2012). In spite of this relatively minor incident, Senegal will be used as a case of a country with 
a low level of electoral conflict, a country that uses a mixed electoral system.  
 Besides Senegal, another relevant African country that uses a mixed electoral system is 
Guinea. After the death of the long serving Guinean president in December 2008, General 
Lansanah Conteh, Captain Dadis Moussa Camara filled a power vacuum through a military 
coup. Regional organizations such as the Economic Community of the West African State 
(ECOWAS) and the African Union, and international organizations, including the United 
Nations (UN), not only strongly condemned the military takeover in the country but also warned 
against a potential contagion effect and a return of military dictatorships in West Africa (Human 
Rights Watch 2011, Nengak 2010, Soares 2009). Camara, who vowed that he would leave power 
after a transitional period of six years to a democratically elected civilian president, became 
obsessed with power and wanted to contest the presidential elections set for 2010 in Guinea. A 
pro-democracy rally in protest against Camara’s inordinate ambition to stay in power was met 
with bloody military repression, which claimed at least 157 lives, 1,253 injured, and scores of 
women sexually assaulted and raped in the football stadium (Soares 2009). An assassination 
attempt that followed the 2009 stadium horrors ousted the leader of the junta, Captain Camara. 
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 None of the candidates who contested the 2010 presidential elections in Guinea was able to 
secure the absolute majority of votes needed to win the elections during the first round. The two 
run-off candidates were Cellou Dalein Diallo with 43.69 percent of the votes and Alpha Condé 
with 18.25 percent of the votes (African Election Database 2012, Nengak 2010). Although 
Condé was far behind the front-runner Diallo, he forged a strong coalition with the other twenty-
two candidates and finally won the second round of the presidential elections. The aftermath of 
the elections was marred by violent clashes between supporters of the two contenders who 
claimed victory (Nengak 2010). However, the recognition of Condé as the president-elect by 
Diallo de-escalated the post-election tension between supporters of the political rivals and ended 
the conflict in Guinea.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
  Unlike Guinea, the situations in Benin and Ghana are quite different. Benin and Ghana have 
been relatively peaceful countries. Since 1990, neither country has had high electoral violence. 
Between 1990 and 2010, both countries had already held at least five multiparty and free 
elections with no major incidents. A score of 2 for civil liberties of both Benin and Ghana and a 
score of 2 to 1 for political rights of Benin and Ghana, respectively, give both countries a “free” 
democratic status (Freedom House 2012). That variation raises two fundamental questions: Why 
do some African countries tend to experience post-election conflicts while others do not?  And 
how can post-election conflicts be prevented in contemporary Africa?  
 In this dissertation, the author tries to answer these questions by looking at a combination of 
factors, including countries’ electoral systems, electoral management commissions, and election 
monitoring mechanisms. The author contends that long lasting solutions to post-election crises 
require preventive approaches. The author also argues in this thesis that having an electoral 
system that produces results that mirror the composition of the populace (social cleavages in 
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society) of the country is one of the effective preventive approaches to post-election conflicts. In 
addition to PR systems that are the most appropriate to bring about democracy in pluralist 
societies such as many countries in Africa, the prevention of post-election conflicts across the 
continent is also dependent on a thorough understanding of and a strict compliance with and 
enforcement of electoral rules by all political actors. Table 1.1 below summarizes the 
characteristics of the six countries selected for the study.       
 
Table 1.1: Summary of Selected Cases 
Electoral systems Low level of violence High level of violence 
Majoritarian systems Ghana Togo 
Proportional systems Benin Guinea-Bissau 
Mixed systems Senegal  Guinea 
 
 
1.3. Why Study Post-Election Conflicts?  
 First of all, what is post-election conflict? And why study it? These two questions have not 
been the main preoccupations of many social scientists and practitioners in the field of conflict 
resolution and analysis. However, since 1990, the focus has been on elections as a tool of 
transfer of power from authoritarian rulers to democratic ones. This focus has helped to spur a 
tremendous amount of literature on elections and electoral systems design (Hoglund 2009). From 
the academic standpoint, studying post-election conflicts will therefore fill a gap in the literature. 
In this thesis, post-election conflict is simply defined as any dissatisfaction of those who have 
A Preventive Approach to Post-Election Conflicts in Contemporary Africa                           Edoh Agbehonou 
 
14 
 
vested interests in an election (incumbent or coalition government, opposition political parties, 
candidates and their supporters, and other external actors) over the outcome of the election. Such 
outcome may include political violence, which takes several forms such as armed revolution, 
civil strife, institutionalized military repression, intimidation and periodic arrest, and 
assassination of political leaders and their supporters.  
 In addition, the concept of post-election conflicts is worth studying for various practical 
reasons. First and foremost, post-election conflicts can undermine the legitimacy of the incoming 
government and/or tarnish or smear the image of the outgoing one should the latter try to 
maintain power by violent means or highjack the electoral process. Bekoe (2012) concurs and 
argues that electoral violence is “usually a brief, time- and event-bound period of violence, with 
generally low levels of tension but with enormous bearing on a country’s democratization 
process and institutional reform priorities and on its leaders’ legitimacy” (p. 4). But what is 
legitimacy?  
 O’Donnell (2006) states that “across most of the globe today, the ultimate claim of a political 
regime to be legitimate—or at least acceptable—rests on the kind of popular consent that 
purportedly finds expression in the act of free voting” (p. 6). In synthesizing O’Donnell’s quote, 
one can use the term “legitimacy” to simply mean popular acceptance of authority that is 
democratically elected via free, fair and transparent elections. This notion brings in the issue of 
legality. Are the leaders governing under the popularly and mutually acceptable rules by all 
parties? 
 Leaders may also use the avenue of a military coup d’état or manipulate the electoral process 
and rig elections, or a combination of both strategies. The use of these unethical and illegal 
tactics may have negative consequences on the legitimacy of countries’ leaders and heads of 
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states. There are a myriad of instances throughout the world where elected officials and/or 
presidents’ legitimacy has been questioned either by their own people and/or by external actors, 
such as foreign aid donors, the great powers—the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, 
and the like—the United Nations, the European Union, and other regional and international 
organizations. This worldwide outcry over the legitimacy of a government occurs if parties fail 
to obey the rules of the electoral game. The 2007 post-election conflict in Kenya provides a 
palpable example of the manipulation of electoral process and vote rigging that was widely 
condemned. To legitimate the incoming government,  
 Although the 1997 post-election peace agreement required that members of the Kenyan 
independent Electoral Commission (EC) be proportionally represented by the ruling party and 
the political opposition parties, the incumbent president, Mwai Kibaki unilaterally replaced 19 of 
the 22 members of the EC at the expenses of his political opponents (Brown 2011). Even though 
this act might have contributed to triggering the 2007 electoral violence in Kenya, the 
international actors failed to denounce the politicization of the EC but rather legitimized it 
through their continuing financial support of the commission (Brown 2011). In spite of his 
international recognition as the country’s re-elected president, Kibaki’s legitimacy was 
questioned by the overwhelming majority of Kenyan population who took the matter to the 
streets.  To emphasize the record number of Kenyans in disagreement of the re-election of 
President Kibaki, Chege (2010) uses the phrase “Forty-One Tribe Against One.” This slogan 
simply means that out of the forty-two ethnic groups in Kenya, forty-one ethnic groups were 
pitted against Kibaki’s ethnic group, the Kikuyu, by the campaign of the opposition which 
accused the latter of obtaining preferential treatments from the government.  
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 Post-election conflicts may create fear among and within future voters, who can be hesitant 
to go to the polls and exercise their civic and fundamental rights to vote. Voter turnout in 
subsequent elections may be impacted or experience problems. This state of affairs will no 
doubt, have dire consequences on the country’s democratization process. In Cote d’Ivoire for 
example, the 2013 municipal and regional elections, despite being relatively peaceful, saw a 
record low turnout.  
 According to Inza Diomande, a spokesman for the Ivorian Independent Electoral 
Commission (CEI), only about 30 percent of the 5.7 million eligible voters turned out and cast 
their ballots during these local elections (Naharnet 2013). This low turnout not only was a result 
of a call for a mass boycott by the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI), the political party of the former 
Ivorian president, Laurent Gbagbo (who is now in The Hague for crimes against humanity), but 
also it is indicative of a bitter and persistent division between supporters of Gbagbo and the 
current Ivorian President, Alassane Ouattara. This bitterness between the two rival camps was a 
result of the disputed 2010 presidential elections that pushed the country into a civil war.  
 Analyzing violence through the lens of conflict management, Hoglund (2009) writes 
“violence may have a negative impact by polarizing the electorate along conflict lines and in 
extreme cases led to new outbursts of violence” (p. 413). An overwhelming majority of Ivoirians 
(about 70 percent), because of their bad experiences from previous post-election violence that 
occurred in the aftermath of both the 1999 and 2010 presidential elections, may have refrained 
from going to the polls in 2013 during the municipal and regional elections. The low turnout in 
these local elections can also be seen as “a trial run for the 2015 presidential election” (Naharnet 
2013). The report of low turnout in the 2013 Ivorian local elections is consistent with the fact 
that in most democracies local and regional elections tend to have much lower turnouts than 
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national elections because of less high profile candidates, less media coverage, and less interest 
among voters.  
 The 2013 post-election atmosphere in Cote d’Ivoire clearly shows that the country still faces 
significant threats to its current reconciliation talks that are necessary for its long-term stability. 
The long-term stability of the country remains a sine qua non condition for both the survival and 
consolidation of its “infant” democracy. Cote d’Ivoire is still struggling in its democratic 
transition stage. 
 Other instances exist where post-election conflicts have created a political atmosphere in 
which voters not only were psychologically traumatized but also were intimidated by the 
protagonists of the conflicts. For example, dissatisfied with the 2005 general elections in which 
the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and allied parties won 
an overwhelming majority of seats (about 70 percent of total seats) in their parliament, 
opposition candidates and their supporters took the matter to the streets. A score of protesters, 
mostly the leaders of the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD), were arrested and jailed. 
Many people were wounded and some deaths were registered as a result of the government 
response to anti-government demonstrations (Lyons 2006). 
 According to Lyons, journalists and civil society leaders were also arrested and the Ethiopian 
government decided to charge vocal human rights organizations and opposition leaders with 
treason. Such a political development or situation created a psychosis within many voters. These 
voters massively responded to the call by the political opposition parties to boycott the re-run 
elections in electoral districts where there was a disagreement between the coalition government 
and its political opponents over elections’ results.  
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 Post-election conflicts may generate the problem of refugees wherein peaceful citizens for 
fear of military repression leave their homes or countries for foreign places. This case existed 
after the 2005 presidential election in Togo where thousands of people were displaced and 
became refugees in their neighbor Benin to the east, and Ghana to the west. In post-conflict 
societies, as is the case in many African and Middle Eastern countries, candidates often withdrew 
their candidature if they had reason to believe that conditions for peaceful, free, and fair elections 
were not guaranteed by the government in power and that the victory of incumbents was 
regarded as a forgone conclusion. Candidates also called for a mass boycott to delegitimize 
elections’ outcomes if they believed that participating in such elections would lead to additional 
electoral violence. The opposition boycotted elections in many places across the globe.  
 In Burundi, for example, in the aftermath of the 2010 violent presidential election that took 
place on June 28, with the ruling party candidate Pierre Nkrunziza as the only candidate on the 
ballot after the resignation of his political opponents, the parliamentary elections of July 23, 2010 
were also boycotted by the opposition parties, leaving the country with a record low voter 
turnout (Coleman 2012). The country continues to experience post-election political violence 
orchestrated by both the former rebel forces known as the Forces Nationales de Liberation (FNL) 
or National Liberation Forces, and the militia group of the ruling National Council for the 
Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD). According to 
Human Rights Watch (2012),  
The political space in 2011 continued to narrow, with the CNDD-FDD still in a position 
of near monopoly following the main opposition parties’ boycott of the 2010 elections. 
The government continued to harass and intimidate journalists, lawyers, and civil society 
actors who exposed abuses, often labeling them opposition supporters.  
 
This description clearly shows the continuing violations of human rights in Burundi. The 
presence of harassment and intimidation nullifies any efforts toward the establishment of 
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electoral democracy. In a country where there is no guarantee of rights, especially freedom of 
expression and freedom of speech, people tend to live under a constant fear. Such a fear may also 
have been translated into a low turnout as the Burundian opposition candidates boycotted 
elections in 2010.    
 Other instances where boycotts were used as pressure tactics to delegitimize elections and 
election results include, but are not limited to, Zimbabwe (during the second round of the 2008 
presidential election); Togo (in the 2002 legislative and 2003 presidential elections); Ethiopia 
(repeatedly in 1992, 2000, and 2001) (African Election Database 2012); Afghanistan (during the 
second round of the presidential election in 2009); and Sri Lanka (in the 2004 general election) 
(see for example, Hoglund 2009); to name just a few.  In each of these countries, voters may 
have no incentives to go out and vote if their candidates resigned their candidatures. In such 
circumstances, voter turnout may be low, and this low turnout may be a hurdle to the 
democratization process in these countries. It may also affect the legitimacy of elections. 
 Political instability due to improprieties in elections may also have a huge impact on public 
opinion and public acceptability of elections as a means of transfer of power and democratic 
alternations. An in-depth analysis of the 2006 Afrobarometer surveys by Bekoe (2012: 5) reveals 
that in countries where elections have been violent, people tend to have “a less favorable opinion 
of ‘elections as a means to represent the true voice of the people in government’” than in 
countries where elections have been relatively peaceful or with no major incidence. Similarly, 
according to Bekoe (2012), people tend to have a more favorable view of democracy if they view 
their elections as transparent, free, and fair than if their elections lack transparency and fairness.  
 Last but not least, post-election conflicts can also weaken governmental institutions and, 
therefore, jeopardize the democratic process of the country, and in extreme cases, escalate to 
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civil wars. This situation was particularly evident in some post-conflict countries where parties 
turned to armed conflict after elections despite having peace agreements in place (Jarstad 2009). 
Although all cases cannot be discussed in detail in this thesis, I will mention some of the cases 
that most caught the attention of the international community. Examples of these post-conflict 
countries include Cambodia, Republic of Congo, Chad, and Uganda.  
 In Cambodia, after the Paris Agreement of 1991, the May 1993 elections did little to bring 
about peace. The Cambodian government forces and Khmer Rouge resorted to all out war as a 
way to resolve their differences. In the Republic of Congo, the Accord de Cessez-le-Feu (cease 
fire) et de Cessation des Hostilités of 1999 failed to prevent the 2002 post-election violence, 
which degenerated into a civil war. In the same year, armed conflict occurred in Chad despite the 
closeness of the January 2002 Tripoli 2 Agreement and the April 2002 elections. Uganda also 
experienced a violent and protracted armed conflict in the aftermath of the 2006 elections despite 
the implementation of the Yumbe Peace Agreement that was signed by the government and the 
Ugandan National Rescues Front at Yumbe Bona Ground in 2002, four years prior to the 
elections. 
 
1.4. Why Contemporary Africa? 
 Contemporary Africa is referred to here as Africa since 1990, a reference year of the call for 
multiparty systems and electoral democracy around the globe. Since then, elections in Africa 
have often been marred by conflicts and sometimes with violent conflicts. According to Salehyan 
and Linebarger (2013), from 1990 to 2011, most of the 685 conflict events identified by the 
Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD) across the continent were election-related conflicts. 
Salehyan and Linebarger (2013) note that: 
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Democracy is more likely to survive when there is a well-developed economy, a robust 
civic culture, and strong institutions such as an apt judiciary and limits on executive 
power that are able to channel social conflict by ensuring that political decision makers 
are held accountable. These additional elements help preserve the integrity of elections 
and provide assurances to the public that the democratic process will be allowed to take 
its course. 
 
Unfortunately, many African countries suffer from weak institutions, the lack of transparency 
and accountability in decision-making processes, the lack of separation of powers, and the non-
existent vibrant civil society, and underdeveloped economy. Consequently, elections in these 
countries have frequently been accompanied with violent conflicts. The continent was violently 
shaken by post-election conflicts for example, in 1992 and 2007 in Kenya, in 1994 in South 
Africa, in 1996 in Sierra Leone, in 2000 and 2010/2011 in Cote d’Ivoire, in 2003 and 2007 in 
Nigeria, in 2005 in Togo, and in 2006 in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Salehyan 
and Linebarger 2013, Straus and Taylor 2012).  
 According to Frazer (2011), Ethiopia, Liberia, Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda remain the most 
vulnerable cases of African countries that have at least once experienced post-election conflict. 
Due to the frequency of political instability and violence associated with post-election conflicts, 
there has been a negative image of African democracy. The 2012 Freedom House Report reveals 
that only 12 percent of Sub-Saharan African countries are totally free or democratic compared to 
71 percent in the Americas and 85 percent in Western Europe. Figure 1 below illustrates African 
democracy levels in comparison to the rest of the world. 
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Figure 1: Africa’s democracy level in comparative perspective 
 
 
Source: Freedom House 2011 
 
 These descriptive statistics show how poorly most countries in Africa are doing when it 
comes to embracing democratic culture. Free, transparent, and fair elections; respect for human 
rights; protection of the rights of minorities; majority rule; separation of power; and elimination 
of systemic corruption constitute major tenets of democracy. In many African countries, basic 
human rights are often violated and abused. In most cases, both the economic and political 
powers are concentrated in the hands of small groups of corrupt elites who forcefully preside 
over the destiny of their countries.  
 Since the adoption of multiparty systems in the 1990s in some African countries, many 
elections have been marred by violence and boycotts by political opponents who continue to 
question not only the fairness and the transparency of such elections but also the fairness of the 
electoral systems of their countries. The study of general patterns of electoral violence in all the 
50 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1990 and 2008 by Straus and Taylor (2012) shows 
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that, out of the 221 elections, about twenty percent were highly violent with generalized killing, 
repressive violence, and assassinations and torture. Thirty eight percent occurred with low levels 
of violence including intimidation and harassment. However, the study also finds that about 42 
percent of the 221 elections occurred peacefully or with no electoral violence.  
 The analysis of these data shows that about 58 percent of elections occurred with some kinds 
of violence. This fact indicates that in Sub-Saharan Africa, the likelihood of the occurrence of 
violent elections is greater than the occurrence of peaceful elections. This result is also 
significant and should catch the attention of policymakers, peace advocates, and experts in 
conflict management to try to find durable solutions that aim not only at ending post-election 
conflicts but also more importantly at preventing future election-related violence. 
 In March 2010 at the Conference on Preventing Electoral Violence in Accra, Ghana, the 
participants acknowledged the severity and the frequency of post-election conflict in Africa. 
According to Frazer (2011) the participants include “electoral commissioners; parliamentarians; 
Ministers of Information, Foreign Affairs, and Security; members of the United Nations and 
European Union; US Government officials; and non-governmental business leaders and 
academics” (p. 16). A conference of such a caliber does not occur often.  
 The stated objective of the conference was “to focus on effective prevention and the 
mitigation of violence through credible elections and good governance” (Center for International 
Policy & Innovation [CIPI], 29 March 2010). To achieve stated objective, the conference laid out 
six practical recommendations as an action plan, which includes: (1) dismantling the structures 
for violent political mobilization through citizen education and empowerment, (2) promoting 
adoption of core principles for conducting elections, (3) harmonizing codes of conduct across 
Africa, (4) strengthening the association of African electoral authorities (AAEA) to serve as a 
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resource for senior level election professionals, (5) promoting transparency of the electoral 
process, and (6) increase and support research agenda on electoral violence (CIPI, 29 March 
2010). However, the conference did little to prevent the 2012 electoral violence and military 
coup in Guinea-Bisseau, and 2013 election-day violence in which about 15 people in Kenya 
were killed.   
 Between 1990 and 2010, the time period that is the focus of this dissertation, the SCAD 
reported an estimated 2,652 deaths in the top ten most violent African elections. These deaths 
were recorded during election months alone. Out of these 2,652 deaths, the Kenyan 2007 
electoral violence claimed the lion share with 1502 deaths (Salehyan and Linebarger 2013). 
These deaths were directly related to elections. Table 1.2 below displays the circumstances, 
dates, and places of these top ten most violent elections. The death toll of the horror of the 2010 
Ivorian post-election crisis was not included in the SCAD report or these figures would be even 
higher.  
Table 1.2: Top Ten Violent Elections in Africa, 1990-20105 
Country Election Date Number of 
Deaths 
Kenya December 2007 1502 
South Africa April 1994 239 
Nigeria April 2007 226 
Cote d’Ivoire October 2000 178 
Kenya December 1992 156 
Zimbabwe March 2008 114 
Togo April 2005 110 
Nigeria April 2003 57 
DRC October 2006 42 
Sierra Leone February 28 
Total 2652 
Source: SCAD. See also Salehyan and Linebarger (2013) 
                                                           
5
 The table summarizing the top ten most violent African elections is a collaborative work of Idean Salehyan, an 
associate professor of Political Science at the University of North Texas and an associate at the Robert S. Strauss 
Center for International Security and Law and Christopher Linebarger, a PhD student in International Relations and 
Comparative Politics at the University of North Texas.  
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 The SCAD report indicates that not only do electoral conflicts occur frequently in Africa, 
but also they have devastating effects on the continent’s democratization process. If the 
establishment of democracy is the ultimate goal in order to ensure good governance and 
sustainable peace and development in Africa, then, as Bekoe (2012) has suggested, electoral 
violence should be an explanatory variable regarding conditions of survival and consolidation of 
democracy.  
Many countries in contemporary Africa have been experiencing post-election conflicts 
since 1990. For this reason, this thesis will: (1) examine the relationship between post-election 
conflict and electoral systems; (2) examine the impact of a critical intervening variable: electoral 
system type on the main types of electoral conflicts (i.e. identity conflict, campaign conflict, 
balloting conflict, and results conflict); and (3) provide policy recommendations on how to 
reduce or eliminate the frequent occurrence of post-election political unrest. The section below 
provides the structure of the thesis and discusses how the study is carried out. 
 
1.5. Overview of the Thesis 
The thesis is structured in six chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the topic, discusses the 
importance of studying post-election conflicts, and explains the choice of Africa and some 
specific cases as the area of study. Chapter 2 covers two important aspects of the thesis. First, it 
presents the review of the existing literature on post-election conflicts, their origins and 
consequences. In the literature, the author specifically looks at possible definitions of post-
election conflicts and political instability. The author then discusses the correlation between the 
two concepts and how they can affect the legitimacy of elections and countries’ democratization 
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processes. The author also identifies and conceptualizes the various types of electoral conflicts 
including identity conflict, campaign conflict, balloting conflict, and results conflict.   
The literature also addresses possible roles of elections in African politics and discusses 
the relationship between neo-patrimonialism and elections’ outcomes. After defining a critical 
control variable, that is, social cleavages, the author presents and discusses how their presence 
might affect the electoral systems designs in Africa and vice versa. Furthermore, the author 
argues in this chapter that the presence of ethnic heterogeneity alone normally does not ignite a 
conflict, in this context, post-election conflict, but a conflict can erupt if ethnic groups are 
manipulated by leaders for their political ambitions. Second, these four key theories—the Social 
Cleavages and Party System Theory (SCPST), the Bounded Rationality Theory (BRT), Relative 
Deprivation Theory (RDT), and the Democratization Approach (DA)—provide a theoretical 
framework for analyzing and explaining the frequency of post-election conflicts and electoral 
behavior in Africa.  
Chapter 3 discusses the data and methods used in this thesis.  In order to get the variables 
that are critical for this study so as to thoroughly address the theoretical question being 
investigated, that is, “In Contemporary Africa, why do some countries tend to experience post-
election conflict while others do not?”, this chapter  takes a step back and lays out  two testable 
hypotheses as follows:  
(H1): In Africa, countries that use majoritarian electoral systems are more likely to experience 
post-election conflicts than countries that use proportional representative electoral systems; 
(H2): In Africa, countries that use majoritarian electoral systems are more likely to experience 
post-election conflicts than countries that use mixed electoral systems. 
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 In addition, chapter 3 provides a comprehensive definition of the dependent variable, that 
is, post-election conflict, and takes appropriate steps to measure both the dependent variable 
(DV) and independent variables (IV), including but not limited to, the types of electoral systems, 
effectiveness of elections, disproportional index, ethnic fractionalization index, living standard, 
level of education, and the level of inequality. This chapter also examines the mixed method 
approach adopted in this thesis.  Such a method is conducted in two phases.  
In phase I, secondary quantitative data are used and issues regarding the reliability of 
sources are addressed. Because of the continuous DV, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
analysis is run to determine the effect of election systems type on the post-election conflict in all 
African nations that hold elections. Matching pattern is used in phase II, as in-depth comparative 
case studies of six African states (as described earlier in the section of the statement of the 
problem), to determine in detail why countries, despite using similar electoral systems, 
experience electoral conflicts at different levels.  
Chapter 4 discusses variations in electoral systems in contemporary Africa. It generally 
looks at electoral systems in democratizing countries and examines the African models. It also 
addresses questions concerning rules that govern elections and electoral processes and how such 
rules may hinder or promote democracy in Africa. Chapter 4 also examines the relationship 
between elections and party systems. 
In an in-depth comparative analysis, chapter 5 sheds light on how the political institutions 
function and how these institutions influence people’s voting behavior in each of the six 
countries—Benin, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Togo, and Senegal—selected for this study. It 
also investigates whether previous elections in each of these cases are competitive, free and fair, 
and/or legitimate.  The chapter discusses how elections are sequenced, managed, and monitored. 
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The role of civil society and traditional authorities in promoting democracy and conflict 
mitigation is also discussed in chapter 5. The chapter also addresses a critically important 
question, that is, “What are the consequences of electoral systems and the rules of the game on 
democratic alternations?” Such a question, at least in the context of Africa, is not yet widely 
studied by either scholars in academe or practitioners in the field of conflict management.  
Chapter 6 emphasizes the importance of electoral systems and the role they play in 
conflict management and resolution in general and in the prevention of post-election conflicts in 
particular. After a critical analysis of the devastating effects of post-election conflicts on Africa’s 
development, governance, and democratization, the chapter outlines a series of lessons learned 
based on past electoral malpractices across the continent. Furthermore, chapter 6 underlines and 
discusses the policy implications of this study. This chapter also sums up the main findings of 
the thesis and discusses their significance with regard to the emergence, survival, and 
consolidation of democracy as well as the prevention of post-election conflict in contemporary 
Africa. It finally discusses the limitations of the study and establishes the ground for further 
investigations into post-election conflicts beyond the African continent.                                                                                                
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CHAPTER TWO 
UNDERSTANDING POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE IN AFRICA 
 
2.1 Literature Review 
Political stability plays a paramount role in the consolidation of democracy. In places where 
political instability reigns as a result of frequent electoral violence or other forms of major 
conflict, any endeavors toward political liberalization and economic development become 
problematic. If establishing democracy requires holding elections, and if African elections often 
degenerate into violence, then why are elections necessary instruments of legitimacy? What are 
the potential causes of conflict after elections? What are the necessary conditions for holding free 
and fair elections that are indispensable for the emergence and survival of democracy in Africa?  
The literature review discusses these questions in depth so as to provide a better 
understanding of the main purpose of this study and help answer the research question, “In 
Africa, why do some countries tend to experience post-election conflict while others do not?” 
Preventing electoral conflicts requires a total elimination of biased rules of the electoral game 
and an understanding of “unbiased” rules and especially their fair application. Given that all 
electoral rules include some biases, it is the fair implementation of such rules that is most critical 
in the prevention of electoral conflict. But before exploring the existing literature on electoral 
violence, let us first and foremost define the concept of conflict, identify various types of 
electoral conflicts, and discuss potential root causes of post-election instability. 
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2.1.1. Definition of Conflict and Causes of Post-Election Instability 
 In this section, I adopt the conceptual definition of the two categories of conflict (violent 
and nonviolent conflicts) from the 2006 HIIK Conflict Barometer, operationalize each category, 
and discuss potential sources of political instability. 
2.1.1.1. Defining Post-Election Conflicts and Political Instability 
Conflict is defined here as the result of an incompatibility of goals, objectives, and 
interests of parties involved in the struggle for power and/or allocation of scarce resources. The 
definition of the term “conflict” is not as simple as it appears. The complexity of conflict 
requires researchers and scholars to categorize conflict into two types: non-violent and violent 
conflicts. Violent conflicts occur in many forms including crisis, severe crisis, civil war, attacks 
on the regime, violent protests, and riots (Franke, Hampel-Milagrosa, and Schure 2007).6 By 
contrast, non-violent conflicts are observable conflict behaviors, such as peaceful 
demonstrations, boycotts, rallies, and sit-ins that can contribute to potential conflicts if they are 
perceived and reacted to. While the classification of conflict into violent and non-violent 
conflicts is both creative and interesting, it is not comprehensive enough to empirically help 
explain potential causes of electoral conflicts as it fails to discuss conflict within the rules of the 
electoral system and outside existing system rules. 
In the context of elections, Straus and Taylor (2012) define electoral violence as 
“physical violence and coercive intimidation directly tied to an impending electoral contest or an 
                                                           
6
 According to the 15th Annual Conflict Analysis of the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research 
(HIIK), a crisis is “a tense situation in which at least one of the parties uses violent force in sporadic incidents” and a 
severe crisis is defined as a crisis in which “violent force is repeatedly used in an organized way.” HIIK also defines 
a war as “a type of violent conflict in which violent force is used with a certain continuity in an organized and 
systematic way. The conflicting parties exercise extensive measures, depending on the situation. The extent of 
destruction is massive and of long duration.” An extensive discussion on crisis, severe crisis, and war is available at: 
http://www.hiik.de/konfliktbarometer/pdf/ConflictBarometer_2006.pdf 
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announced electoral result” (p. 19). Such violence also includes the use of threats of physical 
harm by at least a stakeholder that has vested interests in elections and electoral outcomes. 
Outside existing electoral system rules, it is very important to determine whether violence is 
committed by the ruling party and supporters to maintain power or by the opposition parties to 
challenge the outcomes of the elections and, therefore, change the status quo (Straus and Taylor 
2009). Most importantly, regardless of who uses violence for a political gain, how it is reported 
remains a key empirical question when it comes to conducting a comprehensive analysis of 
electoral conflict. Straus and Taylor (2009: 21) identify four levels of electoral violence: 1) no 
reported violence throughout the entire electoral process, ranging from pre- to post-election; 2) 
violent harassment (police or security forces breaking up rallies, party supporters brawling in the 
streets, confiscation of opposition newspapers, candidate disqualifications, and limited short-
term arrests of political opponents); 3) violent repression, which includes high-level 
assassinations and targeted murder,  continuous high-level arrests of party leaders, long-term 
violent intimidation and torture; and 4) violent campaign with generalized violence including 
widespread physical attacks and massive killings.  
Another way to discuss electoral conflict is to look within the rules of the electoral 
system and discuss parties’ motives to embrace violent conflict behaviors. According to 
Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall (2011: 7-8),  
Conflict is universal feature of human society. It takes its economic differentiation, social 
change, cultural formation, psychological development and political organization –all of 
which are inherently conflictual –and becomes overt through the formation of conflict 
parties, which come to have, or are perceived to have, mutually incompatible goals. 
 
In the same order of ideas, Deutsch, Coleman, and Marcus (2006) contend that “conflict is often 
a means of seeking or maintaining the balance of or imbalance of power in relationships” (p. 
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120). These two quotations capture well what motivates parties to engage in violent conflicts 
during electoral processes. In the context of elections, the ruling party or a coalition government 
may want to maintain the status quo by preventing its political opposition parties the access to 
power through elections while the opposition parties may seek change or opportunity for change. 
How can a ruling party or coalition government maintain the status quo? An answer to such a 
question can be found in Cox (1997)’s discussion on what he called “coordination failures and 
democratic performance” (p. 223). The author identifies three main ways by which political 
opposition parties can be prevented access to power.  
First, the ruling party may decide to make the electoral system stronger. According to 
Cox (1997), “Increasing the strength of the electoral system will decrease the representativeness 
of the polity’s legislative and executive branches but will increase government stability” (p. 
225). As the electoral system becomes stronger, smaller parties may not be able to win seats in 
parliaments and, therefore, will be excluded from the decision-making processes. Second, 
governments can deny their political opponents access to power by “sustaining dominant party 
systems” (p. 238). If the electoral system does not allow opposition parties to coordinate at the 
electoral stage, these parties may fail to agree on a mutually acceptable compromise that may 
help them compete in elections against the dominant party and possibly win seats. Coordination 
failures help to perpetuate the dominant party in power (Cox 1997).  
Third, the dominant party prevents peaceful and democratic alternations by provoking 
“short-lived but very intense disruptions of traditional patterns of voting behavior” (p. 251), 
and/or making sure that the main political party is fragmented. In such circumstances, the 
dominant party may either provide incentives for voters so that they can switch their partisan 
voting habits or dictate to them how to vote and threaten them with retaliation if they vote 
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otherwise. The costs of coordination failures are in most cases extremely high. If parties failed to 
coordinate, the situation may lead to violent and deadly conflicts, especially where the 
legitimacy of the government is put into question. The most recent example of such conflicts in 
Africa is the 2010 post-election crisis in Cote d’Ivoire where thousands of people were killed.  
In the section below, I discuss various types of electoral conflicts, including identity, 
campaign, balloting, results, and representation conflicts.  
 
2.1.1.2. Types of Electoral Conflicts 
 Fischer (2002), an election expert of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems 
(IFES), identifies and discusses five possible types of electoral conflicts that may occur during 
an election chronology. These interrelated conflicts include identity, campaign, balloting, results, 
and representation conflicts. In this thesis, I adopt this typology of electoral conflicts to help 
explain why some African countries tend to experience electoral violence while others do not.  
 
a.) Identity Conflict 
In the context of elections, identity conflict occurs during the voter registration process 
when within a country some citizens are denied their voting rights. They may be treated as 
second-class citizens or illegal immigrants. With that status, they may be unable to clearly 
establish their national identities or citizenships, and therefore, will not be able to register to 
vote.  Denying any citizen or groups of citizens—assuming that these people are actually 
legitimate, legal citizens—their basic civic rights does nothing but incite them to resort to 
violence. 
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Horowitz (2001)’s discussion of ethnic violence as a specific example of identity conflict 
identifies pre-emptive strikes, break-outs, and lock-ins as patterns of ethnic violence that occur in 
the early phases of elections.  These three patterns of ethnic violence are discriminatory in 
nature.  The main objective of pre-emptive strikes is to enhance one party’s winning chances at 
the expenses of the other or others as with new voter ID laws in some U.S. states. In other words, 
“pre-emptive strikes are aimed at enhancing a particular community’s chances of electoral 
success, for example by driving out, intimidating or otherwise influencing voters whose vote is 
assumed to go to a different political party” (Wolff 2006: 13). In electoral contests, pre-emptive 
strikes are often used by politicians to eliminate their political opponents and their supporters. 
For example, in Cote d’Ivoire, the current Ivorian President, Alassane Ouattara, because of his 
parents’ status as immigrants, was repeatedly excluded from contesting presidential elections 
after the death of President Houphouet Boigny.  
However, when there is a need to broaden their political base, politicians sometimes use 
break-outs that consist of making refugees and other non-citizens (for example) members of their 
political parties and providing them with party identification cards and voter registration cards to 
allow them to cast the ballots in their favor. Wolff (2006) writes, “Break-outs often happen in the 
form of attempts to broaden the base of an existing political party to expand beyond its 
traditional core ethnic constituency,” (p. 13) (quoted in Horowitz 2001, pp. 295-308). This 
break-outs strategy surfaces in the 2012 elections in Ghana when the main opposition party, the 
New Patriotic Party (NPP), accused the ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC) of inflating 
the list of registered voters with non-Ghanaians.  
According to Horowitz (2001), both pre-emptive strikes and break-outs threaten not only 
the prospect of other political parties but also their mere existence. Because no political party 
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leaders would want the survival of their parties threatened by their counterparts, the likelihood to 
engage in violence as a way to deal with such threats increases even before the election takes 
place. As Fischer (2002) notes, it is too simplistic to say that identity conflict in the electoral 
contests occurs in the registration process. Wolff (2006), who discusses what Horowitz (2001), 
calls “lock-ins” as a type of ethnic violence in particular and identity conflict in general, argues 
that identity conflict occurs even beyond the voter registration process given that it is often one 
of the main sources of post-election conflict. Lock-ins happen when “elections confirm the 
continuation of dominant, demographic majorities” (Wolff 2006: 20) through the use of 
illegitimate methods, including the gerrymandering technique, whereby boundaries of electoral 
districts are drawn to unfairly increase the dominant party’s winning chances. If the electorate 
were expecting a change, or more specifically, a democratic alternation, but an election 
confirmed the status quo (through breakouts or ins), post-election violence would be a more 
likely result.      
 
b.) Campaign Conflict  
 During any election season, campaigns are organized to persuade registered voters to 
elect one candidate or party over others running for the same public offices. To appeal to voters, 
candidates have to know voters’ needs, concerns, and interests, and be able to convey their 
message that addresses such needs and interests. Any successful campaign requires all kinds of 
resources including, but not limited to, human, material, and financial resources. Conflict often 
occurs because of the scarcity of such resources. Political parties and their candidates fight over 
those resources. For example, how is access to the media distributed among parties or candidates 
to the elections? During presidential elections, are candidates free to campaign throughout the 
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country? In legislative contests, do all candidates have equal access to voters in their 
constituencies regardless of their ethnic and/or religious backgrounds?  
Once candidates and their supporters realize that these scare resources are not equitably 
distributed, the occurrence of violence is more likely during election campaigns. In the 2009 
UNDP Elections and Conflict Prevention Guide, campaign conflict is defined as “efforts to 
intimidate or influence voters and candidates, and efforts to affect participation (usually to limit 
it through creating insecurity)” (p. 21). Campaigns are often disrupted, and voters and candidates 
are intimidated. As an immediate consequence, participation in voting may be negatively 
impacted (Fischer 2002).  
Similarly, Bratton (2008) argues that “threats of violence lead to an especially sharp 
reduction in voter turnout” (p. 2). In Mali for example, due to internal strife and voter 
intimidation, voter turnout has been consistently low (below 40 percent) since 1992. In Malian 
parliamentary elections, voter turnout was 21.09 percent in 1992, 21.58 percent in 1997, 26.00 
percent in 2002, and 32.19 percent in 2007. In presidential contests in Mali, although voter 
turnout seems to have a slight increase compared to that of Malian parliamentary elections, it has 
been below 40 percent. In 1992, 1997 and 2007, the voter turnouts in the country presidential 
elections were 20.9 percent, 28.41 percent, and 36.24 percent, respectively. The highest voter 
turnout in Malian presidential elections was 38.57 percent. It occurred in 2002 (International 
IDEA 2011).  
Many African election campaigns are marred by violent clashes between supporters of 
different rival groups. According to Teshome (2009), countries like Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Mozambique, Tanzania, Togo, and Zimbabwe, to name just a few, have been experiencing 
violent election campaigns since 1991. Even Ghana, which is known recently for holding 
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peaceful and democratic elections in Africa, experienced pre-election violence that killed “three 
people and injured many others in northern Ghana” (IRIN News 2008). During election 
campaigns in Ghana, not only are anti-government demonstrations dispersed by the security 
forces loyal to the ruling party, but also peaceful campaign rallies are often attacked or restricted 
(IRIN News 2008). 
Teshome (2009) pinpoints the daunting problems facing East African countries when it 
comes to establishing democracy in the region. He argues that the main handicap of Africa’s 
democracy is with no doubt the frequency of political and electoral violence. Teshome (2009) 
then notes, “The most common types of political and electoral violence in East Africa include 
abduction and kidnapping, assault, violent disruption of political meetings and rallies, murder 
attempts, murder, hooliganism, torture, arson, death threats and threats to violence” (p. 464).  In 
general, how election campaigns were conducted by political actors gives a preview of how the 
polling day will look.  There is a high likelihood that violent election campaigns lead to a high 
level of violence at the polling stations.  However, despite pre-election tensions in Lesotho and 
post-Arab Spring Egypt and Libya, peaceful elections were held (The Nordic Africa Institute 
2012/3).    
 
c.) Balloting Conflict  
Balloting conflict happens on election days at the polling stations (Fischer 2002, Bratton 
2008, and UNDP 2009). Bratton (2008: 2) conducted a critical analysis of the 2007 Nigerian 
elections and noted, 
Voting for President and National Assembly failed to take place in certain polling 
stations in a half dozen states in the southeast and northeast due to the non-delivery of 
electoral materials. In numerous other locations across the country, ballot papers were 
misprinted or arrived late. In the southern Niger Delta zone, armed militias brazenly stole 
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ballot boxes or substituted pre-stuffed containers of their own. Despite guarantees from 
the Inspector General of Police that public security would be assured, opposition 
candidates were harassed or arrested, voters were turned away from polling places by 
gangs of young thugs, ballot secrecy was  violated by party workers and police, and some 
300 persons were killed in election related violence. 
 
The quote cited above shows how violence, corruption and misuse of political power are still 
dominating Nigerian politics. Achebe (1967) demonstrates how the Honorable Chief Nanga used 
greedy and violent means, including trying to bribe and proceed with the arrest of his opponents 
(Max and Odili) and supporters, killing Max, and stuffing ballot boxes in order to win elections 
against his main challenger, Odili. Practically, in Nigerian politics there is no change from when 
Achebe wrote his A Man of the People. The Nigerian case is just an example among others in 
Africa. Besides electoral improprieties such as ballot rigging and stuffing, intimidations, 
harassments, and arrests of political opponents and their supporters, it is not a surprise to learn 
that both sides (the ruling party and its political opposition) may engage in reciprocal accusations 
of fraud on Election Day (Teshome 2009, IciLomé.com 1 August 2013). Palpable examples of 
African elections where accusations and counter accusations between rival camps escalated into 
post-election mayhem include, but are not limited to, the 2005 parliamentary elections in 
Ethiopia; the presidential elections in Togo (2005 and 2010), in Kenya (2007 and 2012), and in 
Cote d’Ivoire (2010); and the legislative and presidential elections in Zimbabwe (2008 and 
2013). 
Allegations of fraud on Election Day make all stakeholders, including election observers, 
aware of the possible unfairness of the elections so that they can find a remedy to the situation.  
As the Democratic Governance Group and Bureau for Development Policy (2009) note, if 
parties’ concerns about electoral fraud are not seriously addressed by election management 
commissions or elections’ administrators, then election materials, such as ballot boxes can be 
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stolen or physically attacked, voters may be intimidated and decide not to turn out to vote, and/or 
Election Day may turn bloody as rebel forces or government forces for that matter—if fearing a 
loss—may use firearms and seize power as a way to stall political log-jam.  
 
d.) Results Conflict 
If the registration stage of elections and election campaigns are crucial in setting the tone 
of whether such elections will be fair and transparent or not, the period between voting and the 
proclamation of election results are also crucial in determining the fate of parties and their 
candidates. In many countries, electoral commissions play an important role in the credibility of 
both the electoral process and elections results. The electoral commissions are responsible for 
handling a series of duties, such as voter registration, ensuring that only legal citizens and 
eligible voters were those on the voters’ registry and that no voter registered twice. In addition, 
the electoral commissions manage campaigns for various electoral contests, such as local, 
legislative or parliamentary and presidential elections (Sabastiano 2006). The electoral 
commissioners assume the responsibility for the delivery of electoral kits or materials to polling 
stations as well as dispatching members of polling stations and polling officers to ensure not only 
the security of voters, but also the security of the ballot boxes and the serenity of Election Days.  
The electoral commissions are also in charge of recruiting international election 
observers, who according to Sabastiano (2006: 2), are able to: (i) demonstrate a track record of 
credibility; (ii) demonstrate neutrality in elections; (iii) illustrate that governance is a key aspect 
of their activities; (iv) submit timely written observation reports; (v) meet their upkeep expenses; 
and (vi) comply with guidelines to be issued by the electoral commissions. Vote counting and the 
proclamation of election results are also key responsibilities of the electoral commissions. “The 
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people who cast the votes don’t decide an election, the people who count the votes do,” said 
Joseph Stalin (quoted in Popovic, Milivojevic, and Djinovic 2006, p. 16). The credibility of 
elections results depends on both the credibility of the electoral commissions and the 
trustworthiness of these commissions and accredited international observers. 
 When parties have reasons to strongly believe that elections were fraudulent, that the 
electoral commissions and international observers failed to demonstrate their neutrality and 
impartiality during the electoral process, and that they have no chances of winning and that there 
are no independent legal institutions or election dispute mechanisms to correct elections’ 
improprieties, violence becomes a potential ultimate option to them. Similar to balloting conflict, 
results conflict may be characterized by (1) armed clashes among political parties, (2) violent 
clashes among groups of rival supporters, (3) vandalism and physical attacks on property of 
opponents, and (4) targeted attacks against specific candidates or political parties (Democratic 
Governance Group and Bureau for Development Policy 2009: 21), or peaceful demonstrations 
which may be repressed by security forces loyal to the regime as was the case in Egypt where 
over two hundred civilians were killed and about two thousand people injured (Mohyeldin, 
Engel, and Arkin 2013, Hendawi and Michael 2013). 
 
e.) Representation Conflict 
Fischer (2002) writes, “Representation conflict can occur when elections are organized as 
‘zero sum’ and where ‘losers’ are left out of participation in governance” (p. 10). It seems that 
Fischer is only alluding to post-election period when he talks of “governance.” After a critical 
analysis of the chronology of the discussion on the types of electoral conflict, I argue that 
representation conflict can also be discussed even before identity conflict. The issue of 
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representation emerges even before election date is decided. For example, during the process of 
redistributing electoral districts, the dominant party may use gerrymandering practices with a 
hope to establish a political advantage over its opponents and secure its majority in subsequent 
parliamentary elections. The electoral map of Cameroon provides a good example of 
gerrymandering or what Ochieng’ Opalo (2012) called “strategic legislative malapportionment” 
(p. 81). According to Ochieng’ Opalo (2012), Cameroonian president, Paul Biya’s “home region 
of South Province, for instance, has five MPs representing 121,000 inhabitants while North West 
Province, and opposition bastion, also have five MPs—but they represent 313,000 people” (p. 
88). Electoral malpractices of this kind have helped Biya and his Cameroon People’s Democratic 
Movement (CPDM) to enjoy landslide victories election after election since 1992. 
Political actors talk of representation during discussions about the composition of 
election management commissions (EMC) that must be in charge of the organization and 
administration of elections. Which party must be a member of EMC and which one should be 
excluded? What quota of representation can each party get? What will the threshold of 
representation be? What role can each participant play in the commission and how? and 
international observers participate and what role will they play? Representation conflict erupts as 
tension increases around the debate about who gets “what, when, and how” in the EMC.  
Other kinds of representation conflict surface in the post-election era when losers are not 
included in the administration of their country’s economic, cultural, and socio-political affairs. 
Reynolds, Reilly, and Ellis (2008) discuss in-depth the concept of “representation” in terms of 
geography, ideology, political party, and social fabric (gender, age, class, ethnicity, religion, etc.) 
of the country. First, since in much of Africa ethnicity and geography coincide, does each region 
have representative(s) in the legislature? If so, are all regions equally or proportionally 
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represented? Second, are all political ideologies within the country represented in the legislature? 
Finally, as Reynolds, et al. (2008) point out, “the legislature should be to some degree a ‘mirror 
of the nation’ which should look, feel, think and act in a way which reflects the people as whole” 
(p. 9).  Countries may experience a representation conflict if the legitimacy of their legislatures is 
in doubt. For instance, during the apartheid era (1948-1990), elections in South Africa were 
“white-only’ elections (African Election Database 2011).  
Indeed, when the Afrikaner National Party (NP), a party of white minority in South 
Africa, “won” a general election in 1948, the apartheid policy was established to protect the 
political and socio-economic interests of the minority white population. Because of its monopoly 
of the House of Assembly, the NP was able to enact discriminatory laws and policies that 
prevented the majority black population from sharing South Africa’s scarce resources. This 
minority population of about 5 million of whites at the time controlled 87 percent of land and 
other economic assets at the expense of 33 million of blacks and colored people, including the 
Indians (Ottaway 1993). Because the majority black population suffered discrimination as a 
result of lack of representation in the House of Assembly, they engaged in the struggle against 
the apartheid or racial discrimination via legitimate revolutions that paved the way for South 
Africa’s democratic transition in 1994. 
 In all, conflict is inherent in human nature. As long as human beings continue to interact 
among themselves, conflict is unavoidable. However, violent conflicts are destructive and, 
therefore, must be avoided. Van der Stoel (1994) argues that violent conflicts can be prevented 
and/or avoided if their origins or sources are carefully identified and addressed in the early stages 
assuming there is no core value conflict. The section below turns to a discussion of the potential 
causes of electoral conflicts. 
A Preventive Approach to Post-Election Conflicts in Contemporary Africa                           Edoh Agbehonou 
 
43 
 
2.1.1.3. Potential Causes of Post-Election Instability 
Numerous scholars of African studies (such as Williams 2011, Akokpari 2008, Mazrui 
2008, Zeleza 2008, and Alao 2007) have been writing on issues such as military coups, natural 
resource conflicts, and identity-based conflicts and how to deal with them. However, despite the 
multiplicity of studies on current conflicts in Africa, little effort has been made to isolate and 
study post-election conflicts in Africa and how to prevent such conflicts from arising. This study 
attempts to fill this gap in the existing literature.   
Fischer (2002) combines the two concepts—conflict and violence—and argues that, to 
some extent, conflict and violence impact electoral processes the same way. However, he argues 
that their nuances remain in what he calls “the magnitude of the victimization” (p. 9). According 
to Fischer (2002), “electoral conflict and violence can be defined as any random or organized act 
that seeks to determine, or otherwise influence an electoral process through threat, verbal 
intimidation, hate speech, disinformation, physical assault, forced ‘protection,’ blackmail, 
destruction of property, or assassination” (p. 8). These terms are used in my analysis of types of 
post-election violence. Fischer (2002) also identifies five potential types of conflicts that often 
occur during an election process. These types include identity conflict during the voter 
registration stage, campaign conflict, balloting conflict, results conflict, and representation 
conflict (as discussed earlier).  
By definition, political violence takes several forms, including armed revolution, civil 
strife, institutionalized military repression, intimidation and periodic arrest, and assassination of 
political leaders and their supporters. Ong’ayo (2008) discusses the association between political 
violence and political instability. The author argues that during the 1990s the leadership in most 
African countries have had difficulty accepting the multi-party system as one of the 
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preconditions for the emergence of democracy. These African political leaders “did not fully 
embrace the changes that accompanied the transition” (p. 6). The reluctance of these leaders to 
cope with these new changes has been one of the root causes of political instability in many 
African countries.  
Most literature on political violence and civil war has focused on economic indicators 
that are more likely to signal countries’ vulnerability to civil war (Gleditsch and Ruggery 2010). 
Such indicators include, but are not limited to, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, the size 
of country’s population, employment and wages, productivity, inequality, consumer price index 
(CPI), food shortage, financial meltdown, economic depression (Abrahamian 2009: 162), and 
social exclusion (Gurr 1968).  
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) also show a linkage between GDP per capita and conflict. 
They argue that the higher the GDP per capita, the lower the potential for conflict. Although 
focusing mainly on economic grievances as potential root causes of instability has been useful, it 
has failed to show the big picture when it comes to identifying and understanding the overall 
determinants of political instability. For example, in studying a causal model of civil strife, Gurr 
(1968) finds that “a psychological variable, relative deprivation, is the basic precondition for 
civil strife of some kind, and that the more widespread and intense deprivation is among 
members of a population, the greater is the magnitude of strife in one or another form” (p. 1104). 
To Gurr, the concept of relative deprivation is defined as the perceived discrepancy that exists 
among members of a society about what they have and what they feel that they ought to have.  
Theoretically, if a group of people within a society perceives that it is relatively deprived 
compared to other groups within the same society, it is more likely that the deprived group will 
expresses frustration and aggression toward the authority and or the privileged groups (Brush 
A Preventive Approach to Post-Election Conflicts in Contemporary Africa                           Edoh Agbehonou 
 
45 
 
1996, Gurr 1968). Many current conflicts in Africa can be explained through the lens of relative 
deprivation. Examples of such conflicts include, but are not limited to, the current Malian crisis 
in which the Touaregs feel that they have been excluded from sharing their country’s resources 
(land, political power, etc.), and the Ivorian civil war after the late President Felix Houphouet 
Boigny. Social exclusion in these countries has been going on for decades. The impact of relative 
deprivation is moderated in many ways by intervening variables such as “coercive potential, 
institutionalization, and social facilitation” (Gurr 1968: 1104). Defining the following variables 
has a significant importance for clarification purposes. The first variable is coercive potential. 
The term coercive potential refers to the degree to which people are affected by deprivation. It 
also denotes the intensity of deprivation and multidimensional deprivation (Whelan and Maître 
2005). The second intervening variable that moderates the relative deprivation is 
institutionalization.  
According to Collins English Dictionary, institutionalization is “the act or process of 
establishing something as a custom or common practice”. In his discussion of relative 
deprivation, Gurr (1968) defines the term institutionalization as “the extent to which societal 
structures beyond the primary level are broad in scope, command substantial resources and/or 
personnel, and are stable and persisting” (p. 1105). Theoretically, the existence of such structures 
minimizes the occurrence of civil strife and political instability (Huntington 1965, Kornhauser 
1959). The third variable is social facilitation. By definition, social facilitation denotes the 
existence of conditions that facilitate mass mobilization and uprisings. As Gurr (1968) notes it, 
“populations in which strife is chronic tend to develop, by an interaction process, a set of beliefs 
justifying violent response to deprivation” (p. 1106). The magnitude of strife is, therefore, 
proportional to the level of social facilitation. The long term relative deprivation remains thus the 
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main cause of civil strife and political instability in many divided societies in transition to 
democracy.  
Schnytzer (1994) and Gurr (1970), argue that major explanatory factors of democratic 
deficit—lack of civil liberties, lack of political rights and lack of opportunities for political 
participation—may also create room for violent anti-government uprisings (quoted in Gleditsch 
and Ruggery 2010: 301). These factors of democratic deficit have produced relative deprivation 
in many regions and countries, such as Middle East and North Africa, where there are ongoing 
anti-government uprisings or Arab Spring (Baroi 2012, Fahmy 2012, Byman 2011), and South 
Africa under the apartheid regime (Lodge 2009, Ottaway 1993).  
With the exception of Nazi Germany and contemporary China, countries that have strong 
political institutions are less likely to experience political violence than countries that do not 
(Sander, Tschirhart and Cauley 1983). For instance, in 2005 in Togo, after the abrupt death of the 
longtime dictator, President Eyadéma Gnassingbé, the country experienced a bloody political 
transition as a result of non-compliance with the Togolese Constitution by the ruling party. Faure 
Gnassingbé, a son of the late president became first, an interim president by a constitutional coup 
and second, the country’s president through the 2005 electoral holdup (Bertelsmann Stiftung’s 
Transformation [BIT] 2012).  This constitutional coup was possible in Togo not only because of 
the state’s monopoly of the military and security forces as a means of regime maintenance, but 
also most importantly because of a lack of strong institutions, including the constitution.  
In Guinea, a military coup led by Captain Dadis Camara followed the announcement of 
the death of President Lassana Conté in 2009. However, when a similar scenario occurred in 
2012 in Ghana, the political transition following the death of the Ghanaian president Atta Mills 
went smoothly without violence. The country’s Vice President became the Interim President and 
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finished the four remaining months of the mandate of his predecessor. He then prepared and held 
multiparty democratic elections in December 2012 and won the presidency for another four 
years.  
Given that Togo and Guinea are not yet full democracies while Ghana is (Freedom House 
2012, African Election Database 2011), these cases illustrate how democracies with strong 
institutions and leaders that are imbibed in democratic values rely heavily on such institutions to 
mitigate their political crises. In addition, according to Afrobarometer Round 5, an online survey 
analysis conducted between 2010 and 2012 in twenty-two African countries, an overwhelming 
majority of people in those countries have a favorable view about democracy.7 For instance, in 
Togo, 77 percent of the 1200 respondents affirm that democracy is preferable to any other kinds 
of government (Afrobarometer 2012). This popular support for democracy in that state does not, 
however, influence their country’s political leaders to establish strong institutions that can help 
prevent potential political violence. 
In a country, political stability and its breakdown depend not only on the strength or 
weakness of political institutions, but also on its political leaders’ understanding of power and 
how to access power. Gleditsch and Ruggery (2010) measure political stability by looking at 
how leaders come to power. By definition, political stability is a multidimensional concept, 
which denotes “system maintenance, civil order, legitimacy, and effectiveness” (Lijphart 1977: 
4) (quoted in Eckstein 1973). In their discussion on political stability, Gleditsch and Ruggery 
(2010) link “the security with which leaders hold office to the risk of civil war” (p. 302). From 
that association, one should expect that leaders who come to power through violent coup d’état 
                                                           
7
 Benin (72 %), Botswana (82%), Burkina Faso (72%), Burundi (74%), Cape Verde (81%), Ghana (82%), Kenya 
(73%), Lesotho (55%), Liberia (81%), Malawi (76%), Mali (62%), Mauritius (85%), Mozambique (63%), Namibia 
(64%), Nigeria (69%), Sierra Leone (76%), South Africa (72%), Togo (77%), Uganda (79%), Tanzania (84%), 
Zambia (90%), and Zimbabwe (79%). 
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are more likely to experience political instability and even be removed via violent coups. This 
situation is the case in Guinea (2009), the Democratic Republic of Congo (1997 and 2001), and 
Central African Republic (2003 and 2012 – present). 
Kenya is a good example of how leaders use violence to reach their political objectives. 
In Kenya, both President Mwai Kibaki and the Kenyan opposition leader, Raila Odinga, have 
resorted to violence to achieve their political gains (Otieno 2009, Chege 2008). The death toll in 
the 2007 electoral violence was estimated at 1,200 (Voice of America, 2013). While Kibaki 
managed to hold on to power after the bloody 2007 presidential elections, his challenger, 
Odinga, became the country’s Prime Minister after a political peace agreement between the 
former rivals. Odinga led the Kenyan coalition government and prepared the 2013 presidential 
elections in which he took part as one of the leading candidates (France 24, 28 January 2013). 
Zimbabwe is another interesting case that fits this model of reliance on violence.   
As Bratton and Masunungure (2010) note, in Zimbabwe, “The political elite take as 
articles of faith the assumptions that violence was effective in delivering independence and that 
repression is the party’s most effective weapon for countering real and imagined threats” (p. 
347). Thus, in 1976, Robert Mugabe proclaimed that “our votes must go together with our guns; 
after all any vote…shall have been the product of the gun. The gun, which provides the votes, 
should remain its security officer, its guarantor” (p. 12) (see for example, Bratton and 
Masunungure 2010, p. 347). Throughout the history of Zimbabwe, the ruling party (the 
Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front [ZANU-PF]), which has been in power since 
independence in 1980, relies on the use of force to consolidate its power around its leader 
President Mugabe. Mugabe considers the repression of his political opponents and their 
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supporters as the sole and effective means to maintain the status quo in Zimbabwe and hold on to 
power for life (Kriger 2005).  
Mugabe’s 2008 presidential runoff strategy against his challenger, Morgan Tsvangirai, 
was termed “electoral cleansing” (Bratton and Masunungure 2010: 348). This strategy of 
“electoral cleansing” was not only directed at intimidating supporters of the opposition 
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), but also it aimed at assassinating the political 
opponents of the dictatorial regime. Mugabe still uses a violent language even after the 2013 
presidential elections held on July 31 that he won with 61 percent of the vote against his 
traditional opposition leader, Tsvangirai (Aljazeera 22 August 2013).  In his inaugural speech in 
Harare (the capital of Zimbabwe), Mugabe told his critics, including Tsvangirai and Western 
powers who accused him of electoral holdup, to “go hang” (Chinaka and Dzirutwe 2013). 
Studying potential causes of political instability in Africa, Ong’ayo (2008) contends that 
“the African elites, who are bent on hanging to power at all cost and for the purpose of primitive 
accumulation, have perfected the art of political expediency even when these acts threaten the 
stability of their countries” (p. 7). The author concludes that although a new type of leadership 
within Africa is both required and needed so as to find immediate solutions to political 
instabilities on the continent, external actors, especially in the Western countries, have to change 
their attitudes and behaviors toward these African countries. The author, then, argues that lasting 
solutions to Africa’s instability issues require new leaderships in both sides: African countries 
and Western countries. These new leaders should really commit themselves to an agenda that 
promotes democracy — which no doubt will minimize the frequency of post-election conflicts 
— rather than worrying about their self-interests.  
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Although Ong’ayo (2008) discusses how the type of leadership may promote political 
instability, he overlooks the role of political institutions, such as electoral systems, electoral 
management commissions, and election monitoring instruments.  This thesis tries to fill the gap 
by providing a comprehensive understanding of and approach to post-election conflict and 
prevention in Africa. Such an approach not only looks at the socio-economic root causes of pre- 
and post-election conflicts, but also it provides a detailed overview of the political causes of 
African electoral conflicts.  
Another critical way to delve into the root causes of electoral conflict is to look at the 
nature of political parties and their relationships with social cleavages. 
In their article “Party Politics and Different Paths to Democratic Transitions,” Creevey, 
Ngomo, and Vengroff (2005) identify two important common features in emerging democracies 
in Africa with regard to elections. These features include the “rapid proliferation of political 
parties” (p. 473), and “ethno-regional cleavages” (p. 474). As far as the proliferation of political 
parties is concerned, they argue that, because of severe censorship of associational movements 
during the authoritarian rule in these countries, many political leaders seized the opportunity of 
multi-party system offered by the wave of democratization to get heard through the creation of 
political parties.  
Although the multiplicity of political parties is a necessary step for a multiparty system, it 
does not, as Adejumobi, Hambok, Nordlund, Rukambe, and Dowetin (2007) note, “necessarily 
guarantee competitive party politics” (p. 26).  By definition, competitive party politics is a 
system which precludes a strict monopoly of the electoral space by one dominant party. In such a 
system, competitions for political offices, including the presidency and the legislatures, is open 
to all legitimate political parties (parties that accept the rules of the game and the legitimacy of 
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the electoral process). In many African countries, a competitive party system is almost 
nonexistent. In addition, African political parties have their own problems.  Creevey et al. (2005) 
contend that these political parties have no experience on how to galvanize popular support for 
their ideologies. Therefore, political parties, they argue, rely heavily on ethnic and regional 
cleavages not only as sources of information but also as tools to win elections. These cleavages, 
if exploited, instead of overcoming the violence, provide a fertile ground for conflicts. 
 
2.1.2. Necessity of Elections and Neo-Patrimonialism 
Shedler (2002a), in her study on non-democratic regimes, reveals the two consequences 
that elections may have for these kinds of regimes. She argues that elections may sustain regimes 
or may contribute to regimes’ instability. But Cox (2007) contends that rulers in autocratic 
regimes are motivated by either maintaining the status quo and holding on to power as long as 
possible or by preventing removal from office through violent means by preemptively trying to 
get rid of their opponents via any means including imprisonments. Mozaffar and Vengroff 
(2002) use the case of Senegal where the late President Leopold Sedar Senghor voluntarily 
transferred power to his Prime Minister Abdou Diouf in 1981 to allow the Socialist Party (PS) to 
consolidate its power and maintain Diouf in power until 2000.  
Mozaffar and Vengroff (2002) note that incumbents often design electoral rules to 
achieve three main goals: “(1) enable the opposition to secure enough representation to 
encourage them to stay in the game; but (2) mitigate the prospects of a potential opposition 
majority in the national legislature and, in particular; (3) discourage opposition coordination 
behind a single challenger for the presidency” (p. 603). In spite of some probable costs and risks 
associated with elections, non-democratic regimes still hold elections for three fundamental 
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reasons: first, to gain legitimacy through non transparent elections, elections in which results are 
known beforehand (Linz 2000; Schedler 2002b); second, to reinforce the cohesion among 
members of the ruling party and at the same time facilitate the division among the opposition 
parties by manipulating individual opposition leaders and discouraging strategic coordination 
among the opposition; and third, just to receive foreign aid from the international community.  
Other researchers and scholars such as Abbink (2006), Nawaz (2008), and Lindberg 
(2003) use the neo-patrimonial theory to show how most regimes in Africa favor a small 
segment of their populations, especially their supporters, at the expense of the larger 
populations.8 Indeed, Abbink (2006) uses the neo-patrimonial theory in his investigation of “why 
the Ethiopian political system is moving away from a transitional democracy to 
authoritarianism.” He asserts that “re-institutionalization” of the neo-patrimonialist regime 
hinders the democratization process in Ethiopia. Abbink, however, recognizes that the neo-
patrimonial approach alone cannot explain Ethiopian politics. By comparing  Ethiopian politics 
to that of other African countries, he argues that many factors, such as the “force of ideology,” 
the “inherited tradition of state capacity,” the “existence of professionalism in the bureaucracy 
and the civil service,” and foreign donors’ pressures, have played a significant role in 
undermining its small democratic gains during the transitional period.  
In the same line of ideas, Nawaz (2008) argues that neo-patrimonialism leads to a “hybrid 
state where real decision-making power about state functions, such as resource distribution, lies 
outside of the formal institutions”(p. 2). Cammack (2007) also affirms that rulers in a number of 
                                                           
8
 The term neo-patrimonialism was first used by German sociologist Max Weber. It denotes patron-agent 
relationship whereby a patron rewards his/her clients or followers with gifts, grants, employment, etc. to obtain, 
maintain, and strengthen their loyalty. Neo-patrimonialism is characterized by two main concepts: loyalty to 
political leaders and/or chief executives, and material incentives to followers. According to Bratton (2011), “The 
term neo-patrimonialism refers to a hybrid mode of rule in which political ties and exchanges suffuse the 
management of a state.” Accessed 19 September 2013, from 
http://knowledge.sagepub.com/view/intlpoliticalscience/n386.xml 
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Sub-Saharan African countries and their personal connections are the real decision-makers when 
it comes to their countries’ resource allocation. Using a survey report on the election campaigns 
of members of parliament (MPs) in Ghana and data collected from 34 interviews with MPs, 
Lindberg (2003) finds that “MPs are involved in patron-client relationships to a significant 
degree to reproduce their political power” (p. 121). He further argues that “this persistent pattern 
of patronage politics threatens the very heart of democratic consolidation” (p. 121). However, 
this argument is a “cop-out” and often used to delegitimize governance systems in Africa 
because it deviates from the western practice of supposed “meritocracy.”  Looked at a different 
way, we could argue that this “shadow state” is the way “things are” rather than the way they 
“ought to be” and should be more seriously understood. For example, in the Ghanaian case, one 
could argue that one of the reasons we tend to see less election-related violence is the effective 
incorporation of the “shadow state” (traditional institutions and clientelism) into the operation of 
the post-colonial Westphalian state, especially in the 2012 presidential elections.  
 
2.1.3. Consequences of Social Cleavages on Electoral Systems  
 2.1.3.1. Defining Social Cleavages 
Commonly used in sociology and political science, the concept of social cleavage denotes 
the existence of different groups of people living within the same society. Criteria for 
distinguishing such groups from one another are identified as follows: (i) cultural traits such as 
religion, ethnicity, language and race; (ii) class or economic status; (iii) age; and (iv) geographic 
location or region. These differences must be salient and enter into the consciousness of the 
people either historically or as promoted by political elites. Eckstein (1966) equates social 
cleavages to segmental cleavages and writes, “This exists where political divisions follow very 
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closely, and especially those salient in a society” (p. 34) (see for example, Lijphart 1977: 3). 
Social cleavages mean more than social differences. According to Bornschier (2009), social 
cleavages are “durable patterns of political behavior linking social groups to political 
organizations” (p. 3). In the same order of ideas, Neto and Cox (1997) define the term social 
cleavage as “enduring social differences that might become politicized, or might not: differences 
of ethnicity, religion, language, or occupation, for example” (p. 152). How long such differences 
seem to appear among social groups remains the key to understanding the concept of social 
cleavage.  
Yet other scholars, such as Bartolini and Mair (1990: 213-220) assert that the term social 
cleavage goes beyond both socially-defined differences and the persistence of such differences 
and argue that it must be characterized by three key elements: (i) division of society into groups 
along demographic or socioeconomic lines, (ii) collective identity and shared attitudes of such 
groups, and (iii) distinct organizational bases or forms of collective action of such groups (also 
cited by Chiavacci 2010: 49). In divided societies, each individual group has its own identity, 
and members of such a group may want to protect their group’s identity and ensure its survival.  
In the context of elections, not only may politicians want to play identity cards to build 
support and gather votes, but voters themselves may also want to cast the ballots for candidates 
from their own ethnic groups in the name of securing the accumulation of scarce resources for 
their groups and then distributing such resources to in-group members. Even though some voters 
may not plan to initially vote along ethnic lines, they will end up doing it for fear that their 
counterparts will do so (Horowitz 1985). In ethnically divided societies, voters often face a 
dilemma. The dilemma here is that one group of voters does not know what the other groups will 
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do, how other voters will actually vote.9  In case ethnic voting occurs, ethnic conflict is a likely 
result as other underprivileged groups will not allow the privileged group(s) to indefinitely 
control scarce resources.  
It is quite interesting, but not surprising, to hear the debate on ethnic cleavages and 
African politics (Posner 2007). In Africa, Posner (2007) affirms, “Ethnic cleavages have become 
politically salient” (p. 1304). Why have African social cleavages become so politicized? The 
answer to the question leads Posner (2007: 1304-1305) to identify and discuss three main claims 
with regard to the nature of African politics. To Posner (2005 and 2007) and his predecessors, 
such as Barkan (1979) and Kanyinga (1994), African politics is about maximization of state 
resources. To achieve such a goal, many African leaders resorted to the elimination of their 
political opponents and created one-party systems, defined by a state party and a government, in 
the name of “unity” or “oneness” in the newly independent African states (Zolberg 1966). 
However, there had been a clear “dominance of the party over government” (Zolberg 1966: 106). 
The dominance of the state party over the government is well painted by Cowan (1961) in his 
discussion of the Guinean politics in the early moments of the country’s postcolonial era.  
According to Cowan, “the source of political power is expressly kept outside the 
provisions of the constitution and the subordination of all organs of government to the party 
organization render meaningless the constitutional relationships of these organs to one another” 
(p. 208) (see for example, Zolberg 1966, p. 106). There is no significant change in African 
politics since Zolberg wrote his Creating Political Order. For instance, in Cameroon, the ruling 
party, the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM) consistently modified the 
                                                           
9
 While providing a feedback on this thesis, Professor Richard Vengroff, the Chair of my dissertation committee, 
confirms the attitude and voting behavior of voters in Burkina Faso, an ethnically divided African country. He 
writes: “While working in Burkina Faso rural voters told me they weren’t sure who they would vote for because 
their ‘patron’ hadn’t yet told them.” 
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constitution to allow Paul Biya to retain power for life (Ochieng’ Opalo 2012). This situation is 
also true in many African states, such as Togo and Zimbabwe, where the constitutions do not set 
any cap to the number of terms a president can serve in office.  
African politics is also about throwing electoral support behind candidates from one’s 
own ethnic group to guarantee resources’ redistribution to coethnic group members (Posner 
2007); and most importantly, according to van de Walle (2003), African politics is essentially 
dominated by “strong presidentialism” wherein decision-making powers (executive, legislative, 
and judiciary) are concentrated in the hands of the Head of State and Governement or the 
president. Because the president is empowered to control both the political and state scarce 
resources, including public goods (schools, roads, just to name a few), and because of lack of 
checks and balances to ensure accountability, he/she is free to wield power as he/she pleases. 
The predominance of social cleavages in African countries has affected electoral systems in 
Africa.  
 2.1.3.2. Consequences of Social Cleavages 
Postner (2007) explores a pertinent question regarding whether the shift from one-party 
system to multiparty system has caused “ethnic conflict to be carried out in the name of different 
kinds of identities” (p. 1302). The author uses evidence of pre-transitions to democracy and 
multi-party elections in Zambia and Kenya to illustrate his point and finds that voters in both 
countries made the “strategic choice of local-scale identities over national-scale identities in one-
party elections, and of national-scale identities over local ones in multiparty contests, that 
accounts for the effects of regime change on the salience of different kinds of ethnic cleavages” 
(Posner 2007: 1322). This observation highlights that ethnic cleavages are not static. In a 
country, people may see themselves as members of a particular ethnic group during one-party 
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systems, whereas in multiparty systems voters tend to identify themselves as citizens of that 
country over an ethnic group. However, it is also important to note that this is not always the 
case. For instance, in multiparty systems where political parties are formed along ethnic lines, 
many voters are more likely to identify themselves with their ethnic groups than they do with 
their country. 
The study of social cleavages may be of a help to the study of elections and electoral 
behavior. Franklin, Mackie, and Valen (2009) assert that “The reason why political scientists 
study social cleavages is not because of any interest in these cleavages per se, but because they 
can shed light on voting behaviour” (p. 5). The question here is that: How can such a study help 
explain voting behavior?  This question is interesting especially in the context of Africa, where 
many countries are ethnically divided with preexisting social conflicts.  
These social conflicts were often promoted and exploited by former colonial powers. For 
instance, Zeleza (2008) asserts that “there is hardly any zone of conflict in contemporary Africa 
that cannot trace its sordid violence to colonial history and even in the late nineteenth century” 
(p. 1). These social conflicts occurred in Rwanda (Shah 2006), Uganda (Shaw and Mbabazi 
2008, Van Acker 2004, Nhema 2004, Crook 2001, Osaghae 2001), Nigeria (Newsom 2011, 
Francis, Lapin, and Rossiasco 2011) and others places across the African continent. The 
assumption worth highlighting is that countries that experienced social conflicts in the past are 
more likely to experience electoral conflicts in the future if underlying issues of such conflicts 
are not seriously addressed.  
Zielinsky (2002) raises two concerns regarding the “translation of social cleavages into 
political oppositions—a kernel of contemporary theorizing about political parties and party 
systems” (p. 184). The first concern is that what if emerging democracies have a history of 
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multiple issues conflict? The author suggests that it is up to politicians to determine “which 
cleavages to depoliticize and which to establish as the permanent axes of political competition” 
(P. 185). Is it possible to privilege ethnic issues over religious ones or vice versa? Politicians 
often make political calculations that can help them win strong support from voters. However, in 
his study of party systems in Eastern Europe’s new democracies, Zielinsky (2002: 201) argues 
that: 
In new democracies the early rounds of electoral competition determine not only who 
wins or loses a particular election but also, and perhaps more importantly, which social 
cleavages will be depoliticized and which will be established as permanent bases of 
political conflict. 
 
The second concern is about the emergence of new social cleavages after the 
consolidation of new party systems (Zielinsky 2002).  In this case, there are only two options: 
either allow parties to form coalitions or not. The choice of electoral system, therefore, dictates 
whether the alliance or coalition formation strategy is the appropriate course of action. Some 
electoral systems work well in countries with a small number of political parties while other 
systems give incentives to a large number of political parties. But, what determines the number 
of political parties that can actually compete in elections?  
As stated by Neto and Cox (1997), “the effective number of parties in a polity should be a 
multiplicative rather than an additive function of the permissiveness of the electoral system and 
the heterogeneity of the society” (p. 149). The number of parties is determined either by: (i) 
whether the electoral laws contain a reward mechanism for forming political coalitions or not, or 
(ii) the importance of preexisting social cleavages (Neto and Cox 1997). If a particular electoral 
system has high coalitional incentives, there is a high likelihood to have a reduced number of 
political parties in that country because parties will be better off competing as a coalition than 
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individually. This argument is in line with what Cox (1997: 271) calls “M+1” rule, with M 
denoting the district magnitude (number of seat per electoral district). According to this rule, in 
single member elections held under a majoritarian system, where M equals one—one seat per 
constituency—there should be no more than two viable candidates to compete in case of runoff 
elections. Similarly, in multimember elections, where M is greater than one, the rule states that 
there should be no more than two viable party lists. Also, the importance of social cleavages 
determines which cleavages to depoliticize and which ones to allow as bases of electoral conflict 
(Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Doing so may help reduce the number of political parties that must 
compete in political contests.   
As discussed earlier in the introduction to this dissertation, the majoritarian electoral 
system favors the two-party system, whereas the proportional representative system favors the 
multi-party (more than two) system. This pattern is consistent with Duverger’s Law that states 
that “The simple-majority single-ballot system [i.e., simple plurality rule in single-member 
districts] favors [a] two-party system” (Duverger 1954: 217) (see for example, Neto and Cox 
1997, pp. 149-150).  Regardless of the type of electoral systems, the existence of social 
cleavages and how electoral rules are enacted play a paramount role in determining which party 
or parties to include or exclude in political competitions. As different electoral systems provide 
different incentives to both strong and weak or minority political parties, political elites also 
respond differently to different types of electoral systems. Because proportional representation 
systems do not discriminate against minority parties as much as majoritarian electoral systems do 
(Farrell 2011), political elites have more incentives in translating social cleavages into new 
political parties under proportional representation systems than they do under majoritarian 
systems. 
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2.1.4. Ethnic Manipulation  
Several studies show that there is a direct relationship among ethnic fractionalization and 
civil war onset and indirect effect of the probability of civil war onset (Tembo 2012, Tangera and 
Lagerlof 2009). The 2007 Kenyan electoral crisis, in which over forty ethnic groups were pitted 
against the perceived-to-be-most-privileged Kikuyu ethnic group (Chege 2008, Collier 2009, 
Kiai 2010); and the recent violent post-election conflicts between the rebel forces and supporters 
of Ouattara (who is not only a Muslim from the north of Cote d’Ivoire but also a descendent of 
Mossi speaking parents who migrated from Burkina Faso) and the supporters of Gbagbo (who 
belongs to the Bété ethnic group and is also a Christian from the south) (Akokpari 2008) are just 
a few examples  that illustrate the  importance of discussing  ethnic manipulation in this thesis.  
 Consistent with Easterly and Levine (1997) and Olson (1982), Englebert (2000) asserts 
that, due to ethnic diversity in Africa, “African countries have weak institutions and adopt poor 
policies” (p. 9). Their main argument is that ethnic diversity has brought about what Englebert 
(2000) terms “social polarization” (p. 9) in African countries. This social polarization, they 
argue, may not only hinder economic growth but may also be a source of political instability in 
the region. If social cleavages remain the driving forces of political instability, how do we 
explain sustainable democracy and growing economy in countries like the United States that is 
politically polarized, and India that is the world’s largest democracy and one of the world’s most 
culturally and religiously diverse societies?  Social cleavages contribute to instability in societies 
that lack strong institutions and accountability. They are often used as an ingredient by 
politicians in many African countries to ignite political violence for power’s sake. For example, 
Kagwanja (2005), in investigating youth identity and generational politics in Kenya, draws on 
Lonsdale’s moral ethnicity theory, which puts emphasis on the creation of communities from 
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within. Moral ethnicity theory suggests that the creation of such communities accommodates 
disagreement over social values. The author argues that Kenyan political leaders use Kenyan 
youths as tools to either come to or hold onto power during the post-election era in Kenya. 
Yet another important point is that the existence of social cleavages within a polity can 
affect the country’s party system. Mozaffar, Scarritt, and Galaich (2003) explain how “electoral 
institutions and ethnopolitical cleavages shape party systems as sources of information that 
structure the mutual expectations of voters and candidates about winning and losing, thus 
facilitating their strategic coordination over votes and seats” (p. 380). In elections, while 
candidates may want to win seats, voters on the hand may want to vote for candidates who are 
likely to win seats so that in return they can get some benefits for voting for such candidates 
(Cox 1997). Such a calculation by both the candidates and voters is called “strategic 
coordination” (Mozaffar, Scarritt, and Galaich 2003: 380) (see for example, Cox 1997, Liphart 
1994, Taagepera and Shugart 1989). Theoretically, strategic coordination is moderated by 
ethnopolitical cleavages.  
In ethnically fragmented and politicized societies as is the case in many African 
countries, the number of ethnopolitical cleavages should be proportional to the number of 
parties. On the one hand, if a society is highly ethnically fragmented, there is a high likelihood 
that votes will be also highly dispersed among larger numbers of small parties or ethnic groups, 
reducing the number legislative parties. On the other hand, if such ethnic groups are localized 
within a region, they can form a coalition in order to avoid votes’ dispersion and possibly win 
seats and increase the number of legislative parties (Mozaffar and Scarritt 2005).  
Both among academics and practitioners of conflict resolution and management, little 
attention has been paid to the prevention of post-election conflicts in Africa. For example, in his 
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article “Electoral Conflict and Violence: A Strategy for Study and Prevention,” Fischer (2002) 
writes “the connections between elections and conflict have not been studied in a systematic 
fashion using a generally accepted framework of analysis” (p. 30). However, Fischer (2002) does 
not derive the framework of analysis he is alluding to. Rather, he leaves us with a series of 
unanswered questions, including  
a) What trends can be tracked on a country or regional basis as indicators of the motives, 
victim, and perpetrators of electoral conflict? 
b) How does election sequencing and scheduling impact potential conflict and violence? 
c) Do the number and nature of political parties impact the prospects for a peaceful 
election? 
d) What is the evidence on the impact of the system of representation on the potential for 
conflict? 
e) Does the presence of international observers prevent violence or simply delay it until the 
observers depart?  
f) How does the choice of a third party mediator influence the resolution and management 
of electoral conflict? 
g) How can we then prevent post-election conflicts? 
 
 
2.1.5. Exploring the Gap 
Extensive research has been conducted to determine the causes of electoral conflicts. Posner 
(2007) did an in-depth analysis on the effect of ethnic cleavages on regime change in Africa. 
Zielinski (2002), Lijphart (1990 and 1977), Duverger (1994) studied how electoral laws help 
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create incentives for political actors to reduce the number of parties. While Zielinski (2002), 
Neto and Cox (1997) investigated the relationship between social cleavages and party systems, 
Lipset and Rokkan (1967) studied party systems and voter alignments. Lindberg 2003, 
Wantchekon 2003, van de Wall (2001) also showed the relationship between elections and re-
distribution of scarce resources. Franklin, Mackie, and Valen (2009), Wantchekon (2003), 
Young and Turner (1985), Horowitz (1985) demonstrated how clientelism affects voting 
behavior in ethnically divided societies. Furthermore, Cox (1996), Duverger (1954) studied 
electoral systems and effective number of parties. In addition, Mozaffar and Vengroff (2001) 
demonstrated conditions under which it is in the interest of leaders to expand the number of 
parties, fragment the opposition, and retain control of the key office, the presidency. 
In all, despite a panoply of research on political violence and post-election political unrest, 
little has been done on the prevention of electoral conflicts in Africa. In addition, with the 
exception of few scholars, such as Straus and Taylor (2012), Bratton (2010), and Lindberg 
(2006), who used quantitative approaches in their studies of Africa’s democracy and its 
challenges, many studies on democratization, elections, and electoral conflicts in Africa are short 
of strong empirical evidence (Smith 2012, Oduro 2012, Diamond and Plattner 2010). Also, 
studies on the effects of Africa’s electoral systems as possible sources of electoral conflicts are 
very limited (Mozaffar and Vengroff 2002, Lindberg 2005). 
Using a mixed methodology approach consisting of an ordinary least square (OLS) 
regression analysis and an in-depth comparative case studies, this study is a departure from that 
practice. In this regard, this thesis not only contributes to the existing literature on post-election 
political unrest, but it also raises awareness about one of the critical challenges facing Africa in 
this 21st century. It also argues that ethnic heterogeneity and other causes discussed in the 
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literature are not enough to ignite electoral conflicts. But inadequacies in the distribution of 
power or decision-making mechanisms and the “breakdown in the electoral process” (Fischer, 
2002) are likely to ignite conflicts. It finally will hopefully propose ways to prevent post-election 
conflicts from occurring in Africa. 
 
    2.2. Explaining Post-Election Violence: Theoretical Framework for Analysis 
Based on the premises of the hypotheses and the literature review, I use the following 
theories: the social cleavages and party system theory (SCPST) (Cox 1997, Taagepera and 
Grofman 1985); the bounded rationality theory (BRT) (Simon 1999, Jones 1999); the 
democratization approach (DA) (Baroi 2012, Potter 1997); and the relative deprivation theory 
(RDT) to undergird my study of post-electoral conflict in contemporary Africa.  
 
2.2.1. The Social Cleavages and Party System Theory (SCPST) 
This theory states that in a society with a greater social fragmentation, political parties are 
formed alongside social cleavages (such as class, race, ethnicity, and religion). In other words, 
Taagepera and Grofman (1985) note that “the more axes of cleavages there are within a society, 
the greater will be the number of political parties” (p. 343) (see for example, Cox 1997: 19). 
Consequently, besides issues that are the main sources of political polarization, social 
fragmentation/polarization may lead to political polarization as is the case in many African 
countries (Englebert 2000). What impact (if any) does the social structure have on electoral 
systems? These social cleavages not only affect a country’s party system, but also they predict 
the type of electoral system a country should adopt. Nohlen (1993: 27) notes that  
The greater the social fragmentation, the more probable is the adoption of a proportional 
[electoral] system and also the rise of a multiparty system. The greater the social 
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homogeneity the more probable is the adoption of a single plurality system; but, also, the 
more probable the rise of a two-party system … or of a limited party pluralism (also 
quoted in Cox 1997: 19). 
   
Similarly, Cox (1997), while discussing the endogeneity of electoral structure, argues that 
“the party system (and the calculations of partisan benefit rattling around within it) may affect 
the electoral system” (p. 17). This thesis will discuss potential consequences of both the 
proportional and majoritarian electoral systems on the democratization process in Africa. 
Inspired by Cox’s argument based on Duverger law that states that the number of parties should 
tend toward the number of societal cleavages plus one, I argue in this thesis that an appropriate  
electoral system chosen for a right social structure can help prevent and mitigate post-election 
conflicts in Africa.  
2.2.2. The Bounded Rationality Theory (BRT) 
BRT is based on “rationality” which describes the human behavior of acting rationally and in 
a calculated manner. This theory is based on a satisficing decision-making strategy. By 
definition, the term satisficing is a decision-making strategy that helps, for instance, parties to a 
conflict to reach settlements (that meets their minimum requirements) or solutions that are 
mutually acceptable. BRT asserts that human beings make satisficing decisions rather than 
decisions that optimize their utility, which comes from their self-interests based on limited time, 
information and knowledge (Simon 1995). According to Jones (1999: 299),  
Bounded rationality is a school of thought about decision making that developed from 
dissatisfaction with the “comprehensively rational” economic and decision theory models 
of choice. Those models assume that preferences are defined over outcomes, that those 
outcomes are known and fixed, and that decision makers maximize their net benefits, or 
utilities, by choosing the alternative that yields the highest level of benefits (discounted 
by costs). 
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Decision makers may encounter a situation in which the costs and the benefits of their choice are 
equal. Such a situation is referred to as the equilibrium position. However, in most cases, choices 
are made on deficient calculation of costs and benefits. According to the theory, protesters and 
any political actors who use marches, mass demonstrations, sit-ins, boycotts among others 
means, to bring about a change in the status quo engage in some sort of costs and benefits 
analysis, in which the ultimate outcome is benefit maximization. In the context of post-election 
conflicts, voters may make rational decisions to participate in protests if they feel that they were 
cheated or their votes were wasted. Therefore, participating in anti-government uprisings after 
elections will be their best alternative, especially when they do not trust political institutions in 
their country. The possible outcomes that these protesters can expect to achieve include raising 
public awareness and changing public opinion on issues and gathering both internal and 
international supports for their cause of political change.   
Speaking of trust in political institutions, Cook and Gronke (2005) note that “low trust in 
government and low confidence in institutions reflects skepticism, an unwillingness to presume 
that political authorities should be given the benefit of doubt” (p. 787). In the context of this 
study, political authorities include incumbent governments and a number of institutions—
election management commissions, election monitoring organizations, etc.—in charge of 
organizing, administering elections and proclaiming elections’ results. In advanced democracies, 
such institutions are independent from national governments. In addition, there are separations of 
powers among the three branches of government: the executive, the legislative, and the judicial 
branches. Such separations of powers are made possible by the principle of checks and balances. 
Many countries in Africa suffer separation of powers and checks and balances’ deficit. Because 
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of that deficit, elections management commissions are more likely to be co-opted and play the 
game in favor of incumbent governments.   
 
2.2.3. Democratization Approach (DA) 
The democratization approach is an approach used to transform a corrupt government to a 
more accountable one. In other words, it aims at eliminating systemic corruption. In addition, 
DA aims at guaranteeing both political rights (for example, free and fair competitive elections, 
rights to vote, participatory political culture, etc.,) and civil liberties (such as freedom of speech 
and expression, freedom of assembly or associational autonomy, and freedom of religion) to a 
population within a polity. This approach has been used by a number of renowned scholars, 
including David Potter (1997), as a framework for analysis when explaining the concept of 
‘democratization’ in Potter et al. (1997)’s Democratization, David Held (1996) in Models of 
Democracy, Larry Diamond (1992) in “Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered,” 
Robert Dahl (1989) in Democracy and Its Critics, and Harold S. Baroi (2012) to explain recent 
Arab uprisings or the “Arab Spring.” 
DA is the sum total of three interrelated approaches, including the modernization approach, 
the transition approach, and the structural approach (Potter 1997). Potter (1997) notes that “the 
modernization approach emphasizes a number of social and economic requisites either 
associated with existing liberal democracies or necessary for successful democratization” (p. 10). 
Liberal democracy is defined as a type of political regime in which an accountable/uncorrupt 
government (or representatives) that is elected through free, fair and transparent elections makes 
binding policies that affect the entire country. The modernization theory links economic 
development to the emergence and consolidation of democracy. For Lipset (1960), a country’s 
A Preventive Approach to Post-Election Conflicts in Contemporary Africa                           Edoh Agbehonou 
 
68 
 
level of modernization or socio-economic development determines its level of democracy. The 
assumption here is that countries with a higher socio-economic development are less likely to 
experience political instability. The transition approach focuses on political process and 
institutional choices made by transitional governments so as to establish liberal democracies. The 
structural approach focuses on how to allocate power among the three branches of government—
executive, legislative, and judiciary—to ensure checks and balances. In all, according to Baroi 
(2012), DA addresses issues of “economic development, social divisions, state and political 
institutions, civil society, political culture and ideas, etc.” (p. 110). These factors served in this 
thesis as secondary data collected mainly from the World Bank, Political Institution Database, 
and Afrobarometer Online Analysis. 
 
2.2.4. Relative Deprivation Theory (RDT) 
In discussing the RDT, Hegre, Østby and Raleigh (2009) argue that “the population of 
locations that are relatively poor and are marginalized by the central government should be more 
likely to support and join a rebel group that works to topple the government” (p. 600). These 
scholars also argue that deprivation and inequality are among the main factors in intrastate 
conflicts. Despite a myriad of research on the negative association between the level of socio-
economic development and political violence (Hardy 1979, Weede 1981, Gurr 1994), Auvinen 
(1997) posits that “people are more satisfied with a higher level of economic development and 
consequently are less prone to rebellious action” (p. 179). In ethnically divided countries, how 
people or groups of people feel about their socio-economic status compared to others determines 
their decision to participate in protests. In elections, candidates and their supporters are more 
likely to participate in protests if they feel that they are less advantaged than their counterparts.  
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Thus, there is a positive relationship between relative deprivation and parties’ decision to 
participate in protests: as the intensity of relative deprivation increases, parties’ decision to 
protest also increases. 
In the context of elections and electoral behavior in divided societies that knew nothing but 
protracted authoritarian regimes or military dictatorships, many voters and political opponents 
may lack sufficient information necessary for strategic and informed decisions that can help 
them achieve democratic alternations. To put it in the words of Mozaffar and Vengroff (2002), 
“in the aftermath of extended authoritarian rule with limited or no electoral history, political 
actors usually suffer from an information deficit about the extent of their electoral support” (p. 
603). In many democratizing countries in Africa, not only are political opposition parties often 
denied freedom of movement and assembly, but they are also often denied access to resources 
such as media and campaign financing.  In chapter 3, I discuss the methodological approaches, 
data and sources as well as data collection procedures used in this thesis.     
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CHAPTER THREE  
DATA AND METHODS 
 
In this section, I will explain the research design, measure key variables, test my 
hypotheses, and discuss the results of the regression analysis.  
3.0. Research Design  
Research question: In Africa, why do some countries tend to experience post-election conflicts 
while others do not? 
Research purpose: 
This research investigates the reasons why many countries in contemporary Africa have been 
experiencing post-election conflicts since 1990 and seeks ways to manage such conflicts without 
resorting to violence or use of force. In addition, the intent of the proposed research is to provide 
recommendations on how to reduce or eliminate the frequent occurrence of post-election 
political unrest.  
Hypotheses 
H1: In Africa, countries that use majoritarian electoral systems are more likely to experience 
post-election conflicts than are countries that use proportional electoral systems; 
H2:  In Africa, countries that use majoritarian electoral systems are more likely to experience 
post-election conflicts than are countries that use mixed electoral systems;  
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H3: In Africa, countries that use mixed electoral systems are more likely to experience post-
election conflicts than are countries that use proportional electoral systems. 
 
3.1. Operationalization of Key Concepts 
To test these hypotheses, I identify the variable “post-election conflict” as the dependent 
variable and the independent variables include electoral systems (majoritarian, proportional, and 
mixed); and the disproportionality index, including least squares index, which determines the 
disproportionality between the distributions of votes and of seats; the effective number of parties; 
the effective number of seats, and the total number of seats; the level of inequality; 
unemployment by level of education; ethnic fractionalization; and the level of democracy.  
 
3.1.1. Electoral Systems 
In this thesis, I regrouped countries based on their electoral systems and proceeded with the 
most similar and the most different analysis so as to test my hypotheses. In my analysis, African 
countries are classified into three groups based on their electoral systems as presented in Table 
3.1 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
A Preventive Approach to Post-Election Conflicts in Contemporary Africa                           Edoh Agbehonou 
 
72 
 
Table 3.1 Electoral Systems in Africa  
Majoritarian Electoral System 
(MA) 
Mixed System (Mixed) Proportional Representative  
System (PR) 
Botswana, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Comoros, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Republic of 
Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, The 
Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, 
Liberia, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, 
Nigeria, Sierra Leone, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, 
Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
Cameroon (MMM)10, 
Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) (MMM), Djibouti 
(MMP), Arab Republic of 
Egypt (MMM), Guinea 
(MMM), Lesotho (MMP), 
Libya (MMM), Niger11 
(MMM), Senegal (MMM), 
Seychelles (MMM), Sudan 
(MMM) 
Algeria, Angola, Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape 
Verde, Equatorial Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Namibia, 
Rwanda, Sao Tome, South 
Africa, Tunisia,  
Note: Data on Eritrea, Madagascar, and Somalia are unavailable.  
Sources: African Election Database 2011, IFES Election Guide 2012, Inter-Parliamentary 
Union (IPU) 2012, Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) 2011  
 
3.1.2. Elections 
As it is done in liberal democracies, an election is a formal decision-making mechanism by 
which people choose their fellow citizens for public offices. In line with the definition of an 
election, Fisher (2002) argues that an electoral process is a means for achieving governance. As 
such, elections (municipal, legislative and presidential, to name just a few) are viewed as 
instruments or tools of democracy (Powell, 2000). For the purpose of this thesis, I measured the 
effectiveness of elections between 1990 and 2010 by measuring their qualities: political 
participation, competition, and legitimacy (Lindberg 2006).  
                                                           
10
 MMM stands for the mixed-member majoritarian system also known as mixed independent, and MMP stands for 
the mixed-member proportional system or mixed dependent. 
11
 Niger switched from Mixed to PR in 2010. 
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Political participation is defined as “all voluntary activities that aim to influence political 
decisions at all levels of the political system. These activities include conformist participatory 
activities like party membership or electoral campaigning and non-conformist activities, such as 
strikes and demonstrations” (GSDRC, 2012)12. In order to measure the variable “political 
participation,” the following key questions are carefully looked at. Do the people have the right 
to vote or are there any legal guarantees of universal suffrage in the country? Do the people have 
the right to form and belong to political parties? Do opposition political parties have the right to 
co-exist with the ruling party? Do all political parties have equal access to resources to actually 
compete against the incumbent party or government coalition in elections? How well do people 
turnout to cast their votes? Is the military still involved in politics? Above all, how vibrant and 
independent is the civil society? Briefly, as Cingranelli and Richards (2010) note it, political 
participation is the extent to which “citizens enjoy freedom of political choice and the legal right 
and ability in practice to change the laws and officials that govern them through free and fair 
elections.”13  
By definition, competition requires the existence of more than one choice. Do electoral laws 
in African countries allow choices? If so, are those laws implemented correctly to allow voters to 
actually have choices when they go to the polls? I argue in this thesis that within a democratic 
political system, the effectiveness of elections depends on the creation of a political atmosphere 
that allows individuals and/or political parties to compete without fear. According to Lindberg 
(2006: 31-32),  
                                                           
12
 GSDRC stands for Government and social Development Resource Centre. Retrieved May 17, 2012, from 
http://www.gsdrc.org/go/topic-guides/political-systems/participation 
13
 CIRI Human Rights Data Project. (22 November 2010). CIRI Variable Definitions. Retrieved November 9, 2013, 
from http://www.humanrightsdata.org/myciri/my_ciri_variable_definition.asp#9 
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Individuals or groups aspiring to represent the people and assume the function of 
government—or legislature—must be subjected to competition. Thus, the fundamental 
value of self-government as individual and collective freedom translates not only into 
equality of political participation but also into free political competition allowing the 
people to exercise its sovereign discretion to rule. 
 
Lindberg’s (2006) concept of free political competition implies the importance of a multiparty 
system that guarantees the equality of political participation for all candidates seeking political 
offices through elections. It can also be argued that within one-party system, competition is also 
possible because the party may present several candidates to compete for only one office as was 
the case for example in several African countries (such as Tanzania) prior to the “Third wave of 
democratization.” This practice, however, consolidated authoritarian regimes in Africa and 
undermined any prospect of democracy in the continent. 
        Another indispensable measure of political competition involves the number of seats won 
by political parties that contested the legislative elections: what is the make-up of the legislative 
body and how competitive is it?  The response to this question will indicate not only how strong 
or weak the opposition parties are but may also be indirectly related to how permissive the 
electoral system is. Finally, the legitimacy of elections is measured by whether the elections took 
place with major irregularities, such as vote rigging, ballot stuffing, and/or elections marred by 
violence as both parties claimed victory and wanted to defend their victory at all costs. This 
thesis analyzes the parliamentary or legislative elections held in six African countries between 
1990 and 2010 as summarized in Table 3.1 (see chapter 1) or Table 3.14 (see the method on 
comparative case studies section at the end of this chapter).  
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3.1.3. Level of Electoral Conflicts 
This thesis adopted Straus and Taylor (2009)’s four levels of electoral violence.  The 
level of electoral violence is measured by whether there is a no report of election-related 
violence, or violent harassment, or violent repression, and/or large-scale violence during the 
electoral process.14  In my study I adopted Straus and Taylor’s African model of electoral 
violence with a little modification. Specifically, I disagree with their classification of South 
Africa in the category of countries that usually experience high electoral violence.  It does not 
appear to be an accurate characterization because the country experienced large-scale violence 
only on two occasions: the first-two post-apartheid parliamentary elections of 1994 and 1999. 
Subsequent elections held in 2004 and 2009 in the country were relatively peaceful.  Therefore, I 
classified South Africa in the category of countries with occasional high electoral violence (see 
Table 3.2 below).  
Another problem with the Straus and Taylor (2009)’s model of frequency of high 
electoral violence is that, within the time frame of 1990-2010, some African states such as The 
Democratic Republic of Congo and Cote d’Ivoire had not regularly had elections to be classified 
in the category of countries that usually experienced high electoral violence. To avoid the 
overgeneralization associated with Straus and Taylor’s model, I used their SCAD dataset in 
which countries are classified based on the four levels of electoral violence listed above (Straus 
                                                           
14
 As discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, violent harassment includes police or security forces breaking up rallies, 
party supporters brawling in the streets, confiscation of opposition newspapers, candidate disqualifications, and 
limited short-term arrests of political opponents; violent repression,  includes high-level assassinations and targeted 
murder,  continuous high-level arrests of party leaders, long-term violent intimidation and torture; and  violent 
campaign with generalized violence or large-scale violence includes widespread physical attacks and massive 
killings (see Straus and Taylor 2009: 21). 
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and Taylor 2009: 25)15, and extended it to 2010 and included North African countries (Algeria, 
Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia). However, this thesis differs significantly from Straus and Taylor’s 
scholarly work in two ways. First, while these scholars used descriptive statistics to explain when 
electoral violence mostly occurred during the electoral process and what actually happened 
during an electoral violence, this thesis is interested in how a type of electoral system may 
influence the occurrence of electoral violence in Africa. In addition, this thesis looks at why a 
type of electoral system may be more or less prone to electoral violence than the others. 
 
Table 3.2: Frequency of High Levels of Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan African 
Countries 
 
Never High Electoral 
Violence 
Occasionally High Electoral 
Violence 
Usually High Electoral 
Violence 
Benin, Botswana, Burkina 
Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, 
Djibouti, Gabon, Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea-Bissau*, 
Liberia, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Rwanda, Sao Tomé 
& Principe, Senegal, 
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, 
Swaziland, Zambia 
Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, 
Central African Republic, 
Comoros, Guinea, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Niger, Republic 
of Congo, South Africa, 
Tanzania, Uganda 
Cote d’Ivoire, DRC, 
Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Nigeria, Sudan, Togo, 
Zimbabwe 
Note: Data on North African countries are not available, * Data are collected before 2012 
elections. 
Sources: Straus, S. & Taylor, C. (2012). In Bekoe, D. A. (2012) (Ed.). Voting in Fear: Electoral 
Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa. Washington, D.C.: United Institute of Peace Press. 
                                                           
15
 For the full SCAD dataset, see Hendrix, C. S. & Salehyan. (2013). Social Conflict in Africa Database 
(SCAD). www.scaddata.org, accessed on 2 December 2013. 
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3.1.4. Disproportionality Index 
 The disproportionality index is measured by the least squares index (LSq), which is also 
known as Gallagher’s index. It compares the percentage of votes won by political parties to the 
percentage of legislative seats actually won by parties. As Gallagher (2008) puts it, LSq is “the 
measure of disproportionality between the distributions of votes and of seats.” LSq is calculated 
by the formula LSq =  √ (1/2 ∑ (si – vi)2), where  “Si” represents the percentage of seats won by 
a party and “Vi” represents the percentage of votes it received. Although I used Gallagher’s data 
in the compilation of Table 6 (see Appendix A), I also double-checked every single result by 
calculating the disproportionality index in African countries where the number of votes and the 
number of seats are available independently of Gallagher.  
Because of the unavailability of data within the time frame of this study (1990-2010), the 
dataset used for this thesis lacks the value of LSq of the following African states: Algeria, 
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Cote d’Ivoire, 
The Republic of Congo, DRC (former Zaire), Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The 
Gambia, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, 
Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. I am convinced that the variable LSq may play a 
critical role in predicting electoral conflict; therefore, I will use it in my in-depth comparative 
analysis that will cover the six African states (Benin, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Senegal, 
and Togo). In the section below, I presented ethnic fractionalization as one of the control 
variables to right any possible shortcomings as a result of the inaccessibility of the 
disproportionality index in countries listed above. 
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3.1.5. Ethnic Fractionalization Index 
 The variable “ethnic fractionalization” is moderated by ethnic heterogeneity and/or social 
cleavages. Studies have shown that ethnic heterogeneity disrupts not only the emergence but also 
the survival of democracy. For the purpose of this thesis, I used the index of ethnic 
fractionalization constructed Daniel N. Posner. Posner called this index the “PREG index.” The 
PREG index is the newest index of ethnic fractionalization that is rigorously constructed by 
consulting between five and twenty reliable books and academic sources that discussed 
ethnopolitical cleavages for each country in Africa (Posner 2004). Posner used it to study the 
impact of ethnic diversity on long-term growth and macroeconomic policies.  
Posner (2004) was “particularly interested in sources that described the dynamics of 
competition over resources and policies, especially if the sources provided accounts of the 
coalition-building efforts that were part of this competition” (p. 854). Most importantly, because 
this PREG index was built with data on “party-building, electoral campaigns and voting 
patterns,” and above all, “interethnic alliances and rivalries” (Posner 2004: 854), I used it as an 
intervening variable in my study of post-election conflict in contemporary Africa and simply 
labeled it EFI. Because Posner’s PREG index does not include North African countries such as 
Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia, I fill in that gap with Fearon (2003)’s ethnic 
fractionalization data.      
3.1.6. Living Standard  
 The gross domestic product in terms of purchasing power parity, commonly referred to as 
yPPP, measures the living standard of people within a polity. yPPP shows the big picture of how 
well a country is doing in terms of economic development. The term economic development is 
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used in this thesis to include not only economic growth but also people’s quality of life. As a 
country’s yPPP increases, literacy rate16 also increase, and people tend to have a long life 
expectancy, and infant mortality within that country tends to decrease.  
3.1.7. Unemployment Rate  
 According to the World Bank, the unemployment rate is the proportion of the adult 
population aged 15 and over that is not working. It is measured as a percentage of the total labor 
force. Voters tend to be dissatisfied with the government and governmental institutions if their 
country’s unemployment rate increases or remains relatively high (Harper 2000). Other studies, 
including Evans, and Ivaldi (2008), have linked voters’ decision-making in elections to 
unemployment.  
  
3.1.8. Level of Inequality 
I used the World Bank’s Gini index also known as Gini coefficient as a measure of the 
level income inequality within a country. It determines income inequality among the entire 
population of a country. The lower the value of Gini coefficient, the lower the income inequality 
is. A lower income inequality indicates that the wealth is being distributed relatively equitably 
within the population. On the other side, the gap between the haves and the have-nots increases 
as the value of the Gini coefficient increases. 
                                                           
16
 By definition, the term literacy rate is referred to as the proportion of people aged 15 and over who read and write. “A 
person is literate who can with understanding both read and write a short simple statement on his everyday life...A person is 
functionally literate who can engage in all those activities in which literacy is required for effective functioning of his group 
and community...” (UNESCO, 1978) (also quoted in Wagner 2005: pp. 25-26). 
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 3.1.9. District Magnitude  
 The district magnitude is the size of the electoral district or constituency. It is measured 
by the number of members of parliament or MPs. In this thesis, I used the average or mean 
district magnitudes of the lower houses (MDMH) or National Assemblies/Parliaments (Keefer 
2012). If a country uses a majoritarian electoral system, the value of the MDMH is one. 
Otherwise, the MDMH is greater than one. As Farrell (2011) puts it, the overall proportionality 
of a PR system depends on the MDMH. The electoral system becomes more proportional as the 
MDMH increases (Farrell 2012, Reynolds, et al. 2008).   
The sources of the data used in this thesis and the procedures followed are discussed in 
the methods section below. 
 
3.2. Methodological Approach 
            The study used a mixed method approach consisting of quantitative methods and 
comparable case studies.  In this study, I used the quantitative research method to test the three 
hypotheses that are H1: In Africa, countries that use majoritarian electoral systems are more 
likely to experience post-election conflicts than are countries that use proportional electoral 
systems; H2:  In Africa, countries that use majoritarian electoral systems are more likely to 
experience post-election conflicts than are countries that use mixed electoral systems; and H3: In 
Africa, countries that use mixed electoral systems (MMM especially) are more likely to 
experience post-election conflicts than are countries that use proportional electoral systems.  
Since my main investigation is concerned with what is going on with a sample of types of 
electoral systems in Africa and not what individual countries have done, the quantitative method 
is the most appropriate method. In addition, the results of this study were also reported in terms 
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of type of electoral system used countries in contemporary Africa. This method is in line with 
Robson (2002) who conceptualizes quantitative designs as fixed methods and posits that “the 
advantage of fixed designs lies in their ability to transcend individual differences and identify 
patterns and processes which can be linked to social structures and groups or organizational 
features” (p. 98). Above all, the use of quantitative methods in combination with in-depth case 
analysis helped identify the main causes of post-election conflicts in the continent. 
  
3.2.1. Data Collection and Sources 
I conducted a very rigorous quantitative analysis while using secondary data collected 
from different credible sources, including Afrobarometer Database, African Election Database, 
Database of Political Institutions, Freedom House, The Carter Center, Systemic Peace, Amnesty 
International, Transparency International, and World Development Index from the World Bank. 
The types of data that I collected for that matter include, but are not limited to, types of 
electoral systems used; election results; polity score (Polity II, for example) indicating countries’ 
democratic status; corruption perception index (CPI); countries' data on human rights; data on 
level of inequality and literacy; data on disproportionality (calculated) such as the least squares 
index (LSq), which is used to measure the disproportionality between the distributions of votes 
and of seats; the effective number of votes (Eff_Nv); the effective number of seats (Eff_Ns); and 
the total number of seats (N seats) (Gallagher 1991). The main limitation is that these secondary 
sources may not have updated information. Therefore, it is possible that these standard sources 
may lack some pieces of information that are indispensable for the generalization of findings of 
my study. 
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To fill such a gap, I checked the websites of the individual country electoral commissions 
or ministry of the interior for updated on election-related information.  In addition, I reviewed 
newspapers and watched interviews at various reputable news channels (both local and 
international) such as Africa No 1, BBC Africa, IRIN News (a humanitarian news and analysis 
program), and Al Jazeera. I also browsed relevant online journals, such as The Economist and 
Jeune Africa and blogs. Moreover, I browsed respected websites (local, regional, and 
international) including but not limited to AllAfrica.com, Koaci.com, and CNN.com. Not only 
did using multiple sources for data gathering help fill informational gaps, but also such practice 
helped minimize possible biases embedded in sources (Bernard 2006, Robson 2002). This design 
is basically a secondary data analysis on all the countries that held elections among 50 African 
countries from 1990 to 2010. Figure 3.1 is the map of Africa, the continent being studied in this 
thesis. 
 
3.2.2. Reliability of the Sources  
Sources of the quantitative data are described as follows:  
African Election Database: It supplies the main source of data on Sub-Saharan African 
elections since 1960. It provides an overview of the political system, the type of electoral system, 
and the democratic status of each country in Africa. The election results published by the African 
Election Database are the official results provided by every individual country’s electoral 
management commission. Data collected via this source were cross-checked by using other 
independent and reputable international election monitoring organizations, such as The Carter 
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Center and Adam Carr’s Election Archives, and renowned academic sources, including Inter-
Parliamentary Union (IPU) and IFES.    
Database on Political Institutions: This database is provided by the Norwegian Social 
Science Data Services (NSD), which a world renowned “resource centre, which assists 
researchers with regard to data gathering, data analysis, and issues of methodology, privacy and 
research ethics” (NDS, 2012). The MacroDAtaGuide (an International Social Science Resource) 
of NSD provides credible information on political institutions of countries across the globe.  
Transparency International: The corruption perception index (CPI) is gathered from 
Transparency International, the global coalition against corruption. Scholars such as Emma 
Henriksson from International Peace Bureau Disarmament for Development and Tobias Bock, a 
Project Officer with Transparency International’s Defense and Security Program have written on 
corruption in the arms trade, and the arms trade treaty and the impact of corruption, respectively. 
Freedom House: Since 1972, Freedom House has been providing annually two sets of 
ratings for every country in the world on their political rights and civil liberties. These two sets –
political freedom and civil liberties –are used here as measures of democracy. Freedom House 
continues to provide these sets as a way to help policymakers, media, and human rights 
advocates, among others, to track trends on countries’ democratic status. Countries are rated on 
the scale of 1 to 7, with lower values indicating more freedom and higher values, less freedom 
(Freedom House, 2012 Website). In this study, I combined each country’s political rights and 
civil liberties’ annual scores and calculate the mean value of these scores. In the empirical 
analysis, a country is considered free if it gets a score that is equal or less than 5. A country is 
partially free if its score is between 5 and 10, and a country with a score above 10 is considered 
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not free. Many other reliable sources such as Afrobarometer Database (an African-led series of 
national public attitude surveys on democracy and governance), Systemic Peace, Amnesty 
International, and the World Development Index, which were used in a number of studies 
dealing with democracy, development, elections, conflicts, and human rights, are also used in 
this study. For most indicators of human rights, I used the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human 
Rights Dataset.  
 
3.2.3. Data and Coding 
 The dependent variable (electoral conflict) noted in this thesis as “ELEC_CONF” is 
coded 0 if there is no report of electoral violence during an electoral process in a country. It is 
coded 1, 2, and 3 if a country experienced violent harassment, violent repression, and large-scale 
electoral violence, respectively. Electoral system is the independent variable. At the 
parliamentary or the legislative level, electoral system is used as “LEGIS_TYPE.” 
LEGIS_TYPE is coded by 1 if a country used a majoritarian electoral system (MA), by 2 if a 
country used a proportional representation electoral system (PR), and by 3 if a country used a 
mixed system (MI).  
At the presidential level, electoral system is used as “PRES_TYPE.” PRES_TYPE is 
coded by 1 if a country used a plurality system, where a candidate with the most votes wins a 
presidential election; by 2 if a country used an absolute majority system, where a presidential 
candidate needs 50 percent plus one to win an election; and by 3 if a qualified majority system (a 
system that requires more absolute majority of votes) was used by a country during a presidential 
election.  
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As identified in CIRI Human Rights dataset, other critically intervening variables 
include, but are not limited to, freedom of speech, electoral self-determination (also known as 
political participation or indicator of free and fair elections), freedom of assembly and 
association, freedom of religion, and independence of judiciary. These factors also influence 
elections and voting behavior (Cingranelli and Richards 2008). Their coding for these 
intervening variables has been adopted in this thesis. For example, freedom of speech is coded 
SPEECH and receives a score of 0 if it was censored by a government in a given period of time. 
SPEECH receives i) a score of 1 if freedom of speech was moderately restricted by a 
government, and ii) a score of 2 if freedom of speech was fully allowed in a country. 
Similarly, freedom of assembly and association (ASSN), electoral self-determination 
(ELECSD), freedom of religion NEW_RELFREE), and independence of judiciary (INJUD) 
receives each as a score of i) 0 if people were completely denied each of these freedoms and that 
the judicial branch was not independent from the other branches of government (namely the 
executive and the legislative branches); ii) 1 if these rights were not completely denied to people 
and that the judiciary was partially independent; and iii) 2 if these rights were not restricted and 
that the judicial branch was totally independent from the branches of the government in a given 
year (Cingranelli and Richards 2008). In all, in a country where all of these rights are fully 
guaranteed by the constitution and respected by the government in power, people are less likely 
to resort to violence as a means of electoral conflict resolution tool. 
It is very important to point out that Eritrea, Libya, Somalia, and South Sudan were 
dropped from the study because Eritrea, Libya, and Somalia did not hold any elections while 
South Sudan was not even a sovereign state during that time frame. Table 3.3 (see Appendix A) 
provides a summary of election data used for the purpose of this study.  
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In the next section, I used Gretl computer software as the main instrument to analyze the 
data and proceeded with normality, and multicollinearity tests as well as multivariate regression 
analysis. 
 
3.2.4. Data Transformation and Regression Analysis 
3.2.4.1. Normality Test 
I conducted a normality test to see whether my variables were normally distributed. Data 
that were not normally distributed were transformed by taking the log to improve their normality. 
As illustrated in Figure 1 below, the test statistic for normality with a Chi-square of 6.967 and a 
p-value of 0.03 reveals that the data may not have originated from a normal distribution. The 
improved normality is shown in Figure 3. 3. The test statistic for normality shows a p-value of 
about 0.15.  
Figure 3.2: Frequency Distribution of Electoral Conflict  
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Figure 3.3: Normal Distribution of Electoral Conflict After Transformation 
 
Similar to the dependent variable (ELEC_CONF), which becomes lnELEC_CONF after 
the transformation, the independent variables yPPP, GINI, UNEMP, VPA_TURN, VPR_TURN, 
MA, PR, MI, LSq, Eff_Nv, Eff_Ns, mdmh, EFI, ELECSD, PRES_TYPE, LEGIS_TYPE, 
ELECRULE, ELEC_FORM, SEATS, LITERAC, UNEMP, EFI, ASSN, FORMOV, SPEECH, 
NEW_RELFRE, and INJUD become lnYCAP, lnGINI, lnUNEMP, lnVPATURN, lnVPRTURN, 
lnMA, lnPR, lnMI, lnLSq, lnEff_Nv,ln Eff_Ns, lnmdmh, lnEFI, lnELECSD, lnPRES_TYPE, 
lnLEGIS_TYPE, lnELECRULE, lnELEC_FORM, lnSEATS, lnLITERAC, lnASSN, 
lnFORMOV, lnSPEECH, lnNEW_RELFRE, and lnINJUD. Because the transformation of the 
variable POLITY2 does not provide a better result than the non-transformed POLITY2, I 
therefore kept POLITY2 as it is.     
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3.2.4.2. Multicollinearity Test 
 I conducted a multicollinearity test to check whether the independent variables used in 
this study explain each other. I made a judgment call regarding whether or not to drop some 
variables if the independent variables were highly correlated at 0.7 and above (Field 2009). This 
information helped me to determine whether one variable accounted for half or more of the 
variation in the other.  
An analysis of Table 3.4 below shows that the variable lnLEGIS_TYPE is highly 
correlated with the dummy variables MA and MI with correlation coefficients of -0.947 and 
0.739, respectively. While MA and PR are also highly correlated with correlation coefficient of -
0647, MA and MI moderately correlated with correlation coefficient of -0.483. Because of the 
exact collinearity, one of the dummies will automatically be dropped while running the OLS 
regression. Another important observation worth noting is that there is correlation between the 
variables lnPRES_TYPE and lnLEGIS_TYPE. This means that the type of electoral systems 
(MA, PR, and MI) chosen by a country to allocate electoral votes into seats has no effect on the 
electoral systems (plurality or first past the post, absolute majority, and qualified majority) used 
for its presidential elections  
 
Table 3.4: Correlation matrix with electoral systems  
 
lnPRES_TYPE lnLEGIS_TYPE lnMA lnPR lnMI  
1.000 0.215 -0.266 0.276 0.013 lnPRES_TYPE 
 1.000 -0.947 0.367 0.739 lnLEGIS_TYPE 
  1.000 -0.647 -0.483 lnMA 
   1.000 -0.355 lnPR 
    1.000 lnMI 
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Table 3.5 presents the relationships among electoral rules, electoral formula, types of electoral 
systems, and number of seats directly elected by voters. An analysis of Table 3.5 reveals that the 
variables lnELECRULE and lnELEC_FORM are highly correlated (with correlation coefficient 
of 0.958). It also shows that lnELECRULE is highly correlated with lnMA, lnPR, and lnMI, and 
lnELEC_FORM is highly correlated with lnMA and lnPR, but not with lnMI. Surprisingly, both 
the electoral rules and electoral formulas are not highly correlated with the number of seats, but 
have minimal issues of multicollinearity with it.  
Table 3.5: Correlation matrix with electoral rules, formula, and types of electoral system 
 
lnMA lnPR lnMI lnELECRULE lnELEC_FORM lnSEATS  
1.000 -0.647 -0.483 -0.953 -0.898 0.054 lnMA 
 1.000 -0.355 0.556 0.739 -0.071 lnPR 
  1.000 0.530 0.295 0.005 lnMI 
   1.000 0.958 -0.119 lnELECRULE 
    1.000 -0.152 lnELEC_FORM 
     1.000 lnSEATS 
In Table 3.6, the correlation coefficient of 0.52 shows that the variables lnELECSD and lnASSN 
are highly correlated, and the correlation of 0.42 reveals that lnELECSD is moderately correlated 
with lnSPEECH. These observations indicate that for an African country to have an electoral 
self-determination, it must not only guarantee freedom of speech, but also it must allow all of its 
citizens the freedom of assembly and association.    
Table 3.6 Correlation matrix with opportunity of political participation and judicial independence  
 
lnELECSD lnASSN lnFORMOV lnSPEECH lnNEW_RELFRE lnINJUD  
1.0000 0.5206 0.2539 0.4238 0.2647 0.3366 lnELECSD 
 1.0000 0.1789 0.4045 0.3604 0.3246 lnASSN 
  1.0000 0.2133 0.1971 0.3576 lnFORMOV 
   1.0000 0.2398 0.3978 lnSPEECH 
    1.0000 0.2195 lnNEW_RELFRE 
     1.0000 lnINJUD 
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An analysis of the correlation, Table 3.7 below, reveals a high correlation between the variables 
the POLITY2 and lnELECSD with correlation coefficient of 0.607. This observation is 
consistent with the premise that the emergence and survival of democracy depend on countries’ 
commitments to an electoral self-determination principle, which means holding free and fair 
elections.  
Table 3.7: Correlation matrix with level of democracy and electoral self-determination 
 
POLITY2 lnELECSD lnMA lnPR lnMI  
1.000 0.607 -0.020 0.093 -0.080 POLITY2 
 1.000 -0.043 0.101 -0.062 lnELECSD 
  1.000 -0.647 -0.483 lnMA 
   1.000 -0.355 lnPR 
    1.000 lnMI 
 
An analysis of Table 3.8 shows a fairly high correlation between lnLSq and 
lnELEC_FORM with a correlation coefficient of -0.507, and a very high correlation between 
lnEff_Nv and lnEff_Ns with a correlation coefficient of 0.856. These observations indicate that 
in African countries, any disproportionality between the percentage of votes and the actual 
percentage of seats won in a parliamentary or legislative election may be negatively linked to the 
electoral formula used in translating such votes to electoral seats; there is also an indication that 
as the effective number of elective parties (votes) increases, so does the effective number of 
legislative parties (seats) increases. Another important point worth noting here is the negative 
relationship between the variables lnLSq and lnmdmh. Although these variables are not highly 
correlated, their correlation coefficient of -0.332 tells us that increasing values of one of the 
variables (lnLSq and lnmdmh) is associated with decreasing values of the other variable. 
Therefore, as the district magnitude increases, the disproportionality index decreases.  
A Preventive Approach to Post-Election Conflicts in Contemporary Africa                           Edoh Agbehonou 
 
91 
 
In Table 3.9, the issue of multicollinearity is observed between the variables lnUNEMP 
and lnLITERAC. The correction coefficient of 0.530 indicates that the two variables 
(unemployment rate and literacy rate) are highly correlated. This observation suggests that in 
African countries, as the literacy rate increases, unemployment rate also tends to increase, and 
vice versa.  The literacy rate is, therefore, related to the overall level of unemployment. 
 
Table 3.8: Correlation matrix with disproportionality indexes 
 
lnSEATS lnLSq lnEff_Nv lnEff_Ns Lnmdmh  
1.000 -0.274 0.031 0.076 0.159 lnSEATS 
 1.000 0.244 -0.172 -0.332 lnLSq 
  1.000 0.856 -0.122 lnEff_Nv 
   1.000 0.106 lnEff_Ns 
    1.000 lnmdmh 
 
Table 3.9: Correlation matrix with unemployment and literacy rates 
 
POLITY2 lnGINI lnyPPP lnLITERAC lnUNEMP lnEFI  
1.000 0.271 -0.134 0.050 -0.030 -0.057 POLITY2 
 1.000 -0.263 0.250 0.036 -0.016 lnGINI 
  1.000 0.053 0.193 0.181 lnyPPP 
   1.000 0.530 0.121 lnLITERAC 
    1.000 -0.051 lnUNEMP 
     1.000 lnEFI 
 
 
3.2.4.3. Regression Analysis 
I ran an ordinary least squares regression analysis through Gretl computer software to see 
how much of the dependent variable was explained by the independent variable and conducted 
both the hypothesis, significance, and causality tests.  
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Finally, I ran a multivariate regression analysis between my dependent variable and all 
the independent variables so as to identify the variables that were the main explanatory factors of 
the dependent variable (electoral conflicts) being investigated in this study and the overall 
significance of the model. The decisions to enter the predictors or independent variables were 
based on four main reasons:  
(i) past research (literature) that used sound methodology;  
(ii) by avoiding multicollinerity between explanatory variables;  
(iii) in order of importance or statistical significance of each of the predictors;  
and (iv) other alternative models can also be tested.  
In all, these reasons help to lay out a fully specified model.  
Again, the hypotheses to be tested in order to identify the causes of post-election conflict 
in contemporary Africa are 
H1: In Africa, countries that use majoritarian electoral systems are more likely to experience 
post-election conflicts than are countries that use proportional electoral systems. 
H2: In Africa, countries that use majoritarian electoral systems are more likely to experience 
post-election conflicts than are countries that use mixed electoral systems. 
H3:  In Africa, countries that use PR systems are less likely to experience post-election conflicts 
than are countries that use mixed systems (MMM especially). 
The regression analysis tables provide the results of the OLS regression analysis. In these 
tables, the regression coefficient estimates are the first numbers reported and underneath them 
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are the standard errors reported in parentheses. The tables also include p-values showing the 
statistical significances, the number of observations (N), the Adjusted R-Squared, showing the 
goodness of best fit or how well each model actually reflects the data used, and F-statistics, 
indicating the overall significance of the model. A p-value below 0.01 indicates statistical 
significance at the 1 percent level. 
In contemporary Africa, post-election conflicts are likely to occur in presidential 
elections as well as in legislative elections. Two main reasons inform my decisions to include the 
regression analysis at the presidential level in this project. First and foremost, except Lesotho and 
South Africa, all African countries that are trying to embrace democracy as a form of 
government have opted for presidential systems. Many of these democratizing countries, 
including Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Mozambique, Nigeria and Zambia have held their presidential 
elections simultaneously with legislative elections. In their Puzzle of African Party Systems, 
Mozaffar and Scarritt (2005) show the significance of African presidential elections.  
According to these authors, in Africa, “the presidency is the top prize in the political 
game” and that “African presidents possess substantial resources for patronage” (p. 415). In most 
cases, many presidential candidates from weaker parties entered the electoral competitions with 
the hope to form a strategic coalition, which would secure them a power-sharing deal with the 
winning parties or candidates after the presidential elections. Such a power-sharing accord would 
offer weak presidential candidates and their parties an opportunity to have some access to their 
countries’ resources. At the end such a strategic coalition would be beneficial to all parties of the 
coalition including the winning party as it would broaden the electoral support and base for the 
latter.   
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Secondly, people respond to the electoral system as a whole. For that reason, it is 
indispensable to evaluate the performance of such a system at both the legislative and the 
presidential levels. Although the proportional representative formulas are not used to elect a 
president of a country, African presidents, because of their “unrestricted” powers, influence the 
makeup of their respective states’ legislatures regardless of whether their countries use PR or 
mixed systems for allocating legislative seats. As Mozaffar and Vengroff (2002)’s “whole 
system” approach emphasizes, “Success at one level depends on the performance at all levels” 
(p. 601). This suggests that for an electoral system (MA or PR or MI) to perform as expected will 
depend on how far a president is willing to accommodate or to provide opportunities for his/her 
political opponents to participate in the decision-making process. It is regrettable to learn that in 
many African countries, the outcomes of presidential elections dictate the nature and the 
composition of national assemblies or parliaments. Because of this strong relationship between 
the presidency and the legislatures, I tried to identify through a regression analysis the main 
explanatory factors of electoral violence in the aftermath of presidential elections in 
contemporary Africa before testing my three hypotheses that are exclusively associated with 
legislative elections. 
  
3.2.4.3.1: Potential Determinants of Electoral Conflict at the Presidential Level 
 Table 3.10 presents eight OLS regression analysis models that investigate the potential 
determinants of electoral conflicts in 153 presidential elections in contemporary Africa. 
Obviously, the unit of analysis is presidential elections, and the eight indicators used in the 
analysis include the type of presidential election (lnPRES_TYPE), ethnic fractionalization index 
(lnEFI), electoral self-determination (lnELECSD), freedom of assembly and association 
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(lnASSN), freedom of religion (lnNEW_RELFRE), freedom of speech (lnSPEECH), 
independent judiciary (lnINJUD), and freedom of movement (lnFORMOV).  
 A bivariate regression coefficient of 0.053 between the independent variable 
(lnPRES_TYPE) and the dependent variable (lnELEC_CONF) shows that a one percent increase 
of lnPRES_TYPE increases the lnELEC_CONF by 0.053 percent. However, because the 
estimated coefficient (0.053) is not statistically significant as revealed in Model I, this increase 
indicates that a type of rules or formula used in a presidential election is not in itself the main 
predictor of post-election conflict.  
In Model II, when controlled for lnEFI, the estimated coefficient of lnPRES_TYPE 
becomes statistically significant at 10 percent while the estimated coefficient of lnEFI is 
statistically significant at 1 percent but such significance disappear in Models III, IV, V, VI, VII, 
and VIII. This observation indicates that ethnic fractionalization is not a strong and consistent 
explanatory variable of post-presidential election conflict in Africa. With other critically 
intervening variables such as lnASSN, and lnELECSD, the results are consistent and statistically 
significant. While the regression coefficients of lnASSN maintain their significances at 1 percent 
from Model III to Model VIII, the estimated coefficients of lnELECSD maintain their statiscally 
significances at 5 percent in Models IV and V, and such significances reduce to 10 percent in 
Models VI, VII, and VIII.  
In addition, the negative estimated coefficients of lnASSN and of lnELECSD reveal that 
in countries where freedom of assembly and association is not respected by government, and that 
presidential elections are not free and fair, there is a high likelihood of the occurrence of post-
election conflicts. However, the lack of statistically significance of the estimated coefficients of 
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the control variables (lnNEW_RELFRE, lnSPEECH, lnINJUD, and lnFORMOV) is not 
consistent with prior expectations. In other words, this study helps us to safely say that the lack 
of respect of these rights or freedoms is unrelated to the occurrence of post-presidential election 
conflicts in contemporary Africa.  
Overall, Table 3.10 below shows that conflicts occur in the aftermath of presidential 
elections in Africa as a result of the lack of freedom of assembly and association, and the lack of 
free and fair elections. In addition, the adjusted R-Squared of 0.302 in Model VIII suggests that 
about 30 percent of the post-presidential conflicts that occurred between 1990 and 2010 in 
African are explained by the indicators discussed above.  
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Table 3.10: Ordinary least squares regression results at the presidential level 
DV= 
lnELEC_CON
F 
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI Model VII Model 
VIII 
Intercept 0.728 
(0.099)**
* 
0.397 
(0.133)**
* 
0.995 
(0.157)**
* 
1.119 
(0.164)**
* 
1.229 
(0.183)**
* 
1.222 
(0.183)**
* 
1.243 
(0.185)**
* 
1.242 
(0.188)**
* 
lnPRES_TYPE 0.053 
(0.153) 
0.234 
(0.139)* 
0.168 
(0.127) 
0.176 
(0.124) 
0.155 
(0.125) 
0.178 
(0.126) 
0.156 
(0.129) 
0.156 
(0.134) 
lnEFI  0.886 
(0.255)**
* 
0.322 
(0.251) 
0.242 
(0.249) 
0.193 
(0.251) 
0.226 
(0.252) 
0.238 
(0.253) 
0.239 
(0.256) 
lnASSN   -0.566 
(0.097)**
* 
-0.466 
(0.105)**
* 
-0.437 
(0.107)**
* 
-0.404 
(0.111)**
* 
-0.383 
(0.114)**
* 
-0.383 
(0.115)**
* 
lnELECSD    -0.251 
(0.110)** 
-0.240 
(0.110)** 
-0.204 
(0.114)* 
-0.194 
(0.115)* 
-0.195 
(0.116)* 
lnNEW_RELF
RE 
    -0.128 
(0.098) 
-0.118 
(0.098) 
-0.116 
(0.098) 
 -0.117 
(0.099) 
lnSPEECH      -0.135 
(0.117) 
-0.116 
(0.120) 
-0.116 
(0.120) 
lnINJUD       -0.084 
(0.109) 
-0.085 
(0.113) 
lnFORMOV        0.002 
(0.094) 
Adjusted 
R-Squared 
0.007 0.087 0.278 0.304 0.309 0.311 0.308 0.302 
F-Stat % 11.882 666.943 1562.113 1345.638 1118.316 957.0016 825.549 715.610 
N 133 121 115 115 115 115 115 115 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** = significant at 1%; ** = significant at 5%; * = significant at 
10% 
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3.2.4.3.2 Potential Determinants of Electoral Conflict at the Legislative Level 
To test the three hypotheses formulated for the purpose of this study, I ran three different 
sets of multivariate regression analysis. Each set uses a type of electoral system (MA, PR, and 
MI) as the main independent variable against electoral conflict (ELEC_CONF) as the dependent 
variable. The results of the estimated coefficients are compared against each other in order to 
determine which electoral system may be more prone to post-election conflicts than the other. 
However, to determine whether a result is statistically significant, the estimated regression 
coefficients are compared to at least two times their standard errors. This justification is in line 
with Treiman (2009)’s note: “The convention is to interpret coefficients at least twice the size of 
their standard errors as statistically significant” (p. 107).  To obtain accurate comparisons, the 
following seven indicators (lnSEATS, lnASSN, lnEFI, lnELECRULE, lnELECSD, 
lnNEW_RELFRE, and lnMDMH) are used in each of the three sets of multivariate regression 
analysis.  
In Table 3.11, Model 1, which is a bivariate regression analysis between lnMA and 
lnELEC_CONF, reveals a positive estimated regression coefficient of 0.185. This observation 
indicates that in a country, a one percent increase of the use of a majoritarian electoral system 
increases the occurrence of post-election conflicts by 0.185 percent. In addition, the Model 1 
shows no statistically significant result and the adjusted R-Squared of 0.009 demonstrates that 
only 0.9 percent of post-election conflict is explained by the use of majoritarian electoral 
systems. This first test suggests that MA is not a significant explanatory factor of post-election 
conflict.  
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Although the estimated coefficients of lnMA are not statistically significant across the 
Models 1a, 2a, 3a, 4a, 5a, 6a, and 7a, Model 8a shows a weak statistically significant result at 10 
percent when I controlled for the average district magnitude (lnMDMH). Such an observation 
contradicts the test in Model 1a.  Not only does the control variable lnMDMH exert a weak 
significant (at 10 percent) effect on the majoritarian system, but also it has a weak statistically 
significant effect on the electoral rules (Model 8a) used in legislative or parliamentary elections. 
Overall, while the critically intervening variables such as the number of elected seats, and 
freedom of assembly and association exert significant effects on the occurrence of post-election 
conflicts as revealed by Models 2a, 3a, 4a, 5a, 6a, 7a, and 8a, Table 3.11 demonstrates that the 
control variables lnEFI, lnNEW_RELFRE and lnELECSD have no statistically significant effect 
on post-election conflicts in contemporary Africa. Although ethnic fractionalization does not 
exert any statistically significant effect on the occurrence of post-election conflicts, its positive 
estimated coefficients observed in Models 4a, 5a, 6a, 7a, and 8a indicate that if a country with a 
higher ethnic fractionalization index uses a majoritarian electoral system, the likelihood that it 
experiences post-election conflict increases.  
Similarly, the positive estimated regression coefficients of lnSEATS observed in Models 
in 2a, 3a, 4a, 5a, 6a, 7a, and 8a show that as the number of elected seats increases so does the 
level of post-election conflicts given that in many countries in contemporary Africa, dominant 
parties usually get an absolute majority of seats that enable them to enact all rules and policies at 
the parliament at the expenses of the opposition parties. On the other hand, the consistent 
negative estimated coefficients of lnELECRULE (Models 6a, 7a, and 8a) and lnNEW_RELFRE 
(Models 7a and 8a) indicate that a decrease in the legislative electoral rules leads to an increase 
of post-election conflicts and the more the freedom of religion is restricted within a country, the 
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more likely that country will experience post-election conflicts. Finally, the adjusted R-Squared 
of 0.397 of the multivariate model indicates that about 40 percent of post-election conflicts is 
explained by both the independent (MA) and the critically intervening variables, including but 
not limited to the number of elected seats and freedom of assembly and association.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Preventive Approach to Post-Election Conflicts in Contemporary Africa                           Edoh Agbehonou 
 
101 
 
Table 3.11: Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results at the Legislative Level Using MA 
DV= 
lnELEC_CONF 
Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 4a Model 5a Model 6a Model 7a Model 8a 
Intercept 0.613 
(0.058)**
* 
-1.316 
(0.232)**
* 
-0.717 
(0.301)** 
-0.773 
(0.318)** 
-0.339 
(0.439) 
-0.362 
(0.443) 
-0.257 
(0.471) 
-0.118 
(0.518) 
lnMA 0.185 
(0.119) 
0.104 
(0.101) 
0.155 
(0.102) 
0.091 
(0.110) 
-0.354 
(0.330) 
-0.361 
(0.332) 
-0.379 
(0.334) 
-0.572 
(0.343)* 
lnSEATS  0.405 
(0.048)**
* 
0.327 
(0.055)**
* 
0.316 
(0.057)**
* 
0.301 
(0.058)**
* 
0.303 
(0.058)**
* 
0.293 
(0.060)**
* 
0.285 
(0.068)**
* 
lnASSN   -0.363 
(0.095)**
* 
-0.311 
(0.101)**
* 
-0.303 
(0.101)**
* 
-0.332 
(0.117)**
* 
-0.307 
(0.123)** 
-0.323 
(0.132)** 
lnEFI    0.319 
(0.243) 
0.294 
(0.242) 
0.297 
(0.243) 
0.296 
(0.244) 
0.441 
(0.269) 
lnELECRULE     -0.153 
(0.108) 
-0.158 
(0.108) 
-0.164 
(0.109) 
 -0.229 
(0.116)* 
lnELECSD      0.058 
(0.116) 
0.075 
(0.120) 
0.157 
(0.130) 
lnNEW_RELF
RE 
       -0.081 
(0.123) 
-0.163 
(0.145) 
lnMDMH        0.0150 
(0.043) 
Adjusted 
R-Squared 
0.009 0.318 0.361 0.335 0.340 0.336 0.333 0.397 
F-Stat % 243.265 3758.958 2722.781 1797.522 1489.946 1238.570 1063.350 940.555 
N 163 158 140 136 136 136 136 103 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** = significant at 1%; ** = significant at 5%; * = significant at 
10% 
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Table 3.12 tests how the use of proportional representation electoral systems may 
influence the occurrence of post-election conflicts in contemporary Africa. The estimated 
regression coefficient of -0,111 in Model 1b indicates that one percent increase in the use of PR 
decreases the occurrence of post-election conflicts by 0.111 percent. Also, the adjusted R-
Squared of 0.005 observed in Model 1b shows that only about 0.5 percent of post-election 
conflicts that occurred in contemporary Africa can be explained by the use of PR systems alone. 
This negligible result confirms the lack of statistically significant estimated coefficient in Model 
1b, indicating that PR systems have negligible effect on post-election conflicts.  
After controlling for lnSEATS and lnASSN, the result suggests strong statistically 
significant estimated coefficients across all the last seven models (2b, 3b, 4b, 5b, 6b, 7b, and 8b) 
for lnSEATS, and across the last six models (3b, 4b, 5b, 6b, 7b, and 8b) for lnASSN. These 
observations suggest that the critically intervening variables “number of elected seats” and 
“freedom of assembly and association” are the significant predictors of post-election conflicts. 
However, when one turns to the control variables lnEFI and lnELECRULE, Table 3.12 shows 
mixed results. The estimated regression coefficients remain statistically significant at 10 percent 
for lnELECRULE in Models 5b, 6b, and 7b, but such a weak significance pales in Model 8b. On 
the other hand, the estimated regression coefficient of lnEFI appears statistically significant at 10 
percent only in Model 4b. Again, with this analysis, one can carefully say that both electoral 
rules and ethnic fractionalization are weak explanatory factors of post-election conflicts when a 
country uses a proportional representation system in contemporary Africa. In addition, while 
Table 3.12 shows that none of the estimated coefficients of lnELECSD, lnNEW_RELFRE, and 
lnMDMH are statistically significant, the adjusted R-Squared of 0.388 of the multivariate 
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analysis demonstrates that about 39 percent of post-election conflicts are explained by 
combination of the independent variables used in Table 3.12.  
Finally, Table 3.13 tests the effect of the use of mixed electoral systems (MI) on post-
election conflicts in contemporary Africa. Model 1c uses lnMI as an independent variable. The 
estimated coefficient of -0.038 indicates that a one percent increase in the use of MI decreases 
the occurrence of post-election conflicts by 0.038 percent. The regression coefficient of lnMI 
remains statistically insignificant even after controlling for lnSEATS.  As noticed in Table 3.12, 
the critically intervening variables “number of elected seats” and “freedom of assembly and 
association” remain statistically significant at 1 percent across the last seven models for 
lnSEATS and across the last six models for lnASSN in Table 3.13. These observations, once 
again, confirm the conclusion reached with the analysis in Table 3.11 and 3.12 that the variables 
“number of elected seats” and “freedom of assembly and association” are the strong explanatory 
factors of post-election conflicts in contemporary Africa.   
Another important observation worth discussing here is that the independent variable 
lnMI reveals a statistically significant estimated regression coefficient at 10 percent in Model 3c 
after controlling for lnASSN. This observation suggests that the occurrence of post-election 
conflicts increase if freedom of assembly and association is severely restricted to all citizens. In 
addition, analysis of Table 3.13 shows that none of the estimated regression coefficients for the 
lnEFI, lnELECRULE, lnELECSD, lnNEW_RELFRE, and lnMDMH are statistically significant 
in the overall multivariate regression analysis. These observations suggest that in a contemporary 
Africa, none of the variables: the level of ethnic fractionalization, the electoral rules used, the 
electoral self-determination, the level of religious freedom, and the average of district magnitude, 
have significant effect on the occurrence of post-election conflict if a country uses a mixed 
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electoral system. Finally, the overall adjusted R-Squared of 0.381 indicates that about 38 percent 
of post-election conflicts in African countries that use MI is explained by the independent 
variables.  
In summary, three conclusions emerge from this quantitative study. First, the findings 
from Table 3.11 and 3.12 support the Hypothesis 1 or (H1) that states that “In Africa, countries 
that use majoritarian electoral systems are more likely to experience post-election conflicts than 
are countries that use proportional electoral systems.” Such a comparison is based on the fact that 
there is a likelihood that the occurrence post-election conflict will increase by 0.185 percent if a 
country in Africa uses a majoritarian electoral system and decrease by 0.111 percent if it uses a 
proportional representation system. Second, the findings from Tables 3.11 and 3.13 support the 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): In Africa, countries that use majoritarian electoral systems are more likely to 
experience post-election conflicts than are countries that use mixed electoral systems. Because of 
a likelihood that the occurrence post-election conflict will increase by 0.185 percent if a country 
in Africa uses a majoritarian electoral system and decrease by 0.038 percent if it uses a mixed 
electoral system as revealed by Table 3.11 and 3.13, one can carefully assert that in Africa, 
countries that use majoritarian electoral systems are more likely to experience post-election 
conflicts than are countries that use mixed electoral systems. Finally, the findings from Tables 
3.12 and 3.13 demonstrate that while the occurrence of post-election conflict decreases by 0.111 
percent if an African country uses proportional representation system, it will decrease only by 
0.038 percent that country uses a mixed electoral system.  Therefore, the findings from Tables 
3.12 and 3.13 supports the Hypothesis 3 or (H3) that posits that “In Africa, countries that use PR 
systems are less likely to experience post-election conflicts than are countries that use mixed 
systems (MMM, especially). 
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In all, the procedure used in this thesis only allowed me to find a relationship among the 
variables (both the dependent and the independent variables). The data collection process and 
procedures lasted about six to nine months and were performed mainly in libraries. While this 
study is encouraging, more research is needed not only to confirm the conclusions reached by 
this thesis, but also to show the causation or causal effects among the variables.  
 
Table 3.12: Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results at the Legislative Level Using PR 
 
DV= 
lnELEC_CON
F 
Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b Model 4b Model 5b Model 6b Model 7b Model 8b 
Intercept 0.718 
(0.049)**
* 
-1.251 
(0.240)**
* 
-0.688  
(0.305)** 
-0.799 
(0.321)** 
-0.629 
(0.332)* 
-0.656 
(0.338)* 
-0.574 
(0.365) 
-0.594 
 (0.417) 
lnPR -0.111 
(0.082) 
-0.050 
(0.070) 
-0.007  
(0.073) 
0.041 
(0.077) 
0.128 
(0.090) 
0.128 
(0.090) 
0.129 
(0.090) 
0.113  
(0.102) 
lnSEATS  0.402 
(0.048)**
* 
0.331 
(0.055)**
* 
0.318 
(0.057)**
* 
0.311 
(0.057)**
* 
0.313 
(0.057)**
* 
0.304 
(0.059)**
* 
0.305  
(0.067)**
* 
lnASSN   -0.347 
(0.096)**
* 
-0.296 
(0.099)**
* 
-0.338 
(0.101)**
* 
-0.364 
(0.117)**
* 
-0.342 
(0.123)**
* 
-0.367 
 
(0.132)**
* 
lnEFI    0.405 
(0.236)* 
0.294 
(0.242) 
0.297 
(0.242) 
0.296 
(0.243) 
0.379  
(0.272) 
lnELECRULE     -0.076 
(0.042)* 
-0.079 
(0.042)* 
-0.079 
(0.042)* 
-0.080  
(0.058) 
lnELECSD      0.052 
(0.116) 
 0.066 
(0.119) 
0.137  
(0.131) 
lnNEW_RELFR
E 
       -0.073 
(0.122) 
-0.142  
(0.145) 
lnMDMH        0.009 
 (0.044) 
Adjusted 
R-Squared 
0.005 0.310 0.351 0.333 0.344 0.340 0.337 0.388 
F-Stat % 186.713 3600.364 2601.867 1782.554 1517.940 1260.436 1080.164 906.756 
N 162 157 140 136 136 136 136 103 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** = significant at 1%; ** = significant at 5%; * = significant at 
10% 
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Table 3.13: Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results at the Legislative Level using MI 
 
DV= 
lnELEC_CONF 
Model 1c Model 2c Model 3c Model 4c Model 5c Model 6c Model 7c Model c 
Intercept 0.692 
(0.046)**
* 
-1.280 
(0.235)**
* 
-0.629 
(0.301)** 
-0.698 
(0.319)** 
-0.663 
(0.332)** 
-0.688 
(0.339)** 
-0.612 
(0.367)* 
-0.640 
(0.417) 
lnMI -0.038 
(0.074) 
-0.031 
(0.062) 
-0.125 
(0.067)* 
-0.112 
(0.068) 
-0.094 
(0.083) 
-0.093 
(0.084) 
-0.092 
(0.084) 
-0.037 
(0.095) 
lnSEATS  0.407 
(0.048)**
* 
0.332 
(0.054)**
* 
0.319 
(0.057)**
* 
0.316 
(0.057)**
* 
0.318 
(0.058)**
* 
0.310 
(0.060)**
* 
0.310 
(0.068)**
* 
lnASSN   -0.394 
(0.098)**
* 
-0.342 
(0.103)**
* 
-0.342 
(0.103)**
* 
-0.367 
(0.119)**
* 
-0.347 
(0.125)**
* 
--0.362 
(0.134)**
* 
lnEFI    0.313 
(0.233) 
0.290 
(0.242) 
0.292 
(0.243) 
0.290 
(0.244) 
0.389 
(0.275) 
lnELECRULE     -0.016 
(0.044) 
-0.019 
(0.044) 
-0.019 
(0.044) 
 -0.044 
(0.063) 
lnELECSD      0.048 
(0.116) 
0.063 
(0.119) 
0.135 
(0.132) 
lnNEW_RELF
RE 
       -0.068 
(0.122) 
-0.131 
(0.146) 
lnMDMH        0.014 
(0.044) 
Adjusted 
R-Squared 
0.005 0.309 0.367 0.345 0.341 0.336 0.333 0.381 
F-Stat % 25.947 3580.483 2786.865 1875.887 1493.671 1239.675 1061.245 883.1589 
N 162 157 140 136 136 136 136 103 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** = significant at 1%; ** = significant at 5%; * = significant at 
10% 
 
3.2.5. In-depth Comparative Analysis – Pattern Matching 
           To narrow down the focus of the study, investigate in detail the main research question, 
and obtain robust results for greater replication, the author intends to do in-depth comparative 
case studies on three pairs of African countries {(Ghana, Togo); (Benin, Guinea-Bissau); 
(Senegal, Guinea)}  using a different electoral systems design for each (see Table 1 in chapter 1). 
These pairs are selected from the 54 African countries that hold elections (see Appendix A, 
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Table 3.8). These six countries provide some degrees of variation of the consequences of 
electoral systems on Africa’s democratization process and its conflict prevention mechanisms. 
All elections held at national levels (presidential, legislative or parliamentary) between 1990 and 
2010 will be studied with a particular attention to political participation, competition, and 
legitimacy (Lindberg 2006). In all, a total of 25 parliamentary or legislative elections will be 
analyzed. Table 3.14 below provides an account of the legislative/parliamentary elections being 
investigated in this research. This method focuses also on contemporary events in the six 
countries selected for the study. 
 
Table 3.14: An account of elections to be studied 
 
Countries Legislative elections Total number of elections 
Benin 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007 5 
Ghana 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008  5 
Guinea 1995, 2002 2 
Guinea-Bissau 1994, 1999, 2004, 2008 5 
Senegal 1993, 1998, 2001, 2007 4 
Togo 1994, 1999, 2002, 2007 4 
Total 25 
  
          This comparative study used both qualitative and quantitative data as an analytic strategy. 
The quantitative data helped cover elections and electoral behavior that is the embedded unit of 
analysis that this study purports to explain. The qualitative data, however, helped explain the key 
questions of the study that are (1) “Why are some electoral systems more prone to conflict than 
others?” and (2) “How can post-election conflicts be prevented in contemporary Africa?” Pattern 
matching was used as analytic technique. Yin (2009) notes that the pattern matching “compares 
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an empirically based pattern with a predicted one (or with several alternative predictions)” (Yin 
2009: 136) (see for example, Trochim 1989). This analytic technique helps improve the internal 
validity of the case study. The two important questions raised in this section will be thoroughly 
answered in chapter 5 after the discussion of variations of African electoral systems in chapter 4. 
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Appendix A 
Table 3.3: Elections in Africa from 1990 to 2010 
 
Countries Legislative/ 
Parliamentary Elections 
Presidential Elections Total Number of 
Elections 
Algeria 2007 2009 2 
Angola 1992, 2008 1992 3 
Benin 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 
2007 
1991, 1996, 2001, 2006 9 
Botswana 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009 (President elected by 
House) 
4 
Burkina Faso 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007 1991, 1998, 2005, 2010 8 
Burundi 1993, 2005, 2010 1993, 2005, 2010 6 
Cameroon 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007 1992, 1997, 2004, 7 
Cape Verde 1991, 1995, 2001, 2005?, 
2006 
1991, 1996, 2001, 2006 8 
Central African Republic 1992, 1993, 1998, 2005 1992, 1993, 1999, 2005 8 
Chad 1990, 1997, 2002 1996, 2001, 2006 6 
Comoros 1992, 1993, 1996, 2004, 
2007?, 2009 
1990, 1996, 2002, 
2006, 2008, 2010 
11 
Congo 1992, 1993, 2002, 2007 1992, 2002, 2009, 2006 8 
Congo, Democratic Republic of 2006 2006 2 
Djibouti 1992, 1997, 2003, 2008 1999, 2005 6 
Egypt 2005, 2010 2005 3 
Equatorial Guinea 1993, 1999, 2004, 2008 1996, 2002, 2009 7 
Eritrea N/A N/A N/A 
Ethiopia 1994, 1995, 2000, 2005, 
2008, 2010, 
President elected by the 
House) 
6 
Gabon 1990, 1996, 2001, 2006 1993, 1998, 2005, 2009 
(b/c death) 
8 
Gambia 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007 1992, 1996, 2001, 2006 8 
Ghana 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 
2008 
1992, 1996, 2000, 
2004, 2008 
10 
Guinea 1995, 2002 1993, 1998, 2003, 2010 6 
Guinea-Bissau 1994, 1999, 2004, 2008 1994, 1999, 2005, 2009 
(b/c of the assassination 
of the president) 
8 
Ivory Coast 1990, 1995, 2000 1990, 1995, 2000, 2010 7 
Kenya 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007 8 
Lesotho 1993, 1998, 2002, 2007 Kingdom (PM elected 
by the House) 
4 
Liberia 1997, 2005 1997, 2005 4 
Libya    
Madagascar 1993, 1998, 2002, 2007 1992, 1996, 2001, 2006 8 
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Table 6 (continued) 
 
Countries Legislative/ 
Parliamentary Elections 
Presidential Elections Total Number 
of Elections 
Malawi 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009 8 
Mali 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007 8 
Mauritania 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006 1992, 1997, 2003, 
2007, 2009 
9 
Mauritius 1991, 1995, 2005, 2010 President elected by the 
National Assembly 
4 
Morocco 2007  1 
Mozambique 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009 8 
Namibia 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009 8 
Niger 1993, 1995, 1996, 1999, 
2004, 2009 
1993, 1996, 1999, 2004 10 
Nigeria 1992, 1998, 1999, 2003, 
2007 
1993, 1999, 2003, 2007 9 
Rwanda 2003, 2008 2003, 2010 4 
Sao Tome and Principe 1991, 1994, 1998, 2002, 
2008, 2010 
1991,  1996, 2001, 
2006 
10 
Senegal 1993, 1998, 2001, 2007 1993, 2000, 2007 7 
Seychelles 1993, 1998, 2002, 2007 1993, 1998, 2001, 2006 8 
Sierra Leone 1996, 2002, 2007 1996, 2002, 2007 6 
Somalia   NA 
Somaliland 2005 2003, 2010 3 
South Africa 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009 Pres. elected by the 
House 
4 
South Sudan 2010 2010 2 
Sudan 2000, 2010 2000, 2005, 2010 5 
Swaziland Non partisan Traditional monarchy NA 
Tanzania 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010 8 
Togo 1994, 1999, 2002, 2007 1993, 1998, 2003, 
2005, 2010 
9 
Tunisia 2009 2009 2 
Uganda 2006 2006, 2 
Zambia 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006 1991, 1996, 2001, 
2006, 2008(b/c death), 
9 
Zanzibar 2005, 2010 2005, 2010 4 
Zimbabwe 
 
1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 
2008 
1990, 1992, 2002, 2008 9 
N=324 elections (i.e. 153 presidential elections and 171 legislative/parliamentary elections) 
Sources: Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA):2005-2010 and African 
Election Database 2011 
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Figure 3.1: Map of Democracy Rating in Contemporary Africa 
 
 
Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit; Mo Ibrahim Foundation; The Economist 2012, at 
http://www.economist.com/node/21551494 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
VARIATIONS IN ELECTORAL SYSTEMS IN CONTEMPORARY AFRICA 
The electoral system, or how the votes cast are actually translated into seats, has a 
huge impact not just on inclusion and exclusion but also on the tone of the entire political 
system. The system will also craft the space for corruption and vote rigging—it will not 
eliminate the space for malfeasance, but it can limit it. For these reasons, the crafting of 
appropriate electoral systems is one of the key factors shaping democratization and 
political conflict on the continent. 
       ______ Andrew Reynolds, 2009 
 
The choice of electoral system determines how the entire electoral process will be run. It 
can affect not only the size of electoral districts and the ballot structures but also who can vote 
and how their votes can be counted (Reynolds 2009, Reynolds, Reilly, and Ellis 2008). Conflicts 
are more likely to arise if an electoral system is perceived as a system of “pick and choose.” As 
Chapter 3 of this thesis suggested, some electoral systems may be less prone to post-election 
conflicts than others; and to some extent such electoral systems may also be more helpful in 
promoting democracy than others. In addition, studies have shown that many African countries 
that hold elections inherited their political systems from their former European colonial powers 
(Reynolds 2009, Blanton, Mason, and Athow 2001, Young 1986). Such systems are less likely to 
work on African terrains. Therefore, designing an electoral system that can help minimize 
frequent occurrences of political conflict requires not only an in-depth knowledge of party 
systems in Africa but also a deep understanding of electoral rules of the game. This chapter 
covers two interrelated topics: African models of electoral systems with a particular emphasis on 
electoral rules and democracy promotion, and elections and party systems.  
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4.1. Electoral Systems in Democratizing Countries: Examining African Models 
 In this section, I discuss the main electoral rules and formulas used in allocating elected 
seats in African countries. I also identify and discuss potential effects of electoral systems: 
plurality/majority, block vote, list proportional representation, and mixed-member majoritarian 
and mixed-member proportional systems.  
4.1.1. Electoral Rules and Democracy Promotion 
An electoral rule determines how many representatives or members of parliament (MPs) 
are elected from one electoral district or constituency. If only one MP is elected to a parliament 
from a district, that district will be called a single-member district. However, if more than one 
MP is elected to a parliament from a district, the district will be referred to as a multi-member 
district.17 The plurality/majority systems use single-member districts. These systems are the 
plurality single-member district or the First Past The Post (FPTP), the majority single-member 
district or the Two-Round System (TRS), and Block Vote (BV). The multi-member districts are 
used by both the proportional representation systems (LIST-PR) and mixed systems (MMP and 
MMM). In Africa, the variations in electoral systems indicate that there are also variations in 
electoral rules that are used to translate votes into elected seats and, therefore, into policy 
preferences.  Table 4.1 summarizes the variation in electoral rules used in contemporary Africa.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
17
 For a detailed discussion on single-member district and multi-member district, see Reynolds et al. (2008), Farrell 
(2011). 
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Table 4.1: Variation in Electoral Rules in Contemporary African States   
 
FPTP TRS  BV List-PR MMP MMM 
Botswana, Ethiopia, 
Gambia, Gabon (1996-
2010), Ghana, Kenya, 
Liberia, Madagascar*, 
Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra 
Leone, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Uganda, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe 
Central African 
Republic, 
Comoros, 
Congo 
Republic, 
Egypt, Gabon 
(1990), Mali, 
Mauritania, and 
Togo  
Mauritius Algeria, Angola, Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape 
Verde, Equatorial Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Magadagascar 
(1993), Morocco, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger 
(2010), Rwanda, Sao Tome 
Principe, South Africa, 
Tunisia,  
Djibouti, 
Lesotho  
Cameroon, Chad, DRC, 
Egypt, Guinea, 
Madagascar (1998 and 
2002), Niger*, Senegal, 
Seychelles, and Sudan  
Sources: IDEA, African Elections Database, Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) 
 
An analysis of Table 4.1 reveals that fifteen African states, including Botswana, Ethiopia, 
The Gambia, Gabon (1996 – 2010), Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra 
Leone, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe use FPTP and that most of these 
countries were once colonized by the United Kingdom, the founding country of FPTP systems 
(Reynolds et al. 2008).  While only one African state (Mauritius) uses BV systems, eight 
countries including Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo Republic, Egypt, Gabon (1990), 
Mali, Mauritania, and Togo use TRS. Contrary to FPTP systems, which are mostly used by 
former British colonies, TRS systems have been adopted by overwhelming majority of former 
French colonies in Africa. 
Table 4.1 also suggests that apart from Niger, which recently switched from MMM 
systems in 2010 to List-PR, and Madagascar, which used List-PR in 1993 before switching to 
MMM in 1998 and 2002 and to FPTP in subsequent legislative elections, fifteen other African 
states such as Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, 
Guinea Bissau, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Sao Tome Principe, South Africa, 
Tunisia, used List-PR systems between 1990 and 2010. Among the ten African countries that 
steadily use mixed electoral systems, eight of them—Cameroon, Chad, Democratic Republic of 
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Congo (DRC), Egypt, Guinea, Senegal, Seychelles, and Sudan—use MMM systems, and only 
two of them (Djibouti and Lesotho) use MMP systems.  
Another important point to note is that between 1990 and 2010, while Liberia switched 
from FPTP to List-PR in 1997 and back to FPTP since 2005, other African countries switched to 
a “more proportional system” as a result of post-conflict agreements (Reynolds 2009). For 
instance, Lesotho switched from FPTP to MMP in 2002, Rwanda from FPTP to List-PR after the 
1994 Rwandan genocide, and South Africa  and Sierra Leone from FPTP to List-PR in 1994 and 
1996, respectively (African Elections Database 2012, Reynolds 2009). As it is discussed in 
Chapter 2, MMP systems tend to be more proportional than MMM systems. In general, each 
electoral rule has its advantages and disadvantages. 
 
 4.1.2. Effects of Electoral Systems in Contemporary Africa 
4.1.2.1. Effects of Plurality/Majority Systems  
According to Reynolds et al. 2008), “First Past The Post is the simplest form of 
plurality/majority electoral system. The winning candidate is the one who gains more votes than 
any other candidates, even if this is not an absolute majority of valid votes” (p. 35). Because 
FPTP is simple and easy to understand by political actors in general and voters in particular, it is 
often recommended to less developed countries where, in most cases, illiteracy rate remains 
high. Such a recommendation fails to take into account the existence of multiple sociopolitical 
cleavages in these developing countries given that FPTP favors only strong parties or minority 
groups that are located in a concentrated geographical area.  
In a country where FPTP method or other single-member district systems are used, 
candidates are the focus of voters, who cast their ballots for them instead of voting for political 
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parties. The FPTP system is often believed to strengthen the relationship that must exist between 
representatives and their constituents. Because these representatives are directly elected by 
voters, the latter can hold them accountable for any decisions they made by either re-electing 
them or voting them out in future elections. This is what Strom (2000) refers to as 
“accountability for candidates.” This accountability can be discussed at two levels. First, under 
single-member district systems, MPs are required to maintain permanent communication or 
contact with people they represent. 
Second, because of the existence of strong party discipline under FPTP and other single-
member district systems, MPs must demonstrate strong support for their parties’ policies and 
platforms to earn re-nomination in subsequent elections. But under multi-member district 
systems, such as List-PR, MMM and MMP, voters cannot hold candidates accountable. Instead, 
political parties are often punished for their actions.  
Specific to TRS is that a legislative/parliamentary election is run in two rounds if no 
candidate wins the majority of vote (i.e. over 50 percent) in the first round. Generally, only two 
candidates with the highest vote in the first round are allowed to compete in the second round. In 
that case, the system is called “majority run-off TRS” (Reynolds et al. 2008: 52). The majority 
run-off TRS is commonly used in many states that use majoritarian electoral systems in 
contemporary Africa. As illustrated by Table 4.2, these countries include Central African 
Republic, Comoros, Congo Republic, and Mali. 
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Table 4.2: Variations in Electoral Formula in Contemporary African States 
 
Single-Member District 
Plurality 
Two- Round 
Plurality-
Majority 
Two-Round Majority 
Runoff 
Party Block Vote Hare Quota 
Botswana, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Ethiopia, Gambia, 
Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, 
Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra 
Leone, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe 
Gabon, 
Swaziland, 
Togo 
Central African Republic, 
Comoros, Congo Republic, 
Mali 
Cameroon, Chad, 
Djibouti, Senegal, 
Tunisia 
Madagascar (2007) 
 
Table 4.2 (Continued) 
 
Hare Quota (HQ) with Largest 
Remainders or HQ with 
Highest Average 
Remainders Block Vote Droop Largest 
Remainders 
D’Hondt 
Algeria, Benin (1991), Burkina 
Faso, Egypt, Madagascar (1993) 
Madagascar (1998, 
2002), Niger (2004, 
2009), 
Benin 1995, 1996, 2003, 
2007, Madagascar 
(1998, 2002) 
Mauritius South Africa Angola, Burundi, 
Cape Verde, 
Mozambique, Sao 
Tome Principe 
Sources: African Elections Database, IDEA, and IPU 
 
However, it is also important to point out a variation in TRS method as it is used in 
France and other places around the globe (Reynolds et al. 2008). While the United Kingdom is 
known for creating FPTP method,  France is always referenced when it comes to the use of TRS 
method. Rather than using a majority run-off TRS method, France sets a magic number of 12.5 
percent of the vote as a minimum quota that any candidates must win in the first round of a 
legislative in order to contest the second round if no one wins a majority of vote in the first round 
(Reynolds, et al. 2008). In doing so, the system allows more than two candidates in the second 
round of a legislative election. Such a system is simply called “majority-plurality TRS” 
(Reynolds, et al. 2008: 52). In contemporary Africa, this system is used by countries such as 
Gabon, Swaziland, and Togo. 
A Preventive Approach to Post-Election Conflicts in Contemporary Africa                           Edoh Agbehonou 
 
118 
 
Without distinguishing the type of TRS, the TRS method is often praised not only for 
allowing voters a second chance to select their representatives, but also for minimizing vote-
splitting by allowing coalition formation among candidates who have similar policy agendas but 
are in the competition to win over the same electorate. However, there is a high likelihood for 
party systems to be more fragmented in countries where TRS has been used than in countries 
where other single-member district systems are used.  
Talking of party systems, Erdmann and Basedau (2008) note “Party system stability and 
competitiveness are positively associated with democracy in Africa” (p. 242) (see also Kuenzi 
and Lambright 2005). For example, since 1992, Ghana, which has been using the FPTP method 
to translate votes into elected seats, is currently cited as a model of Africa’s democracy. 
Compared to its neighboring state, Togo, which not only uses TRS is also classified as a country 
with restricted democratic practices by Freedom House, Ghana’s democratic status can be 
credited to the stability of its party system as a result of its reliance on FPTP system for votes 
allocation of the country’s parliamentary elections. 
 
 
4.1.2.2. Effects of Block Vote Systems 
Party fragmentation and vote-buying are usually associated with the use of BV systems in 
legislative elections (Nabki 2012, UNAMI 2008, Reynolds, et al. 2008). By definition,  
Block vote is a plurality/majority system used in multi-member districts. Electors have as  
many votes as there are candidates to be elected. The candidates with the highest vote 
totals win the seats. Usually voters vote for candidates rather than parties and in most 
systems may use as many, or as few, of their votes as they wish (IDEA 27 November 
2013). 
 
Because voters can cast as many votes as there are seats to be directly elected, in countries where 
BV systems are used, candidates of the same political party are allowed to compete against one 
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another (Reynolds, et al 2008). In addition, as Reynolds, et al (2008) note it, the system allows 
voters to vote in many parties within their electoral district. This situation may result not only in 
massive corruption but also in internal party fragmentation and/or the fragmentation of the entire 
political system of countries where BV systems are used. 
 As identified by IDEA (2012), in the world, there are ten countries that use BV systems 
for the legislative/parliamentary elections. These countries include Cayman Islands with fifteen 
elected seats in the national assembly, Falkland Islands or Malvinas (8 seats), Guernsey (45 
seats), Kuwait (50 seats), Lao People’s Democratic Republic (132 seats), Lebanon (128 seats), 
Mauritius (62 seats), Montserrat (9 seats), Syrian Arab Republic (250 seats), and Tuvalu (15 
seats) (IDEA 2012). Apart from Syrian Arab Republic, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, and 
Lebanon, an analysis of the total number of seats directly elected to the legislatures in these 
countries shows that BV systems are usually adopted in countries that choose to have a small 
number of seats.   
Because the BV systems are basically plurality/majority systems in multi-member 
constituencies,  an absolute majority of seats is more likely to be won by bigger parties at the 
expense of smaller parties and minority groups. For instance, since 1990 in Mauritius, the only 
country in contemporary Africa that uses the Block Vote system for translating votes into seats, 
despite its reliance on what Reynolds, et al. call “best loser” seats18, suffered a problem of 
representation of minorities and smaller parties in the legislature.  
According to African Elections Database (2012), in the 1991 Legislative Assembly 
elections, the ruling coalition called the Mauritian Militant Movement-Mauritian Socialist 
Movement (MMM-MSM) won 59 seats against 3 seats for its political opposition coalition, the 
                                                           
18
 The best loser seats, according to Reynolds, et al. (2008), are seats that are guaranteed for the candidates who 
were front-runners in the exit poll but failed to gather enough vote to win seats in the actual legislative election.   
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Mauritian Labor Party-Mauritian Social-Democratic Party (MLP-PMSD), which was 
compensated with 4 best loser seats. The BV system allowed the ruling coalition to continue 
winning an absolute majority of seats (60 seats) in the 1995 National Assembly elections versus 
2 seats for the opposition; and in the 2000 legislative elections, it won 54 seats against 8 seats for 
the coalition of the opposition parties.  Although the number of the best loser seats was increased 
from 4 to 8 in the country’s subsequent legislative elections, it did not help smaller parties, such 
as the Organization of the People of Rodrigues (OPR) and the Rodrigues Movement (RM) to 
play any significant role in the country’s National Assembly since the Third Wave of 
Democratization.  
In spite of their inefficacy in ensuring that smaller political parties and minority groups 
are fairly represented in parliaments, voter turnouts seem to very high in countries where the BV 
systems are used with the exception of Lebanon and Syrian Arab Republic (IDEA 2011). Table 
4.3 shows voter turnouts in legislative/parliamentary elections in BV countries in the world 
during the last two decades. It also highlights whether voting is compulsory in each of these 
countries. A critical analysis of Table 4.3 reveals that compulsory voting has no effect on voters’ 
decisions to turn out to vote. Political instability may have contributed to the low voter turnout in 
Lebanon and Syrian Arab Republic. As discussed in chapter 2 and 3 of this thesis, a higher voter 
turnout indicates a high degree of political participation. As demonstrated in chapter 3, the lack 
of opportunity to participate in the political process has significant effects in the occurrences of 
post-election conflicts in contemporary Africa. According to African Elections Database, 
Mauritius is one of the rare democratic countries in Africa with a political rights score of 1 and a 
civil liberties score of 2. These democratic scores indicate that Mauritius is less prone to socio-
political conflicts in general and electoral conflict in particular.  
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Table 4.3 Voter Turnouts and Compulsory Voting in BV Countries in the World 
 
Cayman Islands 
Year  Voter turnouts Compulsory voting 
2005 80.25% No  
Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
2006 
2002 
1997 
1992 
99.69% 
99.90% 
99.37% 
99.26% 
No 
No 
No  
No 
Lebanon  
2009 
2005 
2000 
1996 
1992 
53.98% 
46.47% 
44.97% 
43.14% 
30.35% 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes  
Mauritius 
2010 
2005 
1995 
1991 
77.82% 
81.25% 
79.69% 
84.08% 
No 
No 
No 
No  
Montserrat  
2009 
2006 
2001 
66.75% 
74.63% 
77.48% 
No 
No 
No  
Syrian Arab Republic 
2007 
2003 
1998 
1994 
56.00% 
63.45% 
82.22% 
61.17% 
No 
No 
No 
No  
Tuvalu  
2002 79.99 No  
Source: http://www.idea.int/esd/type.cfm?electoralSystem=BV 
 
4.1.2.3. Effects of List Proportional Representation (List-PR) 
In a proportional representation system, “all groups influence a decision in proportion to 
their numerical strength” (Steiner 1971: 63) (also quoted in Lijphart 1977: 39). This system is 
just a complete opposite of the majority/plurality electoral system where only stronger parties 
dictate their decisions to smaller parties. To allow parties to be represented in the legislature, 
countries can choose between closed List-PR systems and open List-PR systems (Reynold, et al. 
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2008).  Under a closed List-PR system, voters have no choice than to vote for candidates at the 
top of their parties’ lists or simply vote for the parties. In contrast, under an open List-PR system, 
“voters can influence the order of the candidates by making individual preferences (Reynolds, et 
al. 2008: 60). In contemporary Africa, countries that have used PR systems adopted closed List-
PR (African Elections Database 2011, IDEA 2012, Inter-Parliamentary Union 2013).   
Table 4.1 provides a comprehensive list of African countries that have used closed List-
PR systems. In many of these countries, voters have not been given any incentives to select their 
representatives. They only vote political parties. In South Africa, for example, the PR system has 
opposite effect of what it is initially aimed for. Because of its vivid memories of apartheid, the 
majority black population has been mandating the African National Congress (ANC) to rule the 
country since 1994. This situation has resulted in one-party domination of the South Africa’s 
Parliament.  As an illustration, the ANC alone won 252 seats out of 400 seats in 1994, 266 seats 
in 1999, 279 seats in 2004, and 264 seats in 2009. This observation shows that PR systems may 
not always eliminate the winner-take-all or the majority rule over the minority groups. Despite 
an anomaly observed with the use of a PR system in South Africa, the system generally reduces 
disproportionality between percentages of votes and the actual percentages of seats won by 
parties.  
As members of minority groups, women are often denied opportunities to fully 
participate in politics in many countries in the world. According to the United Nations,  
Politics has traditionally been a male domain that many women have found unwelcoming 
or even hostile. Societies in which traditional or patriarchal values remain strong may 
frown on women entering politics. In addition to dealing with unfavorable cultural 
predilections, women are often more likely than men to face practical barriers to entering 
politics, including a paucity of financial resources, lower levels of education, less access 
to information, greater family responsibilities, and a deprivation of rights that has left 
them with fewer opportunities to acquire political experience. With the exception of the 
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close relatives of male politicians, women generally lack the political networks necessary 
for electoral success.  
 
In many African countries, the use of closed List-PR systems has helped women to break down 
some of these barriers that have prevented them from entering politics. Therefore, the closed 
List-PR system has been praised for allowing a high degree of representation of women in the 
National Assemblies or Parliaments if female candidates are placed at the top on the winning 
party lists (Reynolds, et al. 2008). For instance, South Africa has 42.25 percent of women 
serving as MPs since 2009 (IPU 20 January 2014). In the recent legislative elections in Rwanda, 
63.75 percent (that is 51 out of 80 seats won by women) of women were elected to the Chambre 
des Députés or Chamber of Deputies (IPU 9 January 2014).  
 The next section presents and discusses Africa’s mixed-member electoral systems and 
how the use of such systems affects voters and other political actors.   
 
4.1.2.4. Effects of Mixed-Member Majoritarian (MMM) and Mixed-Member 
Proportional (MMP) Systems  
 
By definition a mixed-member electoral system is a mixture of a single-member plurality 
(SMP) system and a PR system. Consequently, if a country uses a mixed-member electoral 
system, it has to provide two types of elections: SMP and PR elections (Farrell 2011). These 
elections can be either dependent (MMP) or independent (MMM). Because of their linkage in 
MMP elections, the List-PR seats help to reduce the disproportionality of the SMP seats. 
Because of the results MMP elections produce, Massicotte and Blais (1999) call MMP systems 
the “corrective” systems while Farrell (2011) describes them as the systems that “provided the 
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ideal compromise between the proportional virtues of the list electoral system and the district-
orientation of SMP” (p. 117) (also quoted in Kostadinova 2002).  According to Massicotte and 
Blais (1999), the MMP systems are called differently in different countries. For example, in 
Japan they are referred to as “superposition,” “correction” in Germany, “coexistence” or “fusion” 
in France, and “conditional” in Italy (p. 341).  
Between 1990 and 2010, in Djibouti, where an MMP system had been used in legislative 
elections, no opposition candidates had been elected to serve in the National Assembly despite 
the fact that the country embraced a multi-party system since 1992 (African Elections Database 
2011, IPU 2013). The 1992 Constitutional Referendum in Djibouti limited the number of 
political parties to four, including the Democratic Renewal Party (PRD) and National 
Democratic Party (PND), the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD), and the 
People’s Rally for Progress (PRP), the sole political party legally recognized by the state since 
the country’s independence from France in 1977 (African Elections Database 2011, CIA World 
Factbook 2014).  
The Union for a Democratic Alternative (UDA) is a coalition of two opposition political 
parties [Democratic Renewal Party (PRD) and National Democratic Party (PND)]. Because of 
the UDA, which won no seat in the 2003 legislative elections and boycotted the legislative 
elections in 2008, the Union for a Presidential Majority (UPM), which is a coalition of the ruling 
PRP and the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD), had maintained its 
monopoly of the country’s national Assembly by winning all the 65 elected seats. The question 
one has to ask is that if the MMP system is praised for offering the best of both the SMP and PR 
systems (Shugart and Wattenberg 2001), why had Djibouti’s political system been monopolized 
by a single party over the last two decades? As it becomes a routine for the opposition to boycott 
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the elections in Djibouti, it will be extremely difficult for scholars and researchers in the field of 
comparative study of electoral systems to really evaluate the impact of the MMP system on the 
allocation of votes and seats in the country’s National Assembly. One can simply argue that the 
use of the MMP system in Djibouti has produced unintended consequences given that the 
country’s legislative elections held since 1992 produced results that would be similar to election 
results under the winner-take-all systems or majority/plurality systems.  
Unlike Djibouti, where political parties and their candidates not only fight for legislative 
seats but also to win over the presidency, Lesotho is a constitutional monarchy, where only 
members of the National Assembly are elected by voters. Therefore, the focus of each political 
party has always been on how to win a majority of seats in the National Assembly and thereby 
nominate the leader of the party as the country’s Prime Minister. Following the military coup in 
1986, a military regime was established in Lesotho from 1986 to 1993. In the first democratic 
legislative elections held in March 1993, the ruling Basutoland Congress Party (BCP), with only 
74.78 percent of the vote, won 100 percent of seats or 65 seats against none for more than ten 
political opposition parties and independents. In May 1998, the ruling party—at this time under 
the umbrella of Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD)—won 79 out of 80 seats with 60.72 
percent of the vote. Its immediate challenger, the Basotho National Party (BNP), won only one 
seat with 24.47 percent of the vote (African Elections Database 2012).   
Both the 1993 and 1998 National Assembly elections were held under the FPTP system.  
The frustration of opposition parties, especially the BNP, for not being represented in the 
parliament after the 1993 elections, carried over the 1998 National Assembly election results that 
they qualified as fraudulent. Elklit (2008: 92) writes  
A discrepancy of this kind should not come as a surprise—it had happened before—but it 
was followed by the losing parties, especially the main opposition party, the Basotho 
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National Party (BNP), crying ‘Foul’. This was also nothing new, but it was a sad surprise 
that the accusations about the overall correctness of the 1998 election results (which were 
never seriously challenged) sometime after they were published, incensed the public to 
such a degree that they started rioting in the streets of the capital, Maseru, setting fire to 
and demolishing public as well as private buildings. 
 
The turmoil created in the aftermath of the publication of the 1998 election results was met with 
the intervention of the South African troops in Lesotho in the name of maintaining regional 
peace and security, protecting the interests of South Africa (Neethling 1999), and “[creating] a 
safe environment in which Lesotho’s problems could be negotiated” (Sutton-Pryce, Baudin, and 
Allie 1998: 26) (also quoted in Neethling 2000, p. 5; Neethling 1999). According to Kent and 
Malan (2003), “on 22 September 1998, a 600-strong South African military task force entered 
Lesotho to assist the government in restoring law and order following election-related unrest” (p. 
3). The decision to adopt an MMP system in Lesotho was not something that came in a vacuum. 
It was a fruit of a series of negotiations between the opposition parties and the government under 
the auspices of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (Elklit 2008, Santho 
2000).  
The outcome of SADC’s mediation of good offices between the protagonists of the 1998 
Lesotho’s post-election conflict was the creation of an Interim Political Authority (IPA) (Elklit 
2008, UN Peacemaker 1999, EISA n. d.). The IPA, whose main duties and responsibilities were 
“to review the constitution, the IEC, the Lesotho electoral system and the Electoral Code of 
Conduct and to make appropriate recommendations to the relevant public institutions on its 
structures and functions with a view to making it more democratic and representative of the 
people of Lesotho” (EISA n. d.), was composed of twelve political parties that equally 
represented with two representative each (UN Peacemaker 1999).  
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The IPA was able to reach a political compromise with the government, which accepted 
an MMP electoral system with 80 SMP seats and 40 PR seats. This MMP system helped ease the 
political tension that prevailed in the aftermath of the 1998 National Assembly elections in 
Lesotho. Although the LCD was able to win 77 SMP seats in the May 2002 elections with 54.89 
percent of the votes and the two vacant seats in the October 2002 elections, the opposition parties 
came out stronger than ever before by taking not only all the 40 PR seats but also the one 
remaining SMP seat, thanks to the MMP system used to translate votes into elected seats in the 
2002 National Assembly elections in Lesotho (African Election Database 2012).  
The degree of representativeness of the opposition parties increased in both the 2007 and 
2012 National Assembly elections when these opposition parties tried to close the 
disproportionality gap with the LCD by winning 58 seats in 2007, and took over the National 
Assembly with 94 out of 120 seats. With this extraordinary change in the political landscape in 
Lesotho, one can argue that the adoption of an MMP system helped facilitate the democratization 
process in the country. Therefore, since 2002, Lesotho has been propelled to the democratic 
status with a Freedom House political rights score of 3, and civil liberties score of 3 (African 
Elections Database 2012).  
Unlike the MMP systems, where the SMP election and PR elections are linked, under the 
MMM electoral systems, SMP and PR elections are independently held. The independence of 
these SMP and PR elections means that under the MMM systems, there are no compensatory 
seats. Because of the lack of connection between the two systems (SMP and PR) in MMM 
systems, MMM systems tend to be less proportional than MMP systems. In contemporary 
Africa, countries that have consistently used the MMM systems include Cameroon, Chad, DRC, 
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Egypt, Guinea, Senegal, and Seychelles (see Table 4.1). The ways in which MMM systems are 
used in Guinea and Senegal will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5 of this thesis.  
 
4.2. Elections and Party Systems 
The literature on party systems in Africa not only started late (Erdmann and Basedau 
2008, Manning 2005, Erdmann 2004, 1999) but also is still at its early stages (Van de Walle 
2003, Scarritt and Mozaffar 1999). However, Erdmann and Basedau (2008) argue that “While 
systematic research on political parties as organizations is still lacking, there has been increasing 
focus on the new emerging party systems and their relation to democratic consolidation” (p. 
241). As successful and repetitive free and fair elections may give rise to democratic 
consolidation (Powell 2000), party systems also remain one of the drivers of democratic survival 
and sustainability.  
By sustainable democracy, I mean a democratic polity that it is able not only to address 
the needs and concerns of its current populations, but also to address such needs without 
compromising the needs of future generations. So far in contemporary Africa, countries such as 
Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Mauitius, Namibia, Sao Tomé Principe, and South Africa 
can be cited as African states that are moving in the direction of sustainable democracy because 
of their continuous efforts to strengthen their democratic institutions.  
By contrast, Mali is a palpable example of what a sustainable democracy may not look 
like. Indeed, between 1992 and 2012, Mali was hailed as a model of Africa’s democracy for its 
relatively peaceful elections that established two different democratic regimes (one under 
President Alpha Oumar Conaré, and the other one under President Amadou Toumani Touré) 
(African Elections Database 2012). However, the country was not able to address many 
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underlying grievances including, but not limited to, “poor governance, the corrosive impact of 
drug trafficking and other illicit commerce, military fragmentation and collapse, limited 
implementation of previous peace accords with Tuareg rebel groups” (Arieff 2013: 6). The 
failure by the Malian government to seriously tackle those issues may have contributed to the 
public support for the military coup that ousted President Touré and led to a near collapse of the 
state of Mali in 2012.  
How do party systems help sustain Africa’s democratic regimes? A simple answer, 
according to Lindberg (2007), is that democratic sustainability requires both “stability and 
fluidity among legislative parties in Africa’s democracies” (p. 215). When a political party is 
able to ensure its continuity not only by increasing its membership with vibrant members, but 
also by providing policy options that respond to the needs and interests of its constituents, such a 
party can be referred to as a stable and fluid party (Lindberg 2007). In addition, Lindberg (2007) 
joins his predecessors Sartori (1976), Mainwaring and Scully (1995) when he stresses the 
importance of institutionalization of political parties as a prerequisite of democratic 
consolidation.19  
Indeed, to find out whether institutionalization of party systems occurs in Africa, 
Lindberg (2007) conducts an interesting study on 21 African countries that he refers to at the 
time as either electoral democracies or emerging electoral democracies based on their Freedom 
House score of political rights and civil liberties of (4, 4) or below after “at least two successful 
                                                           
19
 According to Lindberg, “stability” and “interaction” are key elements of institutionalization of party systems. The 
author identifies eight indicators of institutionalization as follows: the number of parties in the legislature, the 
number of new parties in the legislature, the share of new parties in the legislature, the number of parties voted out 
of the legislature, the share of parties voted out as compared to the total number of parties that compete in the 
election, the share of seats in the legislature held by the largest party, and the share of seats held by the runner-up. 
The higher the number on these indicators over time, the more fluid the party systems. The party systems become 
stable if parties that contest elections and winning seats are almost the same during every election. One talks of de-
stabilized party systems if the dominant parties lost power. See Lindberg (2007: 222-226) for a detailed discussion 
of measuring institutionalization of party systems. 
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elections” (p. 228). These countries include Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, 
Djibouti, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Nigeria, Sao Tomé Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia. As 
expected, he finds that in these countries, party systems had not been institutionalized. Rather, 
they were either fluid (Benin, Burkina Faso, Madagascar, Mali, Sao Tomé Principe, Seychelles, 
and Zambia) or de-stabilized (Kenya and Senegal) or stable (Botswana, Cape Verde, Djibouti, 
Ghana, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, and Tanzania) 
(Lindberg 2007: 231-233).  
Equally important, the period of Lindberg’s study covered only fourteen years that stretch 
“from 1989 to June 2003” (p. 230), and was published in 2007.  Erdmann and Basedau (2008) 
use a stricter criterion than Lindberg by including in their analysis of African party systems 
countries that held “at least three consecutive elections” (p. 244). The rationale behind the “three 
consecutive elections” criterion is to determine how consistent interactions among legislative 
parties in these countries are. Like Lindberg (2007), these authors are not only inspired by 
Sartori’s (1976) work on the classification of party systems in terms of “‘dominant’ and 
‘predominant’ party” (Erdmann and Basedau 2008: 242), but they also build on the work of 
scholars, such as Hartmann (2007), Mozaffar and Scarritt (2005), Lindberg (2005), Bogaards 
(2004), Mozaffar, Scaritt and Galaich (2003), Nohlen, Krennerich and Thibaut (1999), Scarritt 
and Mozaffar (1999), Van de Walle and Buttler (1999), who have tremendous expertise in the 
study of African party systems.  
In their investigation, Erdmann and Basedau (2008) find that countries such as  
Botswana, Burkina Faso (1992-1997 and 2002), Cameroon, Chad (1997 and 2002), Djibouti, 
Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Lesotho (1993-1998, and 2002), 
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Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles, Sierra Leone (2002), South Africa, 
Tanzania, and Togo have dominant party systems; Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, and Senegal have 
two-party systems; Central African Republic, Comoros, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Niger, Sao Tomé Principe, Sierra Leone (1996), and 
Zambia have moderate pluralism party systems; and Benin (1991, 1995-2003) and Republic of 
Congo have extreme pluralism party systems (p. 248).  
With regard to the relationship between electoral systems and party systems in Africa, 
Erdmann and Basedau (2008) find that 50 percent of one-party dominance can be found in 
countries (i.e. Djibouti and Mauritius) that use plurality systems in multi-member constituencies 
(MMCs); 58 percent in countries [Botswana, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, 
Lesotho (1993-1998), Malawi, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe] where plurality 
systems in single-member constituencies (SMCs) have been used; 56 percent in countries 
[Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad (1997), Comoros, Gabon, Mali, Mauritania, and 
Togo] where absolute majority in SMC or MMC have been used; 57 percent in MMM and MMP 
countries [Chad (2002), Guinea, Lesotho (2002), Madagascar, Niger, Senegal, Seychelles]; 25 
percent in PR countries [Benin (1995-2003), Burkina Faso (1992-1997), Cape Verde and 
Guinea-Bissau with small MMC; 80 percent in PR countries  [Benin (1991), Burkina Faso 
(2002), Equatorial Guinea, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone (2002)] with medium and large 
MMC; and 67 percent of one-party dominance in pure PR countries [Namibia, Sierra Leone 
(1996) and South Africa] (p. 248).  An analysis of these findings demonstrates that despite the 
existence of highly fractionalized ethnic cleavages in many African states (Mozaffar and 
Vengroff 2002; Vengroff 1994, 1993), and in spite of the variations in African electoral systems, 
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the continent is still experiencing the preponderance of dominant party systems (Erdmann and 
Basedau 2008).  
Building on previous literature on African party systems and Erdmann and Basedau’s 
(2008) theoretical contributions to the study of electoral systems and party systems, this thesis 
looks beyond 2003, expands the discussion on elections and party systems in Africa, and 
provides a comprehensive overview of how such party systems affect the promotion of 
democracy across the continent during the time span of 1990 and 2010. The effects of the 
variations of party systems coupled with the impact of the variations of electoral systems on the 
democratization process in contemporary Africa are summarized in Table 4.4 (see Appendix). 
The next chapter will provide a detailed account on the roles of the political institutions, 
the civil society, and the traditional authorities in shaping the democratization processes in these 
six African states: Benin, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal and Togo, in comparative 
perspective. Above all, chapter 5 will discuss the consequences of electoral systems and the role 
of the game on peaceful democratic alternations in each of these countries.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 4.4 African Models of Electoral Systems and Party Systems 
 
Countries Years of 
Legislative 
Elections 
Electoral 
Systems 
# of 
Parties/ 
Coalitions 
at the 
Polls 
# of Parties 
in the 
Legislature 
Names of  
Party with 
Most or 
Coalition 
# of 
Majority 
Seats 
Party 
Systems 
Democratic
/ 
Freedom 
Status   
Algeria  1997 
2002 
2007 
PR 
PR 
PR 
10 pro-
governme
nt parties 
& indpts 
9 & indpts 
24 & 
indpts 
10 & 11 
indpts 
9 & 30 
indpts 
23 
RND 
FLN 
FLN 
156/380 
199/381 
136 
 
Domina
nt 
(Dom.) 
Moderat
e (M) 
Pluralis
m (pl.) 
Not free 
Not free 
Angola 1992 
2008 
PR 
PR 
18 
14 
12 
6 
MPLA 
MPLA 
129/220 
191/220 
Domina
nt. 
Domina
nt 
Not Free 
Not free 
Benin 1991 
1995 
1999 
2003 
2007 
PR 
PR 
PR 
PR 
PR 
14 
18 
16 
12 
12 
12 
18 
16 
12 
12 
UTRD 
PRB 
RB 
MP* 
FCBE 
12/64 
21/83 
27/83 
52/83 
35/83 
Extreme 
pluralis
m (E, 
pl.) 
E. pl. 
E. pl. 
E. pl. 
M. pl. 
Free 
Free 
Free 
Free  
Free  
Botswana  1994 
1999 
2004 
2009 
MA 
MA 
MA 
MA 
5 & others 
5 & indpts 
7 & indpts 
7 & indpts 
2 
3 
3 
5 
BDP 
BDP 
BDP 
BDP 
27/40 
33/40 
44/57 
45/57 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Free  
Free  
Free 
Free  
Burkina 
Faso 
1992 
1997 
2002 
2007 
PR 
PR 
PR 
PR 
10 
4 & others 
13  
13 
10 
4 
13 
13 
ODP-MT 
CDP 
CDP 
CDP 
78/107 
101/111 
57/111 
73/111 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Not free 
Not free 
Not free 
Not free 
Burundi  1993 
2005 
2010 
PR 
PR 
PR 
7 
7 
4 
 
2 
5 
3 
FRODEBU 
CNDD-
FDD 
65/81 
59/100 
80/100 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Not free 
Partly free 
Partly free 
 
Cameroon 1992 
1997 
2002 
2007 
MMM 
MMM 
MMM 
MMM 
4 
8 
5 
5 
4 
8 
5 
5 
RDPC 
RDPC 
RDPC 
RDPC 
88/180 
109/180 
149/180 
153/180 
 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Not free 
Not free 
Not free 
Not free 
Cape 
Verde 
1991 
1995 
PR 
PR 
2 
5 
2 
3 
MpD 
MpD 
56/79 
50/72 
Two-
party 
Free 
Free 
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2001 
2006 
PR 
PR 
5 
5 
3 
3 
MpD 
MpD 
40/72 
41/72 
 Free 
Free 
Central 
African 
Rep. 
1993 
1998 
2005 
MA/TRS 
MA/TRS 
MA/TRS 
13 
13 
9 
13 
13 
9 
MLPC 
UFAP 
KNK 
34/85 
55/109 
42/105 
M. pl. 
*Two-
party 
E. pl. 
Partly free 
Partly free 
Partly free 
Chad 1997 
2002 
MMM 
MMM  
10 
15 
10 
15 
MPS 
MPS 
65/125 
113/155 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Not free 
Not free 
Comoros 1992 
1993 
1996 
2004 
2009 
MA/TRS 
MA/TRS 
MA/TRS 
MA/TRS 
MA/TRS 
6 & others 
9 
2 & indpts 
2 
3 
7 
9 
2 & indpts 
2 
3 
UDD 
RDR 
RND 
CdIA 
Baobab 
Movement 
7/42 
28/42 
36/43 
12/18 
17/24 
E. pl. 
M. pl. 
M. pl. 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Not free 
Not free 
Not free 
Partly free 
Partly free 
Congo 
Rep. 
1992 
1993 
2002 
2007 
TRS 
TRS 
TRS 
TRS 
19 & 
indpts 
14& 1 
indpt 
6 
18 & 
indpts 
19 & indpts 
14& 1 indpt 
6 
18 
UPADS 
UPADS 
PCT 
PCT 
 
39/125 
47/125 
53/137 
46/137 
E. pl. 
M. pl. 
M.pl. 
E. pl 
P. free 
P. free 
Not free 
Not free 
 
Cote 
d’Ivoire 
1990 
1995 
2000 
FPTP 
FPTP 
FPTP 
3 & others 
& indpts 
3 
6 & indpts 
3 & indpts 
3 
6 & indpts 
PDCI-RDA 
PDCI-RDA 
FPI 
163/175 
148/175 
96/225 
M. pl 
M. pl. 
M. pl.  
Not free 
Not free 
Not free 
Democrati
c Rep. of 
Congo 
2006 MMM Over 80 & 
indpts 
Over 80 & 
indpts 
PPRD 111/500 M. pl. Not free 
Djibouti 1992 
1997 
2002 
MMP 
MMP 
MMP 
2 
3 
2 
1 
2 
1 
RPP 
RPP 
UMP 
65/65 
54/65 
65/65 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Dom.  
Not free 
Not free 
Partly free 
Egypt         
Equatorial 
Guinea 
1993 
1999 
2004 
2008 
PR 
PR 
PR 
PR 
8 
3 & others 
3 & others 
3 
4 
3 
3 
3 
PDGE 
PDGE 
PDGE 
PDGE 
68/80 
75/80 
68/100 
89/10 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Dom.  
Not free 
Not free 
Not free 
Not free 
Ethiopia  1994 
1995 
2000 
2005 
2010 
FPTP 
FPTP 
FPTP 
FPTP 
FPTP 
1 & others 
1, others 
& indpts 
6, others 
& indpts 
11 & 1 
indpt 
1 & others 
1, others & 
indpts 
6, others & 
indpts 
11 & 1 indpt 
EPRDF 
EPRDF 
EPRDF 
EPRDF 
EPRDF 
484/547 
483/548 
481/547 
327/547 
499/547 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Not free 
Not free 
Not free 
Not free 
Partly free 
Gabon 1990 
1996 
2001 
TRS 
FPTP 
FPTP 
8 
12 & 
indpts 
8 
12 & indpts 
10 & indpts 
PDG 
PDG 
PDG 
63/120 
85/120 
86/120 
M. Pl. 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Not free 
Not free 
Not free 
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2006 
 
 
FPTP 10 & 
indpts 
13 & 
indpts 
13 & indpts PDG 82/120 Dom. Partly free 
Gambia 1992 
1997 
2002 
2007 
FPTP 
FPTP 
FPTP 
FPTP 
5 & indpts 
4 & indpts 
3 
3 & indpts 
3 & indpts 
4 & indpts 
3 
3 & 1 indpt 
PPP 
APRC 
APRC 
APRC 
25/36 
33/45 
45/48 
42/48 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Free 
Not free 
Not free 
Partly free 
Ghana 1992 
1996 
2000 
2004 
2008 
FPTP 
FPTP 
FPTP 
FPTP 
FPTP 
3 & indpts 
4 
6 & others 
4 & indpts 
4 & indpts 
 
3 & indpts 
4 
6 & others 
4 & indpts 
4 & indpts 
NDC 
NDC 
NPP 
NPP 
NDC 
189/200 
133/200 
99/200 
128/230 
114/230 
Two-
party 
Two-
party  
Two-
party 
Free 
Free 
Free  
Free  
Free 
Guinea 1995 
2002 
MMM 
MMM 
9 
9 
9 
6 
PUP 
PUP 
41/76 
47/76 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Not free 
Not free 
Guinea-
Bissau 
1994 
1999 
2004 
2008 
PR 
PR 
PR 
PR 
8 
8 
15 
21 
6 
8 
5 
5 
PAIGC 
PRS 
PAIGC 
PAIGC 
62/100 
38/100 
45/100 
67/100 
M. pl. 
M. pl. 
M. pl. 
M. pl. 
Partly free 
Partly free 
Not free 
Partly free 
Kenya 1992 
1997 
2002 
2007 
FPTP 
FPTP 
FPTP 
FPTP 
7 
10 
10 
23 
7 
10 
10 
23 
KANU 
KANU 
NARC 
ODM & 
Allies 
100/188 
107/210 
125/210 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Two-
party  
Not free 
Not free 
Partly free 
Not free 
Lesotho 1993 
1998 
2002 
2007 
FPTP 
FPTP 
MMP 
MMP 
12 & 
indpts 
4 & others 
15 
12 
1 
2 
2 
3 
BCP 
LCD 
LCP 
LCP 
65/65 
78/80 
79/80 
62/80 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Partly free 
Not free 
Partly free 
Partly free 
Liberia 1997 
2005 
FPTP 
FPTP 
13 
21 & 
indpts 
6 
11 
NPP 
CDC 
49/64 
15 
Dom. 
M.pl. 
Partly free 
Partly free 
Madagasc
ar 
1993 
1998 
2002 
2007 
PR 
MMM 
MMM 
FPTP 
14 & 
others 
9 & others 
2 & others 
14 & others 
9 & others 
5, others & 
indpts 
2 & others 
CFV 
AREMA 
TIM 
TIM 
47/138 
63/150 
103/160 
105/127 
M. pl. 
M. pl. 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Partly free 
Partly free 
Partly free 
Partly  free 
Malawi 1994 
1999 
2004 
2009 
FPTP 
FPTP 
FPTP 
FPTP 
8 & indpts 
10 & 
indpts 
9, others 
& indpts 
6 & indpts 
3 
3 & indpts 
9, others & 
indpts 
6 & 33 
indpts 
UDF 
UDF 
MCP 
DPP 
84/177 
93/193 
57/193 
113/193 
M. pl. 
M. pl. 
M. pl. 
Ml. Pl. 
 
Free  
Partly free 
Partly free 
Partly free 
Mali 1992 
1997  
TRS 
TRS 
10 
8 
10 
8 
ADEMA 
ADEMA 
76/116 
128/147 
M. pl. 
Dom. 
Free  
Free 
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2002 
2007 
TRS 
TRS 
9 & indpts 
16 & 
indpts 
9 & indpts 
16 & 15 
indpts 
Espoir 
2002* 
ADP* 
66 
115/147 
Two-
party 
Dom. 
Free 
Free 
 
 
 
 
 
Mauritani
a 
1992 
1996 
2001 
2006 
 
TRS 
TRS 
TRS 
TRS 
3 & indpts 
3 & indpts 
7 
15 & 
indpts 
3& 10 
indpts  
3 & 7 indpts 
7 
15 & 41 
indpts 
PRDS 
PRDS 
PRDS 
RFD 
67/79 
70/79 
64/81 
15/95 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Dom. 
E. pl. 
Not free 
Not free 
Not free 
Not free 
Mauritius 1991 
1995 
2000 
2005 
BV 
BV 
BV 
BV 
5 
6 
4 
4 
5 
3 
3 
3 
MMM-
MSM* 
MMM-
MSM 
MMM-
MSM 
AS 
59/62 
60/62 
54/62 
38/62 
M.pl. 
M. pl. 
M. pl. 
M. pl. 
Free 
Free 
Free 
Free  
Morocco         
Mozambiq
ue 
1994 
1999 
2004 
2009 
PR 
PR 
PR 
PR 
14 
12 
21 
19 
3 
2 
2 
3 
FRELIMO 
FRELIMO 
FRELIMO 
FRELIMO 
129/250 
133/250 
160/250 
191/250 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Partly free 
Partly free 
Partly free 
Partly free 
Namibia 1994 
1999 
2004 
2009 
PR 
PR 
PR 
PR 
8  
8 
9 
14 
5 
5 
7 
9 
SWAPO 
SWAPO 
SWAPO 
SWAPO 
53/72 
55/72 
55/72 
54/72 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Free  
Free 
Free 
Free 
Niger 1993 
1995 
1996 
1999 
2004 
2009 
MMM 
MMM 
MMM 
MMM 
MMM 
MMM 
9 
9 
9 
5 
10 & 
others 
7 & indpts 
9 
9 
9 
5 
10 
7 & 10 
indpts 
AFC* 
MNSD-
Nassara 
UNIRD 
MNSD-
Nassara 
MNSD-
Nassara 
MNSD-
Nassara 
50/83 
29/83 
56/83 
38/83 
47/83 
76/113 
M. pl. 
M. pl 
Dom. 
M. pl. 
M. pl. 
Dom. 
Partly free 
Partly free 
Not free 
Partly free 
Partly free 
Partly free 
Nigeria 1992 
1998 
1999 
2003 
2007 
FPTP 
FPTP 
FPTP 
FPTP 
FPTP 
2  
5 
3 
7 & others 
6 
2  
5 
3 
7 
5 
SDP 
UNCP 
PDP 
PDP 
PDP 
314/593 
229/282 
206/360 
223/360 
263/360 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Not free 
Not free 
Partly free 
Partly free 
Not free 
Rwanda 2003 
2008 
PR 
PR 
8 & indpts 
9 & indpts  
7 
8 
FPR-led 
coalition 
FPR-led 
coalition 
40/50 
42/53 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Not free 
Not free 
 1991 PR 4 & others 3 PCD-GR 33/55 M. pl. Free 
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Sao Tomé 
& 
Principe 
1994 
1998 
2002 
2006 
2010 
PR 
PR 
PR 
PR 
PR 
6 
4 & others 
5 
10 
10 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
MLSTP-
PSD 
MLSTP-
PSD 
MLSTP-
PSD 
MLSTP-
PSD 
ADI 
27/55 
31/55 
24/55 
23/55 
26/55 
M. pl. 
M. pl. 
M. pl. 
M. pl. 
M. pl. 
Free  
Free 
Free  
Free  
Free  
Senegal 1993 
1998 
2001 
2007 
MMM 
MMM 
MMM 
MMM 
6 
18 
10 & 
others 
14 
6 
11 
10 
13 
PS 
PS 
Sopi 
coalition 
Sopi 2007 
coalition 
84/120 
93/140 
89/120 
131/150 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Not free 
Not free 
Partly free 
Partly free 
Seychelles 1993 
1998 
2002 
2007 
MMM 
MMM 
MMM 
MMM 
3 
3 & 1 
indpt 
4 & indpts 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
SPPF 
SPPF 
SPPF 
SPPF 
21/22 
24/25 
18/25 
18/25 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Partly free 
Partly free 
Partly free 
Partly free 
Sierra 
Leone 
1996 
2002 
2007 
PR 
PR 
PR 
13 
7 
7 & indpts 
6 
3 
3 
SLPP 
SLPP 
APC 
27/68 
83/112 
59 
M. pl. 
Dom. 
M. pl. 
Not free 
Partly free 
Partly free 
South 
Africa 
1994 
1999 
2004 
2009 
PR 
PR 
PR 
PR 
19 
16 
21 
26 
7 
13 
12 
13 
ANC 
ANC 
ANC 
ANC 
252/400 
266/400 
279/400 
264/400 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Dom 
Dom. 
Free 
Free 
Free 
Free 
Sudan 2000 
2010 
MMM 
MMM 
1 & indpts 
8, others 
& indpts 
1& 5 indpts 
8, others & 
3indpts 
NCP 
NCP 
355/360 
323/450 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Not free 
Not free 
 
Swaziland 
1993-2010 N/A N/A N/A N/A 55 Seats 
are 
indirectly 
elected 
and 10 
seats 
appointed 
by the 
King  
N/A Not free 
Tanzania 1995 
2000 
2005 
2010 
FPTP 
FPTP 
FPTP 
FPTP 
13 
13 
18 
6 & others 
5 
6 
5 
6 
CCM 
CCM 
CCM 
CCM 
186/232 
202/231 
206/232 
186/239 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Not free 
Not free 
Partly free 
Partly free 
Togo 1994 
1999 
2002 
TRS 
TRS 
TRS 
5 
1 & indpts 
5 & indpts 
5 
1 & 2 indpts 
5 & 1 indpt 
CAR 
RPT 
RPT 
36/81 
79/81 
72/81 
M. pl. 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Not free 
Not free 
Not free 
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2007 TRS Over 20 & 
indpts 
3 RPT 50/81 Dom. Not free 
Tunisia         
Uganda 2006 FPTP 6 & indpts 6 & 36 
indpts 
NRM 191/284 Dom. Partly free 
Zambia 1991 
1996 
2001 
2006 
FPTP 
FPTP 
FPTP 
FPTP 
2 
5 & others 
8, others 
& indpts 
5 & indpts 
2 
5 
7 & 1 indpt 
5 & 2 indpts 
MMD 
MMD 
MMD 
MMD 
 
125/150 
131/150 
69/150 
74/150 
Dom. 
Dom. 
M. pl. 
M. pl. 
Free 
Not free 
Not free 
Partly free 
Zimbabwe 1990 
1995 
2000 
2005 
FPTP 
FPTP 
FPTP 
FPTP 
5 & indpts 
7 & indpts 
3 & others 
5 & indpts 
3 
2 
3 
2 & 1 indpt 
ZANU-PF 
ZANU-PF 
ZANU-PF 
ZANU-PF 
117/120 
118/120 
62/120 
78/120 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Dom. 
Not free 
Not free 
Not free 
Not free 
Sources: African Elections Database, supplemented with IDEA Database, and IPU Database. 
MPLA= Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola 
http://africanelections.tripod.com/electoral_democracies.html 
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CHAPTER FIVE  
IN-DEPTH COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES – MOST SIMILAR VERSUS MOST 
DIFFERENT CASES 
 
This chapter provides an analysis of elections and electoral behavior in six African 
countries: Benin, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal and Togo. These countries are 
purposefully selected based on the types of electoral systems used for the allocation of electoral 
seats and/or policies preferences and their levels of post-election conflict. The chapter is 
structured in five sections. The first section analyzes political institutions and voting behavior in 
each of the six countries. The second section discusses democratic qualities of elections in 
comparative perspective. The third section presents election sequencing, management, and 
monitoring mechanisms in place in each the selected countries being studied. Section four 
discusses the role of civil society and traditional authorities in promoting democracy and conflict 
mitigation. The last section sums the chapter up with the discussion of consequences of electoral 
systems and the rules of the game on democratic alternations. 
 
5.1. Political Institutions and Voting Behavior in African States 
Political institutions are commonly defined as a set of political structures or organizations 
that aim to control or influence the behavior of people or groups of people (Dickovick and 
Eastwood 2013, Janda, Berry and Goldman 2011-2012). Examples of political institutions 
include, but are not limited to, the constitution, and the branches of government—the legislative, 
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the executive, and the judiciary—political parties, elections, electoral systems and electoral 
commissions.  
These institutions “establish the rules by which policy is made, and thus how the policy 
preferences of different groups are weighed in the process that determines the policy outcomes” 
(Hiscox 2009: 287). The ultimate goal of almost all political parties is to have control over 
policy-making processes and outcomes. In many democracies and democratizing countries, 
political parties and/or candidates mobilize the electorate and ask for their support and votes in 
order to win elections and set the future policy. In this section, I discuss how political institutions 
shape people’s voting behavior in Benin, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Togo, and Senegal.  
5.1.1. A Brief Political History and Electoral Dynamics of the Cases 
 5.1.1.1. The Case of Benin 
Although both Benin and Togo were former French colonies and had embarked on a 
similar path regarding how to bring about democracy, they have different historical experiences 
when it comes to vibrant civil society. In Social Origins of National Conferences in Benin and 
Togo, Heilbrunn contends that “In a society with a tradition of national associations, the state is 
constrained by the interests of organized groups since attempts to ignore particular concerns may 
result in unrest” (Heilbrunn 1993:298). He argues that while these national associations were not 
present to help coordinate activities for change during the wave of democratization, they have 
been influencing politics in Benin since independence. However, their early involvement in 
politics did not prevent the country from experiencing multiple military dictatorships and 
authoritarian regimes prior to 1990. A chronological overview of the Beninois political situation 
is summarized in Table 5.1 below. 
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Table 5.1: Timeline of Political Situation in Benin  
Timeline Political Systems 
1960-1961 Emerging Democracy 
1961-1963 De Facto One Party State (PDU) 
1963-1964 Military Regime 
1964-1965 De Facto One Party State (PDD) 
1965-1968 Military Regime 
1968-1969 Restricted Democratic Practices 
1969-1970 Military Regime 
1970-1972 Restricted Democratic Practices 
1972-1975 Military Regime 
1975-1990 One Party State (PRPB) 
1990-1991 Multiparty Transition 
1991- Present Democracy 
Source: African Elections Database, 30 May 2011. Available at 
http://africanelections.tripod.com/bj.html 
 
 A glance at Table 5.1 shows that from the early 1960s to 1990, military rule and one-
party system had alternated with restricted democratic practices in Benin. Between 1960 and 
1961, Benin was an emerging democracy. Three political parties—Republican Party of Dahomey 
(PRD), Dahomeyan Democratic Union (UDD), and Democratic Movement of Dahomey 
(MDD)—were formed by the Beninois nationalists during the liberation struggle. These parties 
had their representatives in the Territorial Assembly in 1959. However, during the December 
1960 Presidential and National Assembly elections, the Dahomeyan Democratic Rally (RDD) of 
Hubert Maga and the Dahomey Nationalist Party (PND) of Sourou-Migan Apithy strategically 
coalesced and formed a strong political party called the Dahomeyan Unity Party (PDU), which 
won the elections. Because of the coalition, only the two remaining parties (PDU and UDD) 
dominated the political scene in Benin between 1960 and 1961.  
The following three years were marked by the imposition of one-party system from 1961 
to 1963 by the ruling PDU coalition government led by Hubert Maga and Sourou-Migan Apithy, 
respectively President and Vice President of the country, followed by the installation of a strong 
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military regime (1963-1964) (African Election Database 2011). Military dictatorships continued 
until the early 1990s. In 1972, a military coup led by Mathieu Kérékou consolidated the 
authoritarian rule in Benin for nearly two decades. Political parties, other than the ruling party, 
Benin People's Revolutionary Party (PRPB) were banned. Benin People's Revolutionary Party 
(PRPB) was the only political party or the state party that was legally allowed to conduct 
political activities throughout the country until 1990. As a result of the need for political 
liberalization engrained in the third wave of democratization during the 1990s coupled with the 
late 1980s economic downturn in Africa and other factors including the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, Benin’s patron constrained the Beninois authoritarian regime to open up to the political 
opposition and accept the instauration of a national forum (Heilbrunn 1993). This forum, known 
as Conférence Nationale, put in place binding democratic rules, including the establishment of a 
short period of a democratic power sharing transition between the regime in place and its 
political opposition (Heilbrunn1993, Nwajiaku 1994), The Conference Nationale also 
recommended that free and fair elections be held to end the transitional government. 
Subsequently, the 1990 Constitutional Referendum and the 1991 National Assembly and 
presidential elections were held (African Election Database 2011). 
 The incumbent president Kérékou with 32.27 percent of the votes lost the 1991 
presidential election to the Prime Minister of the democratic transitional government, Nicéphore 
Soglo, with 67.73 percent of the votes in the first round. The latter lost his power after his first 5-
year term in office to his former challenger Mathieu Kérékou through the 1996 presidential 
election (Battle and Seely 2007, African Election Database 2011). President Kérékou 
successfully played by democratic rules and presided over the country’s internal and external 
affairs for another ten years and stepped down at the end of his second term. With over 74 
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percent of the votes, Yayi Boni, who was not affiliated to any Beninois political party 
whatsoever, and often called a “political outsider and independent” (CIA World Factbook 2012), 
succeeded Kérékou and managed to win his second term on March 13, 2011 (African Election 
Database 2011). As of 2010, the population of Benin was over 9 million divided among 42 
ethnic groups, including Xwla, Fon, Adja, Yoruba, and Bariba, to name just the major ones (U.S. 
Department of State 2012). The democratization process went smoothly in Benin, at least in part 
thanks to “the growth of the independent press” (Ibelema 2008).  
  
5.1.1.2. The Case of Ghana 
Ghana (formerly known as Gold Coast) gained its independence from Great Britain on 
March 6, 1957 (Adjei 2012, Gocking 2005). Ghana, which appears to be one of the rare stable 
democratic states in Africa today, was pretty unstable starting from 1964 (when Osagyefo Dr. 
Kwame Nkrumah, the First President of Ghana, changed the country’s political system from 
multiparty democracy to one-party system) to the period leading up to the reestablishment of 
multiparty system in 1992. Table 5.2 is a summary of Ghana’s political situation since 
independence. 
Table 5.2: Timeline of Political Situation in Ghana 
 
Timeline Political Systems 
1957-1958 Democracy 
1958-1964 Restricted Democratic Practice 
1964-1966 One Party State (CPP) 
1966-1969 Military Regime 
1969-1972 Democracy 
1972-1979 Military Regime 
1979-1981 Democracy 
1992-1996 Emerging Democracy 
1996-Present Democracy 
Source: African Elections Database,16 November 2012. Available at  
http://africanelections.tripod.com/gh.html 
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An analysis of Table 5.2 reveals that Ghana experienced several military coups through 
1981 with the final military takeover by Captain Jerry John Rawlings. Rawlings established 
robust military rule in the country from 1981 to 1992. He dissolved the country’s Parliament that 
was elected in 1979, banned all political parties, and put in place the Provisional National 
Defense Council in 1981 (CIA World Factbook 2014, IPU 92). But with the new wave of 
democratization and under both national and international pressure to establish democratic 
institutions in Ghana, he lifted the ban on all political parties, authorized a constitutional 
referendum in which voters overwhelmingly (92.59 percent of the votes) agreed on a new 
constitution prior to subsequent elections (African Elections Database 2012). The country then 
held a multiparty presidential election on November 3, 1992. Rawlings, who also contested that 
presidential election as a civilian alongside a few opposition candidates, emerged as a winner 
with 59.3 percent of votes (IPU 1992).   
The parliamentary elections held on December 29, 1992 were boycotted by the main 
opposition parties, including New Patriotic Party (NPP), People’s National Convention (PNC), 
National Independence Party (NIP) and the People’s Heritage Party (PHP). However, some 
independent candidates and small and pro-Rawlings political parties  such as National 
Convention Party (NCP), and Every Ghanaian Living Everywhere (EGLE) contested the 
parliamentary elections with the ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC), which won 189 
out of 200 seats (African Elections Database 2012, IPU 1994).  With such a supermajority in 
Parliament, NDC was not only able to secure Rawlings’s reelection in 1996 with 57.37 percent 
of the votes against his main challenger John Kufuor (NPP), but also it maintained its dominance 
in Parliament by winning 133 out of 200 seats against NPP (60 seats), PCP (5 seats), and PNC (1 
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seat) during the parliamentary elections held simultaneously on December 7, 1996 African 
Elections Database 2012, IPU 1996).  
In 2000, Ghana witnessed its first and true democratic alternation when the ruling NDC 
accepted defeat in both the presidential and parliamentary elections. Kufuor (NPP), with 56.90 
percent of the votes against John Evans Atta Mills (NDC), Edward Mahama (PNC), and George 
Hagan (CPP), won the 2000 presidential elections. His NPP also obtained 100 seats in 
Parliament. Kufuor was re-elected in 2004, and the NPP gained more seats than ever before. 
However, one can observe a repetition of history when the incumbent party accepted defeat after 
being in power for eight consecutive years. In 2008, NDC, led by Atta Mills, made a come-back 
to power by winning 50 percent of the seats in Parliament and 50.23 percent of the votes in a 
very close and highly disputed presidential election. With a slim margin of 0.23 percent of the 
vote, Nana Akufo-Addo (NPP) lost the 2008 presidential election to Atta Mills, who died in 
office on 24 July 2012 (African Elections Database 2012).   
Subsequently after the death of President Atta Mills, Vice-President John Dramani 
Mahama was sworn in as a “caretaker president” (Dalby 2012). This smooth transfer of power is 
in line with Article 58 (6) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, which stipulates that “Whenever 
the President dies, resigns or is removed from office, the Vice-President shall assume office as 
President for unexpired term of office of the President with effect from the date of the death, 
resignation or removal of the President.” Mahama then assumed his constitutional duty by 
finishing Atta Mills’s “unexpired term of office.” In the highly disputed 2012 presidential 
elections held five months following the death of Atta Mills, Mahama defeated his main 
challenger, Akufo-Addo with 50.7 percent of the votes while his NDC won 148 parliamentary 
seats out of 275 (an increase of seats from 230 seats in 2008 to 275 in 2012 by the Electoral 
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Commission) leaving NPP with 123 seats, CPP with one seat, PNC with one seat and other 
smaller parties or independent candidates with the remaining two seats (IPU 2013). It is 
important to note that the NPP, which criticized the Electoral Commission for favoring the NDC 
with the creation of the 45 news seats in 2012, won 23 seats against NDC, which took the 
remaining 22 seats (The Electoral Commission of Ghana 2012).  
In all, NDC increased its share in the Parliament from 50 percent of seats in 2008 to 54 
percent in 2012. The control of Parliament by NDC gives an edge to President Mahama to carry 
out his political agenda without major obstructions from his political opponents. But the most 
important thing was that the peaceful handling by the Supreme Court of the 2012 electoral 
disputes between Akufo-Addo and President Mahama on the one hand and between Akufo-Addo 
and the Electoral Commission on the other hand showed not only the strength and independence 
of the Judiciary but also the maturity of Ghana’s democracy.  
 
5.1.1.3. The Case of Guinea 
Like other francophone countries in Africa such as Benin and Togo, Guinea experienced 
an extended history of military dictatorship after the death of the country’s father of 
independence, President Ahmed Sekou Touré in 1984 (CIA World Factbook 2014). In fact, 
President Touré was also a dictator himself given that he presided over the country under 
authoritarian rule facilitated by the sole legitimate state party, Democratic Party of Guinea 
(PDG). Under Touré’s presidency, political opposition had no place in Guinea. He used a politics 
of terror as a way to consolidate his power after breaking all relations with the French colonial 
power. As a result of Conté’s dictatorship rule, “tens of thousands of people disappeared, or were 
tortured or executed, during his 26-year regime” (BBC News Africa 2014). The use of fear 
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mongering tactics by President Conté and his government created a psychosis among the 
Guinean population and silenced opposition voices for nearly three decades of Conté’s 
presidency. Table 5.3 provides a brief political history of Guinea since independence from 
France in 1958. 
 
Table 5.3: Timeline of Political Situation in Guinea 
Timeline Political Systems 
1958-1984 One Party State (PDG) 
1984-1990 Military Regime 
1990-1993 Multiparty Transition 
1993-2008 Restricted Democratic Practice 
2008-2010 Military Regime 
2010-Present Emerging Democracy 
Source: African Elections Database, 3 March 2012. Available at 
http://africanelections.tripod.com/gn.html 
 
As it shows in Table 5.3 above, the one-party system established between 1958 and 1984 
had been replaced by a military regime, which dominated the politics in Guinea from 1984 to 
1990 (African Elections Database 2012). After a brief period of a democratic transition (1990-
1993), Army General Lansana Conté, the incumbent president of the military regime, made sure 
that there were no free and fair elections in Guinea until his death in 2008 (CIA World Factbook 
2014). 
Although a multi-party system was established in early 1990s, Conté’s Party of Unity and 
Progress (PUP), the ruling party, not only managed to win an absolute majority in every single 
legislative election but also ensured that President Conté retained the presidency. With 51.71 
percent of the vote, Conté won the first democratic election held in 1993 against many 
candidates of the Guinean political opposition parties including the Rally of the Guinean People 
(RGP), the Union for the New Republic (UNR), the Party of Renewal and Progress (PRP), the 
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National Union for the Progress of Guinea (UNPG), the Union for the Progress of Guinea 
(UPG), the Dyama Party (DYAMA), and the Democratic Party of Guinea-African Democratic 
Rally (PDG-RDA) (African Elections Database 2012). He was re-elected in 1998. Because of the 
control of the National Assembly by his PUP, which obtained 41 out of 76 seats in the 1995 
legislative elections, Conté was able to proceed with a constitutional amendment and increased 
his mandate from five year terms to seven years with no term limits through a national 
referendum in November 2001 (African Elections Database 2012). 
The boycott by the main opposition party, RPG, of both the 2002 legislative elections and 
the 2003 presidential elections helped the ruling PUP to maintain its dominance in the National 
Assembly and allowed Conté to easily win the presidency with 95.25 percent of the votes 
(African Elections Database 2012). Conté then accumulated and centered all powers in himself 
and unilaterally exercised them until his death on 22 December 2008 after a “lengthy illness” 
(Associated Press 2008). The causes of such an illness, according to the Associated Press, were 
not disclosed to the public. As usual in Guinea, the constitution was never respected after the 
death of a Head of State. As Conté himself took power via a military coup following the death of 
President Touré, the junta under the leadership of Captain Moussa Dadis Camara also seized 
power through a coup d’état (CIA World Factbook 2014, Arief and Cook 2009). Camara 
suspended all political institutions, including the country’s constitution, the legislature, and 
political parties as well as trade unions (Arief and Cook 2009). His efforts toward fighting 
corruption, restoring social order, and establishing good governance were undermined by his 
increasing ambition to contest the subsequent presidential elections set to take place in 2010 
against the will of people of Guinea.  
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Unhappy with Camara’s desire to perpetuate his power, the Guinean political opposition 
and advocates of democracy took the matter to the streets and gathered on the national football 
stadium, where they had engaged in anti-government demonstrations (Butty 2009). In the name 
of maintaining social order, “Camara ordered the massacre of a pro-democracy rally where 
numerous witnesses and human rights groups said 157 people were killed and soldiers raped 
several women” (The Guardian 16 December 2009). In the view of Georgette Gagnon, Africa 
director at Human Rights Watch, the massive killing at the stadium was a terror tactic used by 
the junta to “silence opposition voices” (Human Rights Watch 2009). The decision to commit 
such an onerous crime was planned and implemented by the Guinean security forces including, 
but are not limited to, Presidential Guard troops and gendarmes (Human Rights Watch 2009).   
Such a massacre of September 28, 2009 in Guinea was blamed on the former presidential 
aide, Lieutenant Abubakar "Toumba" Diakite by the United Nations and human rights 
organizations. This latter (Diakite), not only refused to accept responsibility for the crime, but 
also he accused Camara of “a total betrayal of democracy” and personally shot him on December 
3, 2009 (The Guardian 2009, Voice of America 2009, Newstime Africa 2011). This 2009 
assassination attempt reveals how history repeats itself in Guinea, which has been ruled by 
strong men and experienced several military coups since 1958. Thus far, according to 2010 
Presidential Election Observers Mission (MOE) of Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy 
in Africa (EISA), the 2010 presidential elections remain the first fair and competitive elections.  
However, Guinean political history may have influenced political institutions and voting 
behavior in the country. The election of Alpha Condé of RPG, a veteran political opponent to 
Conté’s dictatorial regime, in the second round of the 2010 presidential elections with 52.52 
percent of the votes against Cellou Dalein Diallo (UFDG) with 47.48 percent of the votes set the 
tone for the democratization of Guinea.  
 
 
A Preventive Approach to Post-Election Conflicts in Contemporary Africa                           Edoh Agbehonou 
 
150 
 
 5.1.1.4. The Case of Guinea-Bissau 
Guinea-Bissau is a West African country that is bordered by two countries (Guinea to the 
east, Senegal to the north) and the Atlantic Ocean or Gulf of Guinea to the west (see Figure 5.1). 
The country is well known for its cycle of military takeover. Since independence from Portugal 
in 1974 under the leadership of African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde 
(PAIGC) (BBC News Africa, 13 February 2014), the political situation in Guinea-Bissau was 
characterized by a lengthy pattern of one party system-military regime-one party system, a 
shorter period of multiparty democratic transition, and a series of shorter patterns of democracy 
and transitional governments. This Table 5.4 below provides an overview of political history of 
Guinea-Bissau since independence. 
 
Table 5.4: Timeline of Political Situation in Guinea-Bissau 
 
Timeline Political Systems 
1974-1980 One Party State (PAIGC) 
1980-1984 Military Regime and One Party State (PAIGC) 
1984-1991  One Party State (PAIGC) 
1991-1994 Multiparty Transition 
1994-1999  Democracy 
1999         Transitional Government 
1999-2003 Democracy 
2003-2005 Transitional Government 
2005-2012 Democracy 
2012  Military Regime 
2012- Present 
 
Transitional Government 
Source: African Elections Database, 1 June 2012 
 
A critical analysis of Table 5.1 reveals a lack of regime stability in the country. In 
addition, the frequency of military coups even during the era of electoral democracy in Guinea-
Bissau made the case of Guinea-Bissau an exceptional one as compared to the other cases 
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selected in this thesis. The wave of democratization of the 1990s helped the people of Guinea-
Bissau to break away from one party system and adopt a multiparty system. As an immediate 
consequence, PAIGC lost its state party status when the legislatures voted against the legitimacy 
of the ruling party as the sole political party in the country (BBC News Africa 13 February 2014).  
The multiparty transition of 1991-1994 paved the way for true competitive presidential 
elections of July/August 1994 in which the incumbent president, João Bernardo Vieira, won 52 
percent of the votes in the second round against seven political opponents, including his main 
challenger, Kumba Yalá, the leader of Social Renewal Party (PRS), who lost the elections with 
48 percent of the votes (African Elections Database 2012). The closeness of election results is an 
indication of political polarization in Guinea-Bissau since the outset of the country’s 
democratization process.  
However, the results of the 1994 National People’s Assembly elections held 
simultaneously with the presidential elections gave an absolute control of the legislative branch 
to PAIGC with 62 percent of the total seats over its counterparts, the opposition political parties 
such as Resistance of Guinea-Bissau- Bafatá (RGB-MB) with 19 seats, Union for Change (UM) 
with 6 seats, PRS with 12 seats, Democratic Convergence Party (PCD) with one seat, and Front 
for the Liberation and Independence of Guinea (FLING) with one seat. Equally important to note 
is that two smaller opposition political parties, namely Guinean Civic Forum-Social Democracy 
(FCG-SD) and United Social Democratic Party (PUSD), participated in the 1994 legislative 
elections but failed to secure a single seat in the National People’s Assembly (African Elections 
Database 2012, Inter-Parliamentary Union 1994). Despite report by the international observers 
that the elections were “generally free and fair” (Inter-Parliamentary Union 1994), the opposition 
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cried fraud and under strict instructions of Yalá, the opposition parties except RGB-MB 
boycotted Vieira’s new government (Inter-Parliamentary Union 1994).  
Five years later, PAIGC lost its power and accepted defeat in the 1999/2000 presidential 
elections that Kumba Yalá (PRS) won handily with 72 percent of the votes. However, no 
political party won a majority of seats during the 1999 National People’s Assembly elections. 
The trend of a fragmented National People’s Assembly carried on to the 2005 legislative 
elections with a surprising comeback of PAIGC, which won a plurality of seats (45 out of 102 
seats) (African Elections Database 2012). Meanwhile, President Yalá was ousted by a military 
coup in 2003 (BBC News Africa 13 February 2014). The deposing of Yalá helped former 
president João Bernardo Vieira, who contested the 2005 presidential elections as an independent, 
to win the presidency against Malam Bacai Sanhá, the leader of Vieira’s political party, PAIGC 
(African Elections Database 2012). Because of his inability to solve internal political crisis, 
President Vieira was assassinated following the killing of General Tagme Na Waie, the army’s 
chief of staff in March 2009 (BBC News Africa 13 February 2014). Internal conflicts may have 
been the rationale of the assassination of Vieira, but there were certainly other more proximate 
reasons such as the desire to seize power as was always the case in Guinea-Bissau. 
 
Figure 5.1: Map Illustrating the Location of Guinea-Bissau 
 
Source: BBC News Africa, 13 February 2014. 
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5.1.1.5. The Case of Togo 
The political situation in Togo was quite similar to that of Benin in the early 1960s. 
Between 1960 and 1962, four political parties—Justice, Union, Vigilance, Education, 
Nationalism, Tenacity, Optimism (JUVENTO) or Togolese Youth Movement; the Union 
Démocratique des Populations Togolaises (UDPT); the Parti Togolais Du Progrès (PTP), led by 
Grunitzky; and the Comité de Unité Togolaise (CUT), led by the first democratically elected 
president, Sylvanus Olympio—dominated the political activities in Togo (U.S. Department of 
State, 2012). However, CUT, PTP, and a small party called Union of Chiefs and Populations of 
the North (UCPN) had their elected representatives in the 1958 Legislative Assembly (African 
Election Database 2011). With strong popular support, President Olympio banned other political 
parties and established a one-party system two years after he was sworn into office. Table 5.5 
below synthesizes the political history of Togo since the country’s accession to self-
determination in 1960. 
 
Table 5.5: Timeline of Political Situation in Togo 
Timeline Political Systems 
1960-1961 Democracy 
1961-1962 Restricted Democratic Practice 
1962-1963 De-Facto One Party State (CUT) 
1963 Transitional Government 
1963-1967 Emerging Democracy 
1967-1969 Military Regime 
1969-1979 Military Regime and One Party State (RPT) 
1979-1991 One Party State (RPT) 
1991-1993 Multiparty Transition 
1993-Present Restricted Democratic Practice 
Source: African Elections Database, 4 December 2010 
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 An analysis of Table 5.5 shows that the military was a heavy weight in politics in Togo 
and that the country embraced more an authoritarian form of government than a democratic one. 
A brief period of democracy (from 1960 to 1962) was reversed by a bloody military coup d’état, 
which led to the assassination of President Olympio on January 13, 1963 by a group of Togolese 
soldiers including Etienne Eyadéma Gnassingbé, a sergeant who served in the French Army, for 
refusing to reintegrate into the Togolese army “626 Togolese, who had been serving in 
metropolitan regiments” (First 1970, 2012: 208). As First (1970) notes it, these 626 soldiers were 
sent back as a result of the French demobilization program of the late 1950s.   
The complotters of the coup had no political leadership experience. They had to seek help 
from outside the junta. Nicolas Grunitzky (the leader of PTP and a former Prime Minister of 
Togo from 1956 and 1958), who unlike President Olyimpio wanted Togo to be an autonomous 
entity within the French Community, was invited from exile in France to lead a transitional 
government formed by the junta in 1963. Such a government was short-lived. It was soon 
overthrown in a second military coup on January 13, 1967 by the young Lieutenant Colonel 
Gnassingbé Eyadéma who established a strong military dictatorship with a one-party system 
until 1991. Although opposition political parties proliferated during the early 1990s, the 
Togolese Peoples Rally (RPT), the former state party and the party of Eyadéma, ruled the 
country for over four decades and continues to dominate the politics in Togo until today under 
another name, Union for the Republic (UNIR).  
 From the early 1990s to the present day, there have been over 20 political parties. The 
major ones include, but are not limited to, the ruling RPT, Union of Forces for Change (UFC), 
National Alliance for Change (ANC), Action Committee for Renewal (CAR), Democratic 
Convention of African Peoples (CDPA), Pan-African Patriotic Convergence (CPP), Alliance of 
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Democrats for Integral Development (ADDI), and Democratic Alliance for the Fatherland 
(ALLIANCE). Most of these parties were relatively small groups organized around a patron who 
led and financed them. Since 2007, only RPT, UFC, and CAR were represented in the country’s 
2007 National Assembly with 50, 27, and 4 seats, respectively (African Election Database, 
2011). As far as the social fabric is concerned, the Togolese population is culturally and 
ethnically diverse. More than 20 ethnic groups live in the country. With the size of 56,785 square 
kilometers, Togo is about half the size of Benin (116,622 sq. km) (U.S. Department of State 
2012).  The major ethnic groups are Ewe, Mina, Kabyès, Kotokoli, and Moba. While Ewe and 
Mina are concentrated in the south, Kabyès, Kotokoli, and Moba populate the north.  
 As Creevey, Ngomo, and Vengroff (2005) pinpointed in their comparative study of party 
politics in Benin and Senegal, politics in the early 1990s in both Benin and Togo were 
characterized by “rapid proliferation of political parties” (p. 473) and “ethno-regional cleavages” 
(p. 474). These features also remained a reality and continue to shape politics in Togo since 
1990. For example, in Togo, politics has been framed in terms of north versus south in general, 
and Kabyè against southern peoples, particularly, the Ewé ethnic group. Therefore, there has 
been a tendency by political leaders to create political parties based on ethnic and regional lines. 
Heilbrunn observes, “Ethnic strife between Togo's northern and southern peoples aggravated 
suspicions of the Kabyè, some of whom had benefited from the years of Eyadema's rule” 
(Heilbrunn 1993:295).   
 
 5.1.1.6. The Case of Senegal 
History reveals that Senegal has so far been ruled by civilians. For example, since 
independence from France, three consecutive civilians [Leopeold Sedar Senghor (1960-1982), 
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Abdou Diouf (1983-February 2000), and Abdoulaye Wade (2000-2012)] presided over the 
destiny of their country’s domestic and foreign affairs in addition to the Senegalese current 
civilian president, Macky Sall. Transfers of power have always been peaceful in Senegal. The 
country is known for its stability in West Africa in particular and in Africa in general. The 
longtime stability of Senegal can in part be explained by a lack of military interventions in their 
country’s political affairs and an endorsement of elections by all Senegalese as the legitimate 
means of transfer of political power.  Table 5.6 below contains a summary of political situation 
of Senegal since independence.  
 
Table 5.6: Timeline of Political Situation in Senegal 
Timeline Political Systems 
1960-1963 Emerging Democracy 
1963-1966 Restricted Democratic Practice 
1966-1974 One Party State (UPS) 
1974-1978 Restricted Democratic Practice 
1978-2000 Emerging Democracy 
2000-Present Democracy 
Source: African Elections Database, 13 July 2012 
Unlike many African countries, as Table 5.6 indicates, Senegal reintroduced a multiparty 
system as early as 1978 (African Elections Database 2012). Two opposition political parties, 
Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) led by Abdoulaye Wade and African Independence Party 
(PAI) led by Majhemout Diop participated in the 1978 National Assembly elections against the 
ruling Socialist Party (PS) led by Léopold Sédar Senghor (African Elections Database 2012). 
Despite the participation of PAI and PDS in the legislative elections, PS was able to win 82 seats 
leaving PDS with 18 seats, and PAI with empty hands.  
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Since then, PDS maintained its presence in the political scene by leading opposition 
parties with 27 seats in the legislature in 1993 and 23 seats in 1998. The 2000 Presidential 
elections gave Abdoulaye Wade, the leader of PDS or Alternative 2000, a double digit victory 
with 58.49 percent of votes against the incumbent President Abdou Diouf (PS) with 41.51 
percent of the votes (African Elections Database 2012).  The Alternative 2000 that brought Wade 
to power became SOPI Coalition and won 89 out 120 seats against the opposition parties, 
including but are not limited to, Alliance of Progressive Forces (AFP), PS, And Jëf -African 
Party for Democracy and Socialism (AJ-PADS), Union for Democratic Renewal (URD), 
Senegalese Liberal Party (PLS),  Party for Progress and Citizenship (PPC), Alliance for Progress 
and Justice- Jëf-Jël (APJ-JJ), National Democratic Rally (RND), and Independence and Labor 
Party (PIT) (African Elections Database 2012, IPU 2001). 
It is equally important to point out that AFP and PS got the lion share of the 31 remaining 
seats left to the opposition parties by SOPI Coalition by winning eleven and ten seats, 
respectively in the 2001 National Assembly elections. In all, ten political parties were 
represented in the National Assembly. Even though Senegal has had multiparty elections since 
Senghor’s last term in office, it was the 2001 legislative elections coupled with the acceptance of 
defeat by former President Abdou Diouf that brought the country into the family of democratic 
states.  Wade’s subsequent defeat helped institutionalize democracy. 
It is also important to note that since 1978, the number of political parties grew and 
continues to grow at an increasing rate. It grew from three in 1978 to eight in 1983, to eighteen 
in 1998, and to over forty in 2007, given that SOPI Coalition alone was composed of forty 
political parties (African Elections Database 2012). During the 2007 elections, in spite of the 
emergence of a myriad of coalitions of opposition parties including Takku Defaraat Senegal 
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(TDS) coalition, And Defar Senegal (ADS) coalition, and Waar-wi coalition, SOPI candidate, 
President Abdoulaye Wade was re-elected with 55.90 percent of the votes (African Elections 
Database 2012). Additionally, SOPI coalition maintained its supremacy by winning 131 out of 
150 seats in National Assembly against TDS coalition, ADS coalition, and Waari-wi coalition 
each of which won only three seats (African Elections Database 2012, IPU 2007). Except Rally 
for the People (RP), which won two seats, other smaller parties such as Front for Socialism and 
Democracy-Benno Jubël (FSD-BJ), Alliance for Progress and Justice- Jëf-Jël (APJ-JJ), 
Convergence for Renewal and Citizenship (CRC), Authentic Socialist Party (PSA), National 
Patriotic Union (UNP), Reform Movement for Social Development (MRDS) and Rally of the 
Ecologists of Senegal-The Greens (RES- Les Verts) shared equally the eight remaining seats, 
However, the swift shift of power from Wade to Macky Sall, hence from PDS to a broad Macky 
2012 coalition during the second round of the 2012 presidential elections, demonstrates that 
political leaders and their supporters have decided to embrace democratic values and consolidate 
their democratization process in motion in Senegal since 1993.   
    
5.1.2. Effects of Political Institutions on Voting Behavior  
Despite the presence of ethno-linguistically diverse populations in Benin, Ghana, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Senegal and Togo, each of these countries adopted a unitary constitutional 
design. This design indicates that in these countries, “power is not constitutionally divided 
between layers of government but resides exclusively in the central government” (Dickovick and 
Eastwood 2013: 179-180). Nonetheless, there are variations in the implementation of the unitary 
constitutional design in each of these countries. For example in Togo, the government divides the 
country into 30 prefectures, each of which is administered by a prefect appointed by the 
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president or the Head of State. This style of administering a country is consistent with the French 
unitary state model with the central government control exercised on behalf of the president at 
the prefecture level. The main purpose of consolidating power is to limit the competition of local 
politicians in order to avoid a possible destabilization of the central government. In my view, the 
lack of local elections can negatively impact political socialization in the country and 
consequently voting behavior in the country’s national elections.  
Unlike Togo, Ghana has embarked in its decentralization process since 1992. In Benin, 
the central government has been administering the country’s seventy-two communes through 
elected local governments that are accountable to the Beninois government since 2002 
(Bierschenk 2006). He argues that “the holding of local elections in 2002-03 can be seen as the 
culmination of this turn to democracy” (p. 543).  Such a politics of decentralization offers voters 
a high feeling of ownership of the political process in their country and facilitates their voting 
behavior. 
In Guinea-Bissau, Article 2 of the 1984 Constitution, which was amended multiple times 
in 1991, 1993 and 1996, stipulates that: 
1. The national sovereignty of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau lies in the people; 
2. The people shall exercise political power directly and through the organs of 
democratically elected power.  
 
Despite the provision in the Article 2 that sovereignty belongs to people and that democratic 
elections should be the means by which people get access to political power, military 
interventions are often used in Guinea-Bissau as a tool to gain power. As I will discuss later in 
this chapter, the frequency of military coups in Guinea-Bissau left the country with weak 
political institutions that were unable to meet the expectations of voters.  
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For instance, late President Kumba Yalá unilaterally dissolved the parliament, sacked 
judges of the Supreme Court, and dismissed at his will four Prime Ministers during his short 
term in office. A survey data on attitudes and opinions of the Bissau-Guineans regarding the 
quality of democracy will help measure the level of trust in political institutions in Guinea-
Bissau. So far the only database that provides survey data on “the quality of democracy and 
governance in Africa” is the Afrobarometer, run by Michigan State University.  But Guinea-
Bissau is not yet covered in the Afrobarometer online data analysis. However, a decline in voter 
turnouts from 87.6 percent in the 2005 presidential elections to about 60 percent in 2009 
presidential elections shows voters’ uncertainty about who to vote for between two dictators: the 
incumbent President Vieira  and a former president Yalá, who abused his power by dissolving 
the National People’s Assembly and dismissing judges and prime ministers as he wished. The 
decline in voter turnouts is also indicative of a loss of trust in political institutions in the country 
(African Elections Database 2012).  
Unlike Guinea-Bissau, which experienced some brief periods of democracy, Guinea was 
ruled solely by late president, General Lansana Conté, who concentrated all powers in his hands 
as his predecessor President Touré did. None of the Guinean political elites was committed to 
promoting democracy given that separation of powers among the branches of government was 
never a reality in the country. Since 1990, not only were elections not held as scheduled, they 
were also poorly organized and administered. Although the bad organization of elections was 
across the board in many African states, the Guinean case was alarming. Between 1990 and 
2010, only two legislative elections were held in Guinea, and even the latest elections conducted 
in 2002 were boycotted by the principal opposition party, the RPG of Alpha Condé and other 
parties including the UFR of Sidya Touré and the DYAMMA of Mansour Kaba due to the lack 
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of transparency and fairness of such elections (IPU 1996-2010). Above all, the removal of 
presidential term limits during the 2001 referendum held on November 11 constitutes the most 
fundamental obstacle to the emergence of democracy in Guinea.   
In Senegal, the creation of Sopi coalition, which calls for a broader change (constitutional 
amendment, change of ruling government and its political instruments, etc.) helped bring about a 
democratic alternation in 2000. The slogan “Sopi”, which means “change” in the Wolof 
language, resonates well with the electorate who voted massively for Wade and parties of Sopi 
coalition in order to end “40 years of single-party dominance” (Galvan 2001), or what Bingol 
and Vengroff (2012) call “hegemonic rule by the PS” (p. 112).  
As political parties can persuade voters to support a cause, they also have the ability to 
convince them to oppose a cause. This was exactly what happened in 2007 when “Siggil Front,” 
a coalition of opposition parties, boycotted the 2007 parliamentary elections, which saw a record 
low turnout (34 percent as compared to 68 percent voter turnout in the 2001 National Assembly 
elections) (IPU 2007).  
Additionally, the Preamble of the Constitution of Senegal (ratified on January 22, 2001) 
proclaims the principle of equality and separation of powers, and such powers should be 
exercised via democratic procedures. In the Preamble, it also emphasized  
the willingness of Senegal to be a modern state that functions according to loyal and 
equitable game between a governing majority and a democratic opposition, and a state 
that recognizes such an opposition as a fundamental pillar of democracy and an 
indispensable player in a functioning democracy.    
 
Even during the time of President Leopold Sédar Senghor’s presidency, Senegal was one of the 
few African states that allowed a multiparty system. Since 1978, political activities of opposition 
parties were also allowed (African Elections Database 2012, Mozaffar and Vengroff 2002). One 
thing is to recognize opposition parties as vital parts of democracy, but the other thing is to 
A Preventive Approach to Post-Election Conflicts in Contemporary Africa                           Edoh Agbehonou 
 
162 
 
provide opportunities that allow such parties to really contribute to the consolidation of 
democracy. It was exactly what Senghor and his successor, President Abdou Diouf did, but in 
different ways.  
While the Senghor created an opposition that was loyal to him and help his PS to 
maintain its hegemonic rule, Diouf on the other hand and because of increasing demands by 
opposition parties for more political representation during the democratization wave that swung 
across Africa in the 1990s, adopted strategies that later led to his demise as a result of the ability 
of a more radical opposition to coordinate behind Abdoulaye Wade (Mozaffar and Vengroff 
2002). Wade, who was hailed as a president whose only objective was to restore democracy in 
Senegal, embraced many undemocratic practices during his presidency. For instance, during the 
allocation of indirectly-elected senatorial seats, President Wade discriminated against opposition 
parties by signing the “presidential decree 2006-1350 of 8 December 2006” (IPU 2007). Such a 
decree gave more seats to smaller constituencies including Dagana, Kenel, Ziguinchor, Diourbel, 
Vélingara, Linguère, Gossas and Kébémer at the expenses of a much larger district of Bakel 
(IPU 2007). By striking down such a decree, the Constitutional Court demonstrated its 
independence via-a-vis the executive branch. The independence of the court system in Senegal 
has helped moderate the democratization of the country. 
 In the next section, I will discuss how democratic qualities of elections may help 
consolidate the democratization process in each of the six African states: Benin, Ghana, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, and Togo.  
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5.2. Comparing Democratic Qualities of Elections 
Democratic qualities of elections as identified by Lindberg (2006) include political 
participation, electoral competition, and electoral legitimacy.  
 5.2.1. Political Participation 
Linking political participation with elections, I used the Afrobarometer online survey 
analysis Round 5 that covers about 84 percent of countries selected for the purpose of this study. 
Guinea-Bissau was not covered by Afrobarometer. Other reliable sources such as African 
Elections Database and Inter-Parliamentary Union Pipeline are used to help include Guinea-
Bissau in my analysis. The two most important variables I considered when making the decision 
to use Round 5 of Afrobarometer Online Data Analysis were “level of democracy: under 
previous non-democratic regimes” and “level of democracy: ten years ago.” Such variables help 
cover the time frame of the study (1990-2010) and also provide a broad picture for the sample of 
countries selected for this comparative analysis. 
Political participation is measured by two critically intervening variables such as “rights 
and freedoms” and “political engagement” (Afrobarometer 2012). Rights and freedoms include 
freedom of expression and speech, freedom to join political organizations of one’s choice, 
freedom to choose who to vote for during elections, and freedom of press; on the other hand, 
political engagement is measured by citizens’ interest in public affairs and how often citizens 
discuss politics with relatives and friends (Afrobarometer 2012).  
5.2.1.1. Rights and Freedoms 
It is clearly stated in the article 2 of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights that 
“everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without 
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distinction of any kinds, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status” (UN.org 2014). However, it often 
evident to see that respect for such rights and freedoms, which is an international law, is not fully 
obeyed in many African countries. For example, a survey conducted in 34 Afrobarometer 
countries shows that on average only about 50 percent of the 48,004 participants say that they are 
completely free to say what they think in their countries while the other 50 percent are either 
“somewhat free,” “not very free,” or “not at all free” (Afrobarometer 2012).  
In comparing these descriptive statistics to the cases selected for this study, as expected, 
the percentage of participants who think they are free to express their thoughts and ideas 
increases as their country’s commitment to democracy increases.  For example, while 73 percent 
of people in Ghana and Senegal, 57 percent of Beninois, and 55 percent of Guineans say that 
they are free to say what they think, only 21 percent of Togolese say that they are free to say 
what they think without fear (Afrobarometer 2012).  
When it comes to freedom to join political organizations, one can observe similar 
scenarios. According to the same survey, Ghana and Senegal score very high (87 percent and 85 
percent, respectively); Benin and Guinea score moderately high (68 percent and 69 percent, 
respectively); and Togo scores very low (36 percent). The higher the score, the more people feel 
that they are allowed to freely join political organizations or parties. Other concerns of political 
scientists about the respect for political rights and freedoms are whether government should 
allow freedom of press or not. The findings are included in Table 5.7 below. 
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Table 5.7: Perception on Freedom to Vote for a Candidate, and Free Press 
  Variables Benin Ghana Guinea Senegal Togo 
Freedom to choose who to vote for a 
party or candidate 
84% 91% 81% 89% 60% 
The media should have the right to 
publish any view and ideas without 
government control  
51% 55% 48% 29% 55% 
The government should have the right to 
prevent the media from publishing things 
that it considers harmful to society 
49% 43% 50 68% 40% 
Source: Afrobarometer Online Data Analysis, 2012 
   
An analysis of Table 5.7 reveals that in Benin, Ghana, Guinea, and Senegal, not only is there 
freedom of expression, but there is also freedom to select one’s representative through elections. 
It also shows that in Togo even though people are not free to say what they think, they, however, 
are free to vote for the party or the candidate of their choice. Finally, Table 5.7 shows that with 
the exception of Senegal, where overwhelming majority (68 percent) of people want their 
government to regulate the media because of  its past abuses of freedom, people fairly believe in 
Benin, Ghana, Guinea, and even Togo that the government should allow the media to freely 
publish ideas even if these views are against government policies.  
It is equally important to note that the exception observed among the Senegalese 
participants in the Afrobarometer survey does not necessary mean that people have been 
advocating for an authoritarian regime in Senegal. It is perhaps an indication that people in 
Senegal have a preference for a stronger government that should not only protect them from 
harm, but also and most importantly, a regime with the ability to maintain order, given that a 
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majority (56 percent) of Senegalese believe that the news media often abuses its freedom 
(Afrobarometer 2012).   
Although the Afrobarometer survey does not cover Guinea-Bissau, the classification of 
the country by 2013 Freedom House in the category of countries that are not free provides us 
with an image of how rights and freedoms are restricted and/or violated in Guinea-Bissau. Table 
5.3 provides a summary of the result of a survey on freedom of the press in Guinea-Bissau. In the 
survey, press freedom is referred to as the sum total of legal, political and economic 
environments (Freedom House 2012).  
The variable legal environment is moderated among others by independence of the 
judicial branch, how government uses legal institutions to restrict news media, and freedom of 
journalists to freely express their thoughts and opinions. Political environment includes 
intimidation, arrest and assault of journalists, state censorship of the media in general and its 
“control over the content of news media” in particular; economic environment stresses the effect 
of the economic situation in a state on the growth of the news media (Freedom House 2012).  
 
Table 5.8: Freedom of the Press in Guinea-Bissau 
 
Years  Legal 
environment 
(0 = best, 30 
= worst) 
Political 
environment 
(0 = best, 40 
= worst) 
Economic 
environment 
(0= best, 30= 
worst) 
Press freedom 
(0=best, 100= 
worst) 
Press status 
(0-30 = free, 
31-60 = partly 
free, 61-100 = 
not free) 
2002 15 23 18 56 Partly free 
2003 15 27 18 60 Partly free 
2004 17 27 19 63 Not free 
2005 15 23 17 55 Partly free 
2006 13 17 17 47 Partly free 
2007 14 19 15 48 Partly free 
2008 15 23 15 53 Partly free 
2009 15 22 15 52 Partly free 
2010 15 24 15 54 Partly free 
Source: Freedom House, 2002-2010 
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 In Guinea-Bissau, although the 1993 Constitution guarantees freedom of expression and 
freedom of press, journalists of privately-owned radio stations were subjects of constant 
intimidation and harassment. Some of these journalists were even arrested for “refusing to hand 
over tapes of a weekly news commentary” (Freedom House 2002). For instances in 2001, “two 
journalists of the daily Diaro of Bissau were arrested.” Radio stations such as Diaro of Bissau 
and Gazeta de Noticias, which operates on a weekly basis, were closed for being threats to social 
order and “national security” (Freedom House 2002).  
 Additionally, in the name of maintaining social order, Radio Bombolom, the main 
broadcasting medium of the political opposition parties in Guinea-Bissau, was frequently 
“threatened to shut down” for accusing armed forces of facilitating drug trafficking activities in 
the country. Defenders and advocates of human rights and journalists (in this case, those who 
dare to criticize the government) were constantly assaulted. However, perpetrators of human 
rights violations and abuses have never been punished (Freedom House 2009). As a result of 
worsening political environment, the country’s press status increased from 52 percent in 2009 to 
54 percent in 2010 as shown in Table 5.8 above. Such an increase in the press status score means 
the lack of free press and freedom and expression and to some extent a violation of civil liberties 
guaranteed by the constitution of Guinea-Bissau. I would argue that the restriction on the news 
media has negatively impacted the political landscape in the country as people are not free to 
express what they think about their government. 
5.2.1.2. Political Engagement 
Citizens’ interest in public affairs and their willingness to discuss politics determine their 
political engagement. Again, there is a variation in countries’ levels of political engagement. In 
Benin, for example, about 50 percent of people say that they are interested in public affairs while 
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the other 50 percent are not interested in public affairs. Another important observation is that in 
Togo only 45 percent of people say that they are interested in public affairs. The percentage of 
those who identified themselves as having interest in public affairs is higher in the other study 
countries: 52 in Guinea, 57 in Ghana, and 67 in Senegal.  
However, when participants were also asked about whether or not they “discuss politics” 
with their friends or family members, a slim majority in both Senegal (50 percent) and in Benin 
(51 percent) say that they “occasionally” discuss politics with their relatives or friends while in 
Ghana and Guinea, the percentages were 41 and 46, respectively. Somewhat as expected, only 35 
percent of participants in Togo say that they discuss politics with their friends and family 
members (Afrobarometer 2012).  
These observations inform us of a country’s political culture. Countries with a high 
percentage of people who discuss politics or who are interested in public affairs tend to have a 
more participant political culture. However, countries tend to experience subject, and/or 
parochial political cultures where such percentages are lower. From the analysis of the 
Afrobarometer data, one can conclude that in Togo citizens have little to no influence on their 
government policy processes when compared to their counterparts in Benin, Guinea, Ghana, and 
Senegal.   
However, when we discuss each case separately, and based on the statistics provided 
about press freedom in Guinea-Bissau, it is safe to say that Ghana has a participant political 
culture while Togo is dominated by a subject or parochial political culture. In Ghana for 
example, because of positive effects of constitutional guarantees of both political rights and civil 
liberties, the general populace has been very active in discussing politics. As illustrated by the 
Afrobarometer surveys, 60 percent of Ghanaians believed that they discussed politics either 
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occasionally (41 percent of participants) or frequently (19 percent of participants) with their 
friends or family members. Although 39 percent of participants said that they never discussed 
politics, the impact of the overwhelming majority of those who discussed political matters is 
positively felt given that democracy has been consolidated in Ghana. Participant political culture 
can be explained in part by the “institutionalization of the mode of contestation for political 
power,” “the enhanced mode of political participation from the grassroots to the national levels” 
(Boafo-Arthur 2006: 34), and the involvement of the Ghanaian general public in political 
debates/ discussions in Ghana.  
Such an ambiance observed in Ghana was absent in Togo, where the frequent use of 
military repression by the Gnassingbés has silenced the political opposition parties and their 
supporters. In 2013, during a luncheon with a group African scholars at the Association of the 
Studies of Middle East and Africa (ASMEA) conference in Washington, D.C., when I introduced 
myself as a Togolese born American, as a follow-up on my self-introduction, a colleague stated 
that “it was a taboo to even say the name Eyadéma without further explanations.”  A statement of 
that nature shows how serious the violation of freedom of expression was in Togo under the 
presidency of the late President Gnassingbé. Because of fear, the general populace in Togo was 
less involved in their country’s political debates. This situation and other undemocratic factors 
including military repressions provide strong incentives for political parochialism in Togo.     
 Senegal has a participant political culture as compared to Guinea, which has a political 
culture that can be classified within the spectrum of participant-subject political culture. In 
Senegal, a participant political culture can be explained by the ability of the Senegalese civil 
society to mobilize the population and provide strong support for democracy. It is worth noting 
that in Africa, Senegal has the highest statistic of citizens’ support for democracy (87 percent) 
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(Afrobarometer 2012).  In Guinea, the authoritarian regimes established by both Sékou Touré, 
and Lansana Conté and the 2008 military dictatorship of the junta created little room for political 
participation and civic-engagement, quelling interest in public affairs and/or discussions of 
politics despite the fact that more than half the population of Guinea (52 percent) believed that 
they were somewhat interested (20 percent) or very interested (32 percent) in public affairs while 
about 47 percent said that they were not interested in politics (Afrobarometer 2012). This 
situation undermined any prospect for democracy in Guinea since independence.   
When comparing Benin to Guinea-Bissau, one can conclude that political culture in 
Guinea-Bissau is a parochial one because throughout the history, politics was monopolized by 
the military that created weak political institutions with little to no capabilities to protect 
individual political rights and civil liberties. Therefore, engaging in political discussions in the 
country was a risky endeavor for the general populace. A different phenomenon was observed in 
Benin. The Béninois party system, which is characterized by extreme pluralism with no single 
party dominating the political landscape since 1991, facilitated the political socialization, which 
in turn moderated a participant political culture, a main determinant of the emergence and 
survival of democracy in the country. In Benin, only 27 percent of citizens of Benin believed that 
they never discussed politics versus 51 percent who said they it discussed occasionally, and 22 
percent of them discussed politics frequently (Afrobarometer 2012).   
  
5.2.2. Electoral Competition 
Lindberg (2006) argues that “a decent level of electoral competition is central to the 
realization of self-government, which in a representative democracy builds on the accountability 
and responsiveness of elected representatives” (p. 39). Such an argument suggests that for a 
A Preventive Approach to Post-Election Conflicts in Contemporary Africa                           Edoh Agbehonou 
 
171 
 
country to establish a true democracy, political competition, which is a fundamental requirement  
of the emergence and consolidation of democracy or a “supply of democracy,” must be allowed 
in that country.  
The discussion on electoral competition in Guinea-Bissau is not as complicated as it is 
the other five countries selected for the purpose of this thesis. If one looks back and analyzes the 
political situation in the country since independence as revealed by Table 5.1, one can see that no 
president in the history of Guinea-Bissau served a full term (five years) in office without being 
deposed or assassinated. Even though electoral competitions were opened to all political parties 
and independent candidates, military interventions have become a norm in Guinea-Bissau since 
1994. Table 5.9, below, provides a chronological overview of a series of military coups in 
Guinea-Bissau. 
 
Table 5.9: Timeline of the Rise and Demise of Bissau-Guinean Presidents, 1990-2010 
 
Name of Presidents Time in Office Motif of Departure 
Joan Bernardo Vieira August 1994-May 1999 Deposed via military coup 
Malai Bacam Sanha May 1999-January 2000 Defeated in election by 
Kumba Yala 
Kumba Yala January 2000-September 2003 Ousted by General Verissimo 
Correia Seabra* 
Henrique Rosa September 2003-June 2005 End of democratic transitional 
government 
Joan Bernardo Vieira July 2005 Killed by a group of soldiers 
Malai Bacai Sanha July 2009-January 2012 Natural death 
Sources: BBC News Africa 2014, IRIN 2010, IPU 2008 
Note: 1. During his time in office, Kumba Yala appointed and dismissed four Prime 
Ministers and left the country with no real government for months. He also dissolved the 
National People’s Assembly and dismissed the Supreme Court Justice at his will.  
2. General Verissimo Correia Seabra never served as a president but was later 
assassinated by General Bonte Na Man’s soldiers. 
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It is equally important to point out that military intervention has had more impact on the 
presidency than the country’s National People’s Assembly. This fact is consistent with the fact 
that many Africans have adopted a system of government in which the real power is held by the 
president. Additionally, vote-buying was also common in Guinea-Bissau during presidential 
elections (Lundy 2012). Moreover, with the exception of the 1999 legislative elections, the 
National People’s Assembly in Guinea-Bissau has been a monopoly of PAIGC. It (PAIGC) 
occupied the lion share of legislative seats in 1994 and 2008 and a plurality of seats in 2004 
(African Elections Database 2012).  
Even though these observations suggest a lack of true competitive elections in the 
country despite the participation of opposition parties in every single election in Guinea-Bissau, 
it is noteworthy that the fact that the PAIGC had only a plurality of seats in the 2004 National 
People’s Assembly elections indicates some degree of competition.  
Speaking of true competitive elections, Afrobarometer survey analysis shows that an 
overwhelming majority (75 percent) of people in Senegal said that their last national elections 
were “completely free and fair” as compared to one percent of those who said that the same 
elections were “not free and fair.” A majority (52 percent) and plurality (46 percent) of 
participants in Benin and Guinea, respectively, opine that their national elections were 
“completely free and fair.” In Togo, the percentage of survey participants who said that their 
national elections were “completely free and fair” and the percentage of those who said that the 
elections were “not free and fair” are almost the same (28 percent versus 22 percent). But 19 
percent of Togolese respondents said their elections were “free and fair, but with minor 
problems” and 15 percent believed that their elections were “free and fair, but with major 
problems.” On the other hand in Ghana, 39 percent of survey participants said that their last 
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national elections were “completely free and fair,” and only five percent of them said that the 
elections were “not free and fair.” Among the rest of the Ghanaian survey respondents, 40 
percent of respondents believed their last national elections were “free and fair, but with minor 
problems,” 10 percent said that their last elections were “free and fair, but with major” and the 
remaining six percent had no opinion.   
These descriptive statistics suggest a systemic lack of political competition in Togo, a 
true competitive contest in Senegal, and a fairly political competition in Benin and Guinea. 
Although the percentage of survey participants who believe that elections are “completely free 
and fair” outnumbers the percentage of those who say elections are “not free and fair” in Ghana, 
this result (only 39 percent said the elections were completely free and fair) is quite surprising 
because among the six African countries selected for study, Ghana ranks better than any of the 
others in terms of establishing a true democracy (Freedom House 2011). In comparative 
perspective, as of December 31, 2010, Ghana ranked first with political rights and civil liberties’ 
scores of (1, 2) followed by Benin (2, 2); Senegal (3, 3); Guinea-Bissau (4, 4); Togo (5, 4); and 
Guinea (5, 5) (Freedom House 2011). However, we must acknowledge that the freeness and 
fairness of elections are necessary but not sufficient determinants of political competition in a 
country. How the executive obeys laws and how far the government allows other political parties 
to freely operate within a country also matter when it comes to determining whether political 
competition is allowed or not.  
In Ghana for example, an overwhelming majority (61 percent) of participants in the 2012 
Afrobarometer survey asserts that presidents in their country never ignore laws. In Senegal as in 
Benin, a significant majority of participants say that their presidents obey laws. Another trend 
can be observed in Togo and Guinea where only 24 percent and 35 percent of participants, 
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respectively, say that laws are always respected by their presidents.  On the other hand as 
expected, opposition parties are often silenced by governments in countries with restricted 
democratic practices. As illustrated in the survey, 57 percent of participants in Ghana, 38 percent 
in Benin, 33 percent in Senegal, 30 percent in Guinea, and 16 percent of participants in Togo 
assert that opposition parties in their countries are never silenced by their governments. These 
observations are significant because they support the Freedom House’s ranking of these 
countries based on their level of democracy.   
The next section turns to the discussion of another critically important quality of 
elections, electoral legitimacy.  
 
5.2.3. Electoral Legitimacy 
If we defined legitimacy as popular acceptance of authority, then we should 
operationalize electoral legitimacy in terms of the behaviors of both political leaders and their 
supporters. Lindberg (2006) argues in his Democracy and Elections in Africa, “We can measure 
elites’ behavior, but we lack reliable indicators of voters’ acceptance of the electoral process and 
its results, since that  would require a kind of voter survey or behavioral data that does not exist 
in Africa—yet” (p. 43). The gap that existed when Lindberg wrote this book was filled by the 
Afrobarometer database. The Afrobarometer database has been providing data from surveys that 
allow common African people to voice their opinions regarding electoral processes in their 
respective countries. However, it has yet to cover all African states.  
Tables 5.10 through 5.21 provide some insight into the investigation of electoral 
legitimacy of each of the three paired cases [(Ghana, Togo); (Benin, Guinea-Bissau); and 
(Senegal, Guinea)]. Case # 1 shows that between 1990 and 2010 both Ghana and Togo held five 
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presidential elections (Table 5.10 and Table 5.11). In the case of Ghana, all parties accepted 
electoral outcomes in Ghana except in 1992 when the main opposition parties boycotted the 
parliamentary elections and in 2008 when the candidate of the ruling NPP seriously challenged 
the outcome of the presidential elections that gave victory to Atta Mills of the NDC.  
Moreover, Ghana experienced three successful democratic alternations in which 
incumbent political parties accepted defeat twice (NDC in 2000 and NPP in 2008). I will argue 
that three main factors have helped reduce the level of electoral violence in Ghana. These factors 
include 1) compliance with the 1992 constitution that was approved by 92.59 percent of 
registered voters, 2) having the presidential and parliamentary elections simultaneously, and 3) 
acceptance of electoral outcomes by all parties   
The first and the third factors are closely related. First, it is a well known fact that the 
only way to gain access to political power in contemporary Ghana is via a popular suffrage, and 
the guidelines of the rules and regulations governing any of the country’s political elections are 
provided by the constitution. For political actors and the general populace to accept electoral 
outcomes, institutions that provide the elections must also be viewed as credible and legitimate 
institutions. In Ghana it has become a reality since 1992 that no one can unconstitutionally seize 
power. Therefore, as Ninsin (2006) puts it, “both the political class and their follower or 
supporters are gradually accepting election rules and regulations and procedure, and are learning 
to abide by them” (p. 67). Hence, once electoral rules are accepted by all parties, chances are that 
electoral outcomes that emerge as a result of the application of such rules, and regulations will be 
accepted.  
The respect the constitution by the political actors and other stakeholders including the 
military facilitated a smooth transfer of power following the sudden death of President Atta Mills 
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and hence helped avoid political instability in Ghana. Additionally, all highly disputed election 
results (in 2008 and 2012) were resolved peacefully by legal and constitutional means. But in 
Guinea as in Togo, where the presidents of the National Assemblies were denied their 
constitutional rights to succeed the late presidents Eyadéma Gnassigbé in 2005 and Lansana 
Conté in 2008, conflicts escalated following the seizure of power by the military in both 
countries.  
Finally, when both the presidential and parliamentary elections are held on the same 
days, the Electoral Commission does not have to think of organizing them separately, and parties 
and their candidates will only campaign for both types of elections at once. Debrah (2006) writes 
“Democratic campaigns are periods for parties to debate the key issues, excite their supporters 
with distinctive set of goals and programmes that anchor their expectations about democracy. 
They engage in activities that are devoid of conflicts, acrimony, violence and insults” (p. 104). 
Therefore, going through campaign seasons twice may increase the costs (time, money and 
energy) associated with organizing and delivering such campaigns.  In Ghana, having both the 
presidential and the parliamentary elections concurrently has helped minimize such costs. 
Additionally, the likelihood of occurrence of multiple campaign conflicts has also been reduced 
to one simply by reducing the number of campaigns or electoral seasons. 
On the other hand, in Togo, the opposition parties never accepted any results of the 
presidential elections since 1993 when all the political opponents of the regime Gnasingbé (the 
father) unanimously boycotted the elections (African Elections Database 2010). Because of the 
lack of agreement among the opposition parties with regard to the presidential election results, 
because of the lack of independence of the judicial system in the country, and because of the lack 
of trust in the electoral commission, these parties and their supporters always show their 
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discontent on the streets through anti-government protests and demonstrations. These 
demonstrations were always repressed by government security forces resulting in high levels of 
electoral conflict as shown in Table 5.5 and illustrated by the values 2 and 3. 
At the legislative level, the opposition parties, except UFC, which boycotted the 1994 
elections, took part in only two National Assembly elections: the 1994 and 2007 legislative 
elections. In 1994, the coalition of two opposition parties (CAR and UTD) won the majority in 
the National Assembly with CAR receiving 36 seats and UTD winning only six seats. But the 
coalition was short lived because leaders within the coalition were divided over who should be 
appointed as a Prime Minister between Yaovi Agboyibor of CAR and Edem Kodjo of UTD (IPU 
1994). The political dinosaur, the late President Gnassingbé, profited from the disagreement 
between the two former political allies and appointed Edem Kodjo as Prime Minister. Such an 
appointment sealed a bitter division between the two opposition parties.   
The situation frustrated Agboyibor and his CAR. They refused to participate in a 
government formed by Kodjo. Additionally, the deputies of CAR boycotted the parliamentary 
session that endorsed Kodjo’s Government (IPU 1994). I therefore argue that a little window of 
opportunity offered by the 1994 legislative elections to end the longtime dictatorship and 
hegemonic rule of RPT was sabotaged by the selfish behavior and the lack of coordination of the 
leaders of political opposition, namely Kodjo of UTD and Agboyibor of CAR. As a result of the 
lack of coordination, President Gnassingbé coopted Kodjo and bought out his political party 
(UTD), which since then became an ally of the ruling RPT.  
The participation of the opposition parties in the 2007 legislative elections was facilitated 
by a series of political dialogues that established a political agreement among the main parties, 
including, but not limited to CAR, UFC, RPT, and representatives of the civil society. This 
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political agreement known as Accord Politique Globale (APG) or Global Political Accord did 
little to bring about a democratic alternation in Togo given that the ruling RPT with its 
supermajority (50 seats out of 81) in the National Assembly refused to perform institutional and 
constitutional reforms identified in APG. Above all, because the opposition parties were 
fragmented and disunited, because of the effective use of force by the ruling RPT, and despite 
the death of President Eyadéma Gnassingbé in 2005, democratic alternations failed to occur in 
Togo, and the dictatorial regime still prevails as a result of the use of the majoritarian electoral 
system. The continued use of such a system has helped institutionalize the dominant party 
system which made it difficult for opposition parties to gain power in the country.  
Because of the inability of the opposition parties to coalesce and strategically coordinate 
their actions in order to end the hegemonic rule of RPT, some of the parties including the radical 
opposition party (UFC) that wanted power at all costs ended up being bought out in 2010 by the 
Togolese government and remained in alliance with the RPT since then. It is important to point 
out that not all members within the leadership of the UFC had accepted a deal with the RPT. 
Some of the top leaders of the UFC including Jean-Pierre Fabre (a former Secretary General) and 
Patrick Lawson (a former First Vice-President) were excluded from the party for being against 
RPT-UFC historic agreement. These leaders (Fabre and Lawson) alongside other dissidents of 
the UFC created a new right-wing party known as the ANC (Alliance National pour le 
Changement or National Alliance for Change) on October 5, 2010 (Fabre 2010). Even though the 
creation of the ANC brought about a new hope for a democratic alternation since 2010, the 
majoritarian electoral system in use has not allowed the realization of such a dream given that the 
number one enemy of such a system is the existence of multiple fragmented parties whose 
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leaders’ main interest is only on gaining political power and not on establishing democracy per 
se. 
Next, I present and critically analyze electoral legitimacy in both Benin and Guinea-
Bissau as illustrated by case # 2 (see Table 5.14, Table 5.15., Table 5.16, and Table 5.17).  An 
analysis of Case # 2 reveals that democratic regimes are more likely to survive in Benin than 
they are in Guinea-Bissau for three main reasons. First, the authoritarian regime of President 
Kerekou collapsed after the Conférence Nationale Autonome and was replaced by a transitional 
government, which organized and held relatively peaceful democratic elections for a smooth 
transfer of political power to a civilian government led by President Nicéphore Soglo. By 
contrast in Guinea-Bissau, the dictatorial regime of President João Bernardo Vieira survived the 
1994 wave of democratization but failed to persuade the opposition parties to participate in the 
its new government because of a claim by the leader of the political opposition, Koumba Yala of 
massive electoral fraud during the 1994 legislative elections (IPU 1994). Second, with the 
exception of the 2000 presidential elections, which were relatively peaceful as a result of the 
Abuja peace agreement that de-escalated the 1998 civil war, there was a predominance of 
electoral violence during presidential elections in Guinea-Bissau as compared to the presidential 
elections in Benin.  
Third, the periodic occurrences of electoral violence in Guinea-Bissau are due to the fact 
that political parties and their candidates had difficulties accepting electoral outcomes. In Benin, 
however, election results are often accepted by all political actors at least during the country’s 
National Assembly elections because democracy has been consolidated (see Table 5.10). Even 
though Guinea-Bissau held three successful consecutive elections in which the ruling parties and 
incumbent presidents were defeated, democracy was far from being consolidated in that country 
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between 1990 and 2010. Numerous factors may have caused the breakdown in the democratic 
process in Guinea-Bissau. However, in this thesis, I will argue that the failure of the 
consolidation of democratization process in Guinea-Bissau is associated with the prevalence of 
multiple military interventions. The latest military coup occurred on April 12, 2012 after the first 
round of the presidential elections won by the country’s Prime Minister and a presidential 
candidate, Carlos Gomes Junior of PAIGC, with 48.97 percent of the votes against his main 
challenger Yala of PRS, who took the second place with only 23.36 percent of the votes (African 
Elections Database 2012, DW.DE 2012). If there were no breakdown in the electoral processes, 
Gomes Jr. was expected to win the second round of the presidential elections.  
Factors that contributed to the military takeover between the two rounds of the 2012 
presidential elections include “allegations of ‘generalized fraud’ by the opposition in the first 
round of presidential elections on March 18” (GlobalVoices 13 April 2012); poor diplomatic 
relations between Guinea-Bissau’s armed forces and General Feliciano dos Santos; the Angolan 
ambassador in the country regarding his accusation in March 2012 of the Commander in Chief of 
the Bissau-Guinean Armed Forces, General Antonio Indjai, to stage a military coup in the 
country (IRIN 2014, GlobalVoices 2012); and frustrations of the Bissau-Guinean military, 
especially the army chiefs because of the presence in the country since March 2011 of 200 
Angolan military mission troops known as MISSANG (IRIN 2014). Such a mission was 
specifically tasked to provide training and technical assistance to Guinea-Bissau’s military (IRIN 
2014). But in the minds of the junta, MISSANG was a “secret agreement between Carlos Gomes 
Jr. and the Angolan government to ‘annihilate Guinea-Bissau’s armed forces’” (IRIN 2014).  
Another factor of the 2012 coup d’état in Guinea-Bissau has to do with Gomes Jr.’s 
political campaign promises that focused not only on democracy promotion and economic 
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development, but also and most importantly on the reform of the security apparatus. Because of 
the status of the military as the main decision-maker in Bissau-Guinean politics, any policy that 
aims at reforming it will not be accepted by the armed forces. It is exactly what happened in 
2012 when “tensions had also built between the military and the prime minister because of 
Carlos Gomes’s official support for a long-overdue reform of the security sector, which would 
involve reducing the size of the armed forces; retiring older soldiers; and building up the civilian 
police force” (IRIN 2014).  In view of frequent military interventions in the country, no Bissau-
Guinean president served his full term in office without being deposed or assassinated (see Table 
5.16) (BBC News Africa 2014, IRIN 2010, IPU 2008). Additionally, many military coups had 
been successful in Guinea-Bissau since independence because the power has been wielded by the 
military, which is dominated by the Balanta ethnic group (IRIN 2014, DW.DE 2012). Because 
the real political power still remains in the hands of Guinea-Bissau’s armed forces, elections are 
just window dressing.  
Although Senegal experienced violent electoral conflicts during the 1993 and 2000 
presidential elections, and very high violence during in the 1993 legislative elections, the scale of 
violence in the country was relatively low compared to the level of electoral violence in 1993 
and 1998 in Guinea (see case # 3: Table 5.12 through Table 5.15). While Senegal has been ruled 
by civilian regimes, Guinea would have a civilian president only after the 2010 presidential 
elections that elected President Alpha Condé. Unlike Senegal, where electoral outcomes tended 
to be accepted by all parties (Table 5.12 and Table 5.13), election results had always been 
disputed in Guinea since 1993 (Table 5.14 and Table 5.15).  
However, one cannot overlook the bloody dispute between the ruling government and 
PDS of Abdoulaye Wade over the validity of the results of the 1993 National Assembly 
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elections. Such a resulting conflict led to the assassination of the Vice-President of the 
Constitutional Court, Babacar Seye, whose constitutional duty is to confirm election results (IPU 
1993). The ruling PS accused Wade of the crime, but he never accepted responsibility for it, and 
the actual assassins of Seye have not yet been properly identified. Although three suspects were 
jailed for the murder, Cornado (2012) notes that “many Senegalese remain convinced that full 
truth has not yet come out about one the ugliest incidents in the country’s history after Mr. Wade 
pardoned the assassins in 2002.” Another instance when electoral outcomes were challenged by 
the opposition was in 2007 when the “Siggil Front”—a coalition of 17 opposition parties—
boycotted the National Assembly elections in order to show their strong opposition to Wade’s 
2007 re-election results (Timeline of History 2014, IPU 2007).    
Although the democratization process has not yet been consolidated in Senegal, because 
of its past experiences of democratic practices and its recent elections (i.e. the 2012 presidential 
election that gave a landslide victory to Macky Sall over the incumbent president, Abdoulaye 
Wade), the country has a better chance than its counterpart, Guinea, when it comes to moving 
toward democracy. This difference can be explained by the fact that Senegal has strong 
democratic institutions that already produced two democratic alternations in 2000 and 2012 
while in Guinea there is a lack of strong democratic institutions. As a result of the inability of 
these weak political institutions to hold free and fair elections, none of the presidential and 
legislative elections held between 1990 and 2010 was able to bring about a democratic change in 
Guinea (see Case # 3, Table 5.19 and 5.21 below). 
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Case # 1: Ghana versus Togo 
Table 5.10: Electoral Legitimacy in Ghana’s Presidential Elections 
  
Election years Were the 
elections 
peaceful?/level 
of conflict 
Do all parties 
accept the 
electoral 
outcomes? 
Does the 
regime 
survive? 
Was the 
incumbent 
President 
defeated? 
Democratic 
alternations? 
 
 
 
1992 2 No Yes No Yes 
1996 1 Yes Yes No --  
2000 2 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2004 1 Yes Yes No -- 
2008 1 Yes* Yes Yes Yes 
Sources: SCAD Database, African Elections Database, IPU, Freedom House 
Yes* indicates elections too close to call. This situation almost resulted in a breakdown 
the consolidation of democratization process in the country. 
 
Table 5.11: Electoral Legitimacy in Togo’s Presidential Elections  
 
Election years Were the 
elections 
peaceful?/level 
of conflict 
Do all parties 
accept the 
electoral 
outcomes? 
Does the 
regime 
survive? 
Was the 
incumbent 
President 
defeated? 
Democratic 
alternations? 
 
 
 
1993 3 No Yes No No  
1998 3 No Yes No No  
2003 2 No Yes No  No  
2005 3 No Yes No* No  
2010 2 No Yes No  No  
Sources: SCAD Database, African Elections Database, IPU, Freedom House 
No* here indicates the death of the incumbent president who was replaced by one of his 
sons. 
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Table 5.12: Electoral Legitimacy in Ghana’s Parliamentary Elections  
 
Election years Were the 
elections 
peaceful?/level 
of conflict 
Do all parties 
accept the 
electoral 
outcomes? 
Does the 
regime 
survive? 
Was the 
ruling 
party 
defeated? 
Democracy? 
 
 
 
1992 2 No Yes No Yes 
1996 1 Yes Yes No -- 
2000 2 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2004 1 Yes Yes No --  
2008 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sources: SCAD Database, African Elections Database, IPU, Freedom House 
 
Table 5.13: Electoral Legitimacy in Togo’s National Assembly Elections  
 
Election years Were the 
elections 
peaceful?/level 
of conflict 
Do all parties 
accept the 
electoral 
outcomes? 
Does the 
regime 
survive? 
Was the 
ruling 
party 
defeated? 
Democratic 
alternations? 
 
 
 
1994 2 Yes Yes No* No  
1999 1 No Yes No No  
2002 2 No Yes No No  
2007 0 Yes Yes No No  
Sources: SCAD Database, African Elections Database, IPU, Freedom House 
No* indicates that the coalition of opposition parties obtained the majority in the National 
Assembly, but it failed to keep their pre-elections political agreement resulting in the 
dissolution of the coalition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Preventive Approach to Post-Election Conflicts in Contemporary Africa                           Edoh Agbehonou 
 
185 
 
Case # 2: Benin versus Guinea-Bissau 
Table 5.14: Electoral Legitimacy in Benin’s Presidential Elections  
 
Election 
years 
Were the 
elections 
peaceful?/level 
of conflict 
Do all parties 
accept the 
electoral 
outcomes? 
Does the 
regime 
survive? 
Was the 
incumbent 
President/party 
defeated? 
Democratic 
alternations? 
 
 
 
1991 1 Yes No Yes Yes 
1996 0 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2001 0 No Yes No Yes 
2006 0 Yes  Yes Yes* Yes 
Sources: SCAD Database, African Elections Database, IPU, Freedom House 
Yes* indicates no incumbent president contested the election, but the candidate of the 
ruling party was defeated.  
 
 
Table 5.15: Electoral Legitimacy in Guinea-Bissau’s Presidential Elections  
 
Election years Were the 
elections 
peaceful?/level 
of conflict 
Do all parties 
accept the 
electoral 
outcomes? 
Does the 
regime 
survive? 
Was the 
incumbent 
President 
defeated? 
Democratic 
alternations? 
 
 
 
1994 1 No Yes No No  
2000 0 Yes No Yes Yes 
2005 1 Yes No Yes Yes 
2009 1 Yes  No  Yes  Yes  
Sources: SCAD Database, African Elections Database, IPU, Freedom House 
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Table 5.16: Electoral Legitimacy in Benin’s National Assembly Elections  
 
Election years Were the 
elections 
peaceful?/level 
of conflict 
Do all parties 
accept the 
electoral 
outcomes? 
Does the 
regime 
survive? 
Was the 
incumbent 
party 
defeated? 
Democratic 
alternations? 
 
 
 
1991 1 Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
1995 0 Yes  Yes No Yes 
1999 1 Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
2003 0 Yes  Yes No Yes 
2007 1 Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Sources: SCAD Database, African Elections Database, IPU, Freedom House 
 
Table 5.17: Electoral Legitimacy in Guinea-Bissau’s National People’s Assembly Elections  
 
Election 
years 
Were the 
elections 
peaceful?/level 
of conflict 
Do all parties 
accept the 
electoral 
outcomes? 
Does the 
regime 
survive? 
Was the 
incumbent party 
defeated? 
Democratic 
alternations
? 
1994 1 No Yes No No 
1999 0 Yes  No Yes  Yes 
2004 0 Yes No Yes No 
2008 .. Yes No Yes  Yes 
Sources: SCAD Database, African Elections Database, IPU, Freedom House 
The symbol (..) indicates a missing value. 
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Case # 3: Senegal versus Guinea 
 
Table 5.18: Electoral Legitimacy in Senegal’s Presidential Elections  
 
Election years Were the 
elections 
peaceful?/level 
of conflict 
Do all parties 
accept the 
electoral 
outcomes? 
Does the 
regime 
survive? 
Was the 
incumbent 
President 
defeated? 
Democratic 
alternations? 
 
 
 
1993 2 No  Yes   No  No 
2000 2 Yes   No  Yes  Yes 
2007 1 Yes  Yes  No  Yes* 
Sources: SCAD Database, African Elections Database, IPU, Freedom House 
Yes* indicates restricted democratic practices by the PSD and Sopi Coalition 
  
 
Table 5.19: Electoral Legitimacy in Guinea’s Presidential Elections  
 
Election years Were the 
elections 
peaceful?/level 
of conflict 
Do all parties 
accept the 
electoral 
outcomes? 
Does the 
regime 
survive? 
Was the 
incumbent 
President 
defeated? 
Democratic 
alternations? 
 
 
 
1993 3 No Yes No No 
1998 3 No Yes No No 
2003 1 No Yes No  No  
2010 2 No  No  Yes* -- 
Sources: SCAD Database, African Elections Database, IPU, Freedom House 
Yes* indicates the death of the incumbent president, the overthrow of the leader of junta, 
Dadis Camara, and the election of Alpha Condé 
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Table 5.20: Electoral Legitimacy in Senegal’s National Assembly Elections  
 
Election years Were the 
elections 
peaceful?/level 
of conflict 
Do all parties 
accept the 
electoral 
outcomes? 
Does the 
regime 
survive? 
Was the 
incumbent 
party 
defeated? 
Democratic 
alternations? 
 
 
 
1993 3 No Yes No No  
1998 1 No  Yes  No  N0  
2001 0 Yes  No  Yes  Yes  
2007 1 No  Yes  No  Yes*  
Sources: SCAD Database, African Elections Database, IPU, Freedom House 
Yes* indicates restricted democratic practices by the ruling Sopi coalition. 
 
 
Table 5.21: Electoral Legitimacy in Guinea’s National Assembly Elections  
 
Election years Were the 
elections 
peaceful?/level 
of conflict 
Do all parties 
accept the 
electoral 
outcomes? 
Does the 
regime 
survive? 
Was the 
incumbent 
party 
defeated? 
Democratic 
alternations? 
 
 
 
1995 1 No  Yes  No No  
2002 0 No  Yes  No  No  
Sources: SCAD Database, African Elections Database, IPU, Freedom House 
      
Above all, how elections are sequenced, managed, and monitored also provide important 
information regarding the qualities of elections.  
 
5.3. Election Sequencing, Management, and Monitoring 
It is a well-known fact that election sequencing is not the same for all countries in the 
world.  In Africa, for example, while some countries hold elections on average every four years, 
the majority of African countries hold elections every five years. However, the frequency of 
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elections across the continent is not often respected because of periodic political instability and 
repeated cycle of violence (see Table 5.22).   
 
Table 5.22: Legislative Election Sequencing and Management  
 Case #1 Case #2 Case #3 
 Ghana Togo Benin Guinea-
Bissau 
Senegal Guinea 
Election 
Sequencing  
Dec. 1992 
Dec. 1996 
Dec. 2000 
Dec. 2004 
Dec. 2008 
(regular) 
June 1994 
March 1999 
Oct. 2002 
Oct. 2007 
(irregular) 
Mach 1991 
March 1995 
March 1999 
March 2003 
March 2007 
(regular) 
July 1994 
Nov. 1999 
March 2004 
Nov. 2008 
(irregular) 
May 1993 
May 1998 
April 2001 
June 2007 
(irregular*) 
June 1995 
June 2002 
(irregular) 
Election 
Management 
Bodies 
(EMBs) 
Electoral 
Commission 
(EC) 
Independent 
National 
Electoral 
Commission 
(CENI)  
Autonomous 
National 
Electoral 
Commission 
(CENA) 
National 
Elections 
Commission 
(NEC) 
Autonomous 
National 
Electoral 
Commission 
(CENA) 
Independent 
National 
Electoral 
Commission 
(CENI) 
Sources: African Elections Database 2014, AllAfrica.com 2012 
Irregular* indicates a change in election scheduling as a result of constitutional 
amendment in 2001 
 
5.3.1: Election Sequencing 
As shown in Table 5.22, during 1990 and 2010, elections had been regularly held in 
Benin and Ghana. The irregularity noted in election scheduling in Senegal was a result of the 
2001 constitutional referendum, which not only reduced the presidential term from seven years 
to five but also abolished the Senate and adopted a unicameral legislature (also known as the 
National Assembly) (African Elections Database 2012). These observations indicate that 
electoral conflicts are less likely if election calendars are respected by all parties, and  elections 
are held as scheduled.  Electoral conflicts often arise in countries that have a culture of non-
compliance of election scheduling or electoral conflicts lead to rescheduling. For instance, during 
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the 2000 legislative elections in Cote d’Ivoire, polling stations were disrupted in the northern 
part of the country, and many members of the local election management body were subjected to 
intimidation by supporters (especially the rebel forces) of Alassane Ouattara, who was 
previously prevented from running in the presidential elections that were held on October 22, 
2000 (IPU 1996-2011). Because of electoral of such incidents, elections were postponed on 
January 14, 2001 for the 26 seats in the northern electoral districts (African Elections Database 
2012). Additionally, the politics of ivoirité, which led to the denial of citizenship to Ouattara by 
the Ivorian Supreme Court, also contributed to the delay in election scheduling since 2000. The 
long-awaited presidential elections, which were finally held in October/December 2010, resulted 
in a historic violent post-election conflict that required international intervention.     
In Togo, Guinea-Bissau, and Guinea, election calendars have never been pre-
determined/fixed, meaning that elections have not been planned ahead of time. In these countries 
where elections were often long-delayed, electoral conflicts had been the actual results as 
stakeholders (the ruling parties and the political opposition parties) tended to disagree on the 
planning and management of elections. This disagreement was the case particularly of the 
legislative elections in Togo. Elections had been also long-delayed in Guinea-Bissau as a result 
of frequent military interventions. Elections had been irregularly held in Guinea because of the 
long term authoritarian rule established by late Guinean president, Lansana Conté, and the 
military coup by Captain Dadis Camara in 2008.  If elections were to be held in each of these 
countries, they would often have occurred under the pressure of international aid donors, 
especially the European Union, and in disagreement with the ruling party and the opposition 
parties.  
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5.3.2: Election Management Bodies (EMBs) 
The constitutional duties and responsibilities of election management bodies (EMBs) are 
to organize free, fair, and transparent elections acceptable to all interested parties. However, 
there are variations in how EMBs are established across the African continent. Their names vary 
from country to country.  
The EMB in Ghana is referred to as the Electoral Commission (EC). The EC was 
established by Article 43, 44, and 45 of the 1992 Constitution (Electoral Commission of Ghana 
2012). The independence of the commission was established by Chapter 007, Article 46 of the 
Constitution of Ghana, which stipulates that “Except as provided in this Constitution or in any 
other law not inconsistent with this Constitution, in the performance of its functions, the 
Electoral Commission shall not be subject to the direction or control of any person or authority” 
(The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992). Each of the seven members of the EC (a 
Chairman, two Deputy Chairmen, and four other members) are appointed by the President of 
Ghana in consultation of the Council of State as stipulated in Chapter 008, Article 70(1)20. The 
appointment process of EC members is embedded with checks and balances that strengthen EC’s 
independence in decision-making and instill confidence and trust in all parties that have vested 
interests in Ghana’s elections.     
By contrast in Togo, neither the 1992 Constitution, which was approved by 99.18 percent 
of Togolese voters, nor the 2003 Constitution established the Independent National Electoral 
                                                           
20
 It is equally important to note that the Council of State is also an independent political institution, which is 
composed of a former Chief Justice, a former Chief of Defence Staff of the Armed Forces of Ghana, a former 
Inspector-General of Police, the President of the National House of Chiefs, one elected representative from each 
region of Ghana, and 11 other members. All members of the Council of State are appointed by the President in 
consultation with Parliament (see Article 89).  
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Commission (CENI).21 The composition of the CENI was imbalanced. For instance, in 
preparation for the 2007 legislative elections, the CENI was composed of 19 members. Out of 
these 19 members, 12 came from the ruling party thus dominating the other 7 members from the 
political opposition coalition.22  The imbalance noted in the composition of CENI in the 2007 
legislative elections and 2010 presidential elections was also a deciding factor in the 2013 
legislative elections. The total number of members of CENI was reduced to 17. In this new 
CENI, the opposition was given only three representatives, three to civil society, and 11 to the 
ruling UNIR and political partner, UFC (Lidawo 2013). Given that the Togolese civil society is 
often viewed by the opposition parties as an instrument of the ruling party (Lidawo 2013), its 
three members also side with the 11 UNIR members in CENI when it comes to making major 
decisions.       
In Guinea, CENI was created in 2007 not by the constitution, but by a legislative action 
known as Law L/2007/013/AN (CENI Guinée 2014). It was modified in April 2010 through a 
political agreement that established Transitional National Council presided by General of 
Brigade, Sékouba Konaté (CENI Guinée 2014). Whether it is the old electoral code or the new 
one, the composition of the CENI remains unchanged. It is composed of 10 representatives from 
the majority party, Party for Unity and Progress (PUP); 10 from political opposition parties; 
three from civil society organizations; and two from the Ministry of Territorial Administration 
and Political Affairs (MATAP), which provides technical assistance to CENI (CENI Guinée 
2014, The Carter Center 2010).  
                                                           
21
 The 2003 Constitution of the Republic of Togo is the amended version of the 1992 Constitution. It was 
unilaterally amended by the ruling RPT via the Law No. 2002-029 of December 31, 2002. See World Intellectual 
Property Organization [WIPO], “Togo: The Constitution of the IVth Republic (as amended by the Law No. 2002-
029 of December 31, 2002). (2014) http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=8112 
22
 Aimé Gogué, “This is How We Do Our Part,” MO5-Togo. (2011) http://www.mo5-togo.com/le-mo5-vous-donne-
la-parole/2859-professeur-aime-gogue-cest-notre-maniere-de-faire-notre-part-.html (accessed April 13, 2012). 
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An analysis of the composition of the CENI shows that in the outset the distribution gives 
an edge to the ruling government in Guinea with 12 representatives out of 25 in the CENI. This 
distribution of membership in CENI can also cause a serious problem in case the Guinean civil 
society becomes co-opted by the government. Nothing of that nature has yet happened, but 
Cellou Dalein Diallo, a former Prime Minister and the main challenger to Alpha Condé during 
the 2010 presidential elections, accused CENI of being biased. However, as The Carter Center 
points out, “The partisan polarization of the CENI was a large factor in the inability of the 
institution to produce timely guidelines and procedures, the delay of which undermined the 
performance of electoral official across the country” (pp. 20-21). The polarization of the CENI in 
Guinea is an immediate consequence of maintaining party loyalty and doing everything thing in 
one’s capacity to protect the party’s interests. This focus caused a big dispute between President 
Condé and Diallo in the second round of the 2010 presidential elections in Guinea. Because of 
the closeness of the electoral outcomes, both candidates claimed victory. However, on December 
2, 2010, the Supreme Court, a court of last resort, confirmed the results and declared Condé the 
new president of Guinea with 52.52 percent (African Elections Database 2012, Voice of America 
2010, The Carter Center 2010).   
Similarly, in Senegal the Commission Electoral Nationale Autonome (CENA) was 
created by legislation. It was established by the Law 2005-07 of May 2005 (AU-Senegal.com 
2012). Contrarily to Guinea where members of the CENI are mostly appointed from political 
parties, in Senegal the 12 members of the Commission Electoral Nationale Autonome (CENA) 
are nominated via a presidential decree based on their “moral integrity, intellectual honesty, 
neutrality and impartiality” (AU-Senegal.com 2012). Thus far elections in Senegal have been 
successful because the CENA has been perceived as a competent agency and most importantly as 
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an independent EMB. Additionally, the CENA did not have to intervene because election results 
were accepted, albeit reluctantly, by the losers. 
In the same purview, I will argue that elections failed to consolidate the democratization 
process in Guinea-Bissau in part because of the weakness and the incapacity of National 
Elections Commission (NEC). The main reason for this was that the NEC did not have full 
control over the electoral administration process in the country. The NEC, which was created by 
the Law 4/98, a Law on National Election Commission (AU 2014), shared its duties and 
responsibilities with 
• the Ministry of Internal Administration in charge of domestic voter registration 
issues; 
• the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in charge of registering Bissau-Guineans living 
abroad and overseeing the voting of the diaspora; 
• the Supreme Court, which acts as a substitute of the Electoral Court of Appeal by 
pronouncing on the eligibility of parties and their candidates and adjudicating 
electoral disputes; 
• and the Head of State who announces the schedule of all elections and referenda.  
This complex structure observed in the administration of elections in Guinea-Bissau 
incapacitated the NEC to freely accomplish its tasks that include “voter registration, organization 
of elections and referenda, voter education activities, and handles of complaints and protests” 
(AU 2014). By contrast in Benin, the Autonomous National Electoral Commission (CENA) is  
the sole independent election management organ in charge of organizing and administering all 
political elections. It was established in 1994 as a result of lack of trust in the Beninese 
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government, which traditionally was responsible for organizing elections in Benin (Fall, 
Hounkpe, Jinadu, and Kambale 2011).  
Unlike the NEC of Guinea-Bissau, the Beninois CENA’s members are nominated by the 
government, the National Assembly, the judiciary, and the Beninois Human Rights Commission 
(CBDH) (Fall, Hounkpe, Jinadu, and Kambale 2011). It is important to point out that throughout 
the period of 1990-2010 the vast majority of members of the CENA were nominated by the 
National Assembly. What made the Beninois CENA to present a stark difference from other 
African electoral commissions in general and the Bissau-Guinean NEC in particular was that 
representatives of the Beninois civil society were allowed to chair the country’s CENA for the 
management of the 1995, 1999, and 2008 elections (Fall, Hounkpe, Jinadu, and Kambale 2011). 
However, because the CENA of Benin has mostly been chaired and dominated by 
representatives of political parties, its impartiality has been questioned during the 2011 
presidential elections.  
Table 5.23 below provides the current composition of each of the six EMBs discussed in 
this section as well as the main functions that each plays in ensuring that peaceful democratic 
elections are held in Ghana, Togo, Benin, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, and Guinea, respectively. In 
most cases membership to these electoral commissions is based on party affiliation. Benin, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and Togo are evidence of countries where political parties are 
represented in their electoral commissions. But because of possible biases in the number of seats 
a party ought to have and the process of distribution of such seats in such commissions, the 
question of independence of EMBs in these countries always remains current. Although political 
representation is one of the main determinants of the survival of democracy in divided societies, 
imbalanced representation of political parties within an EMB can hinge on the ability of that 
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EMB to make impartial decisions that can help mitigate and/or prevent electoral conflict. Ghana 
and Senegal move away from using the model of political representation in the composition of 
their respective EMBs.  
 
Table 5.23: Summary of Roles of Electoral Commissions  
Country Denomination Nature Number 
of 
Members 
Roles/Functions 
Benin Autonomous 
National 
Electoral 
Commission 
Partisan  11 • The role of CENA is to focus 
strictly on election management: 
planning and preparation, 
organization, administration, and 
supervision of all political 
elections and investigation of 
electoral improprieties 
• To propose all election dates that 
are promulgated by governmental 
decree 
• To implement voters’ census; 
• To oversee designing and printing 
the voter registry 
• To ensure the centralization of 
election results 
• To only proclaim the results of 
local elections but the legislative 
and presidential elections (Article 
45 of the law of November 2007); 
it cannot draw electoral 
boundaries. 
Ghana Electoral 
Commission 
Non-
partisan 
7  • To compile the voter registry 
• To draw electoral districts of all 
elections (national and local) 
• To divide Ghana into 
parliamentary constituencies 
• To review such constituencies 
within 12 months following the 
publication of a national census or 
at least every 7 years 
• To register political parties 
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• To set presidential election dates  
•  To organize, hold and supervise a 
referendum 
• To supervise the election of the 
Council of State 
• To create or merge regions of 
Ghana 
• To provide civic education on the 
electoral process 
Guinea Independent 
National 
Electoral 
Commission  
Partisan 25 • To update voter registration lists 
• To organize, administer and 
supervise of all political elections 
and referenda 
• To proclaim preliminary or 
provisory election results 
Guinea-
Bissau 
National 
Electoral 
Commission  
Partisan 4 • To oversee voter registration 
• To organize elections and 
referenda 
• To direct voter education activities  
• To address all complaints and 
protests 
Senegal Autonomous 
National 
Electoral 
Commission 
Non-
partisan  
12  • To oversee  control and 
supervision of elections, but the 
Ministry of Interior is in charge of 
the organization of all elections 
• The role of the CENA is to help 
invalidate fraudulent voter registry 
via the courts and tribunals within 
the Ministry of Justice  
Togo Independent 
National 
Electoral 
Commission 
Partisan 19 • To organize and supervise 
electoral operations and referenda 
• To elaborate rules and procedures 
to ensure the regularity, security, 
and transparency of elections 
• To distribute elections materials in 
polling stations 
• To register and publish the names 
of candidates during various 
election 
• To identify and nominate national 
election observers 
• To centralize election results 
• To proclaim provisory election 
results 
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Sources: Electoral Commission of Ghana, CENA Senegal, CENI Togo, CNE Guiné-
Bissau, Fall, I. M, Hounkpe, M., Jinadu, A. L., & Kambale, P. (2011). Electoral 
Commissions in West Africa: A Comparative Study.Abuja: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. 
 Note: An electoral commission is referred to as a partisan commission if its members are 
representatives of political parties. A non-partisan electoral commission is a political 
institution whose members are not affiliated to any political parties.  
 
In sum, the EMB in each of the countries being studied for the purpose of this thesis 
suffered and continues to suffer the issue of political polarization. Many of their governments 
lost their credibility to organize free and fair elections. Therefore, foreign aid donors and 
international and regional organizations, as well as voters, lost trust in these governments and 
had been relying instead on election observers (especially, international election monitors) as 
credible arbiters that should report on the freeness and fairness of elections.  
In the next section, I discuss the role of the main elections observers that monitored 
elections, facilitated electoral processes, and/or helped mediate electoral disputes in Africa. 
 
5.3.3: Election Monitors 
Alongside civil society organizations and local elections observers, regional 
organizations such as the African Union (AU),  Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), and international election monitors including the European Union (EU), the United 
Nations (UN), the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), the International 
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) and The Carter Center, played and 
continue to play paramount roles “supporting, advising, and enhancing the credibility of ECs” 
(Pastor 1999: 18). In addition to their supporting and advising missions, election monitors also 
report on the legitimacy of elections. 
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A common theme that often emerges from the report of international election monitors 
and observer missions deployed to monitor elections across the continent was that despite minor 
incidents elections in many African countries were generally free and fair and occurred in 
“generally satisfactory conditions” (IPU 1990-2010). In most cases, in my view, such 
declarations by international election observers are often said in order to avoid further escalation 
of electoral conflicts. Equally important is that elections monitors rarely cover the country, 
especially rural and other remote areas. Therefore, most of their mission reports are an 
overgeneralization of what actually happened in countries where they were deployed. 
This analysis does not mean that international election observers have never questioned 
the freeness and fairness of African elections. Indeed, since the wave of democratization, not 
only were international election monitors critical of how elections were held and managed across 
the continent, but they were also concerned of frequent occurrences of electoral conflicts in 
Africa.  For instance, they attributed the lack of transparency and fairness of elections to biases 
in electoral codes as in the case of the 1993 National Assembly elections in Senegal (Pastor 
1993), the electoral fraud and vote rigging in the 1993 presidential elections in Senegal, the 1995 
National Assembly elections in Guinea, and the 1998 presidential elections in Togo and Guinea 
(Pastor 1999).  
Even though international election observers identified electoral improprieties in these 
countries, because of states’ sovereignty they had no authoritative enforcement mechanisms to 
make all parties comply with democratic rules of elections except for imposing sanctions that in 
practice affect more the populations of these countries than their leaders. Nelson Madiba 
Mandela, the late African nationalist and former president of South Africa, used to helplessly ask 
his African audiences, “Why [do] elections in Africa need international supervision while 
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elections in developed countries do not?” His question has never been answered, and it remains 
current today.  
Indeed, Mandela was never satisfied with the way the so-called international community 
conducted its affairs with Africa. He may have been right. Africa may not need international 
electoral observer missions to monitor elections across the continent if civil society organizations 
and traditional institutions are strong enough and endowed with transparency to help facilitate 
the electoral processes and African leaders are accountable to their populations. But this is rarely 
the case across Africa. 
Next, I turn the discussion to the role of traditional institutions and civil society 
organizations in accompanying the realization of the democratization enterprise in Ghana, Togo, 
Benin, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, and Guinea.      
 
5.4. Role of Civil Society and Traditional Authorities in Promoting Democracy and Conflict 
Mitigation  
In Ghana, the promotion of democracy and the prevalence of low level of electoral 
conflict can be attributed to many factors including the vibrancy of civil society and the 
commitment of traditional institutions or authorities in “spreading a message of tolerance and 
peace” (Adjei 2012: 248). They have been instrumental in political socialization of the 
Ghanaians through civic education. As a palpable example, Adjei (2012: 248) notes that  
The workshops on political behavior organized by the Center for Democratic 
Development (CDD) and radio and television programs on peaceful elections that 
included representatives of various civil society groups created awareness among the 
population the need for Ghana to pass the litmus test in 2008. 
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These civil society organizations (CSOs) receive strong support from the Ghana Civil Society 
Centre (CSRC), which was created in 2007. The CSRC is sponsored by the United Development 
Programme (UNDP). It provides technical assistance and training that can help CSOs to energize 
the electorate by providing them with advocacy and civic education skills (CSRC 2009). In 
Ghana, CSOs also work in collaboration with traditional institutions that are often referred to as 
instruments of peace and development.  
In his analysis on the role of traditional authorities in contemporary Ghana, Crook (2005) 
defines traditional institutions as “forms of social and political authority which have their 
historical origin in the pre-colonial states and societies, and which were incorporated by British 
colonial rule into what is now Ghana” (p. 1). These traditional authorities are commonly referred 
to as chiefs. Although these same institutions have often contributed to ethnic and political 
conflict, especially in the northern part of Ghana, they continue to play a paramount role not only 
in keeping cultural diversity alive, but also and most importantly in making sure that their 
country develops economically and that democracy survives in Ghana.  
As Crook (2005) points out, in order to achieve their aims, chiefs’ “control over land” 
ensure the fertility of land and its distribution and represent their community before their national 
government. According to Crook, a chief is a “symbolic leader and patron of 
development/youth/hometown associations” (p. 2). At that capacity, chieftaincy organizations 
have been mobilizing support for democratic change and economic development in Ghana since 
1992 by participating in local government and district assemblies whose members are not 
affiliated with any political party (Crook 2005).  
Chiefs have always been strong advocates of peaceful elections in Ghana. For instance, 
as Gyamfi II (2012) notes, the College of Christian Chieftaincies (which is a council of chiefs 
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and queen mothers) assumed their role as conflict preventers and mediators by calling on all 
Ghanaians to adopt “peaceful attitudes” throughout the 2012 electoral process in order to avoid 
electoral catastrophe in Ghana. 
In addition to chieftaincy organizations, there has also been a myriad of NGOs that have 
been facilitating the democratization process in the country. Among others, one can cite Africa 
Leadership Forum, Dialogue on Democratic Decentralization (DDialogue), Centre for 
Democratic Development (CDD), Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG), Centre for the 
Promotion of Democratic Governance (CEPRODEG), Transparency International-Ghana (TI-
Ghana), Civil Rights Education for Democracy and Human Rights (CREDHR), and many others 
in the area of human rights and justice (WASIC 2014).   
  Unlike Ghana where civil society organizations were visible and their impact on the 
democratization process was felt, Togo suffered and is still suffering a deficit of a vibrant civil 
society.  For example, in an interview with the journal le Soleil about the work of Togolese 
CSOs, Mamadou Seck, the General Coordinator of Goreé Institute, said that  
This is another big problem. Civil society suffers from credibility. She is young, weak, in 
need of leadership and strong leadership to be heard. Bastilles to conquer, we must fight. 
This is probably related to the youth of democracy still has not necessarily spaces of 
interaction and evolution of civil society. At each stage of development, its civil society, 
they say. 
 
This observation suggests that for a democracy to emerge and flourish there must the presence of 
a reliable civil society endowed with experience and strong leadership. However, in Togo, it is 
the opposite. As Seck (2014) pinpoints it, the Togolese CSOs shines by their weakness and lack 
of experience.  It is also important to note that the Togolese press, which should serve as a 
medium of communication of these young CSOs, is also young and highly controlled by the 
High Authority for Audiovisual and Communication (HAAC) (Seck 2014).   
A Preventive Approach to Post-Election Conflicts in Contemporary Africa                           Edoh Agbehonou 
 
203 
 
 In Benin, factors such as “popular mobilization” and Conférence Nationale brought about 
the collapse of the Kérékou regime in 1989 (Alen 2014). The rule of law has been restored and 
human rights and civil liberties have been established by a new constitution. Because of the 
constitutional guarantee of these rights and liberties, a plethora of civil society organizations 
have been active in many domains including the promotion of democracy and good governance 
and the protection of human rights and justice.  
In the area of democracy and good governance, one can pinpoint the organizations such 
as Association Béninoise de Droit au Developpement, Association de Lutte Contre le Racisme, 
l’Ethnocentrisme et le Regionalisme (ALCRER), Dialogue on Democratic Decentralization 
(DDialogue), Front des Organisations Nationales Contre la Corruption (FONAC), Observatory 
of Democracy and the Good Governance in Africa, Reseau des ONG Béninoise pour la 
Gouvernance Democratique, and Transparency International-Benin (WASCI 2014). When it 
comes to ensuring that there is justice and that human rights are respected, nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) including Action des Chrétiens pour l’Abolition de la Torture, Groupe 
d’Action pour la Justice et l’Egalité Sociale, Monde-Vie-Liberté, AJPDE ONG, Que Choisir 
Bénin, Coalition Human Rights Task Group, Société Africaine de Droit International et 
Comparé, and Grande Dignité Humaine, Solidarité Sans Frontieres (WASCI 2014). Arguably, 
these NGOs have been instrumental in consolidating democracy in Benin. 
The vibrancy of civil society noted in Benin is almost absent in Guinea-Bissau. Nonetheless, the 
effort by Caritas Guinea-Bissau, Liga Guineense des Direitos Humanes (LGDH), and the Legal 
Information and Orientation Centre in helping protect human rights and justice in Guinea-Bissau 
must be acknowledged (WASIC 2014).       
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As Seck (2014) notes, Senegalese civil society has tremendously contributed to the 
democratization process in the country. Examples of these organizations include Forum Civil, 
Institut African pour la Démocratie (IAD), Institut Panos Afriques de l’Ouest (IPAO), 
Transparency International-Senegal, Fahamu, Vivre Caprec, and Rencontre Africaine pour la 
Defense des Droits de l’Homme (RADDHO) (WASIC 2014).  The devotion of these CSOs and 
NGOs to the promotion of democracy prompted the sitting president of the United States to pay a 
visit to his Senegalese “homologue” (counterpart) and encourage these organizations in their 
endeavors.  
Indeed, on June 27, 2013, President Barack Obama met with civil society leaders in 
Gorée Island, Senegal, where he emphasized the important roles that civil society organizations 
ought to play for democracy to emerge and survive in a country. In his remarks, President 
Obama stated  
Democracy and good governance involves the need for transparency and accountability 
on the part of government, but also active citizens who are monitoring what the 
government is doing, that are speaking out. It involves a free press, freedom of assembly, 
rule of law. And it also involves organizations like this that aren't just working politically, 
but are also working to increase youth employment, helping to empower women, making 
sure that children and other vulnerable populations are protected. That's all part of the 
democratic process. 
 
Not only does this quote from the President’s remarks summarize the conditions for 
democratization and democratic consolidation, but also it explicitly pinpoints how the civil 
society leaders should help create opportunities for political participation within democratizing 
countries. Such opportunities include “youth employment,” women’s empowerment, and 
protection of “vulnerable populations” such as women and children (Obama 2013).  President 
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Obama’s visit to Senegal is indicative of the fact that the country may be on the right track when 
it comes to meeting democratic standards and values.  
 Contrary to the Senegal case, where there is a panoply of NGOs that promote democracy 
and good governance, Guinea suffers a shortage of vibrant CSOs and youth associations as it has 
never experienced any democratic alternations before 2010. The only visible NGO, Research 
Institute on Democracy and Rule of Law, which should facilitate the democratization process in 
the country, was weak because of the consolidation of all powers around the late Guinean 
president, Lansana Conté. But if there were any independent NGOs, they might be operating 
underground in order to avoid harsh punishments and persecution. Whether President Alpha 
Condé will allow NGOs and CSOs to freely operate in Guinea remains to be seen.  
In the next section, I address a critically important question, that is, “What are the 
consequences of electoral systems and the rules of the game on democratic alternations?”  
 
5.5. Consequences of Electoral Systems and the Rules of the Game on Democratic 
Alternations 
In this section, the consequences of electoral systems are discussed through the lens of 
representation, which is determined by the rules of the electoral game. However, as Pastor 
(1999) puts it, “the fair and effective administration of the rules is often as important as the rules 
themselves” (p. 6). This thesis discusses how such rules were implemented and the impact of 
their implementation on the representation of political parties in the legislative elections in 
Ghana and Togo, Benin and Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, and Guinea.  
 To explore the consequences of electoral systems, I use Michael Gallagher (2014)’s 
election indices dataset, which provides the values of critically important variables including the 
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least squares index (LSq) indicating the disproportionality between the percentage of votes and 
the percentage of seats won in a parliamentary election, the effective number of parties at 
electoral level (EffNv), and the effective number of parties at legislative level (EffNs).23 Since 
1990, the average value of LSq in parliamentary elections in Ghana was about 5, and the average 
value of LSq in Togo was above 16. However, the mean value of EffNs (2.02) in Togo in 2007 
was about same as the average value of EffNs (2.12) in 2008 in Ghana (Gallagher 2014). 
These observations indicate that although Ghana and Togo used majoritarian electoral 
systems, the dominant party system in Togo had not allowed more opposition political parties to 
be represented in the National Assembly. Additionally, in a single-member plurality (SMP) 
system as in the case of Ghana, which used the First-Past-The Post (FPTP), parties have equal 
chance of being represented in or excluded from the parliament. In Ghana, the FPTP system 
might be a deciding factor in the loss of parliamentary majority status in 2000 and 2004 by the 
incumbent party (NDC), and in 2008 and 2012 by the NPP.  Because the two-round system 
(TRS) majority parties favor stronger parties, if a minority party faces a majority party in the 
second round it has a lower chance of winning the electoral contest. Arguably, this lower chance 
might be one of the many reasons why the ruling RPT maintained its dominance in Togo given 
that the political opposition and smaller parties also failed to act strategically to gain power.  
Also, an analysis of the average values of EffNs in Ghana and Togo shows the real effect of the 
use of majoritarian systems that is the establishment of two party systems.  While a two-party 
system was established by the 1996 parliamentary elections, Togo briefly experienced a two 
party system for the first after 2007 legislative elections (African Elections Database 2012).  
                                                           
23
 The lower the value of LSq, the more proportional is the electoral formula used to allocate legislative seats, and 
the higher the value of EffNs the better, the higher the number of legislative parties. It is also important to note that 
EffNv and Effs are positively and highly correlated, as I discussed it in chapter 3.  
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In Benin, the average value of LSq was about three, and the mean value of EffNs was 
above 8. By contrast, in Guinea-Bissau, the average value of LSq was about 13, and the average 
value of EffNs was about two (Gallagher 2014). These observations reveal that, although these 
two countries used List-PR systems, there was a huge disproportionality in the distribution of 
electoral outcomes in Guinea-Bissau compared to Benin. The analysis of the value of EffNs 
shows that while the multiparty system was being consolidated in Benin, Guinea-Bissau was 
dangling or swinging between a one-party system and a two-party system.  
Indeed, in Benin the 1995 Electoral Law established 83 seats that must be contested in 24 
multi-member electoral districts. Such districts correspond to the 24 departments of the country. 
The law also stressed that electoral seats be distributed to party lists based on the rule of the 
largest remainder method (LRM) (IPU 1996-2013). However, Benin used the Hare quota (HQ) 
with Highest Average in the 1991 National Assembly elections.  With the Highest Average 
Method, “when a seat is allocated, the original vote party that wins it is reduced by division” 
(Reynolds, et al. 2008:177-178). In Benin, D’Hondt formula was used in 1991, and the electoral 
votes received by each party were divided by one, two, three, four … in order to distribute seats 
to the party.  
According to Reynolds, et al. (2008), the D’Hondt formula tends to discriminate against 
smaller parties. However, that was not the case in the 1991 given that the Kérékou regime 
collapsed as a result of popular pressure for a democratic change. No party was able to gather a 
majority of seats. The Union for the Triumph of Democratic Renewal (UDFP-MDPS-ULD) 
headed the list of parties in the National Assembly with 12 seats out of 83 (African Elections 
Database 2011, IPU 1991).  
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A more proportional formula, Largest Remainder Method (LRM), was used in the 1995, 
1999, 2003, and 2007 National Assembly elections. This method allowed no single party to have 
a monopoly over the political process in Benin. I would argue that the electoral system used at 
the legislative level in Benin facilitated independent presidential candidates to win the 
presidential contest in 1996 with President Kérékou, and in 2006 with President Yayi Boni. 
Additionally, the democratization was consolidated in Benin not only because of five successful 
democratic elections, but also because of increased political representation of opposition parties 
in the National Assembly.  
On the other hand in Guinea-Bissau, the 1985 Electoral Law not only created 27 multi-
member constituencies, but also it invalidated any electoral outcomes if voter turnout was less 
than 50 percent in each of the districts (IPU 1996-2013).  Unlike Benin where civil society 
organizations were vibrant and the List-PR system helped create a multiparty system, in Guinea-
Bissau, despite the use of PR system, a dominant-party system was institutionalized by various 
military and authoritarian regimes established since independence from Portugal.  
The value of LSq in Senegal’s has increased from 11.19 in 1993 to 12.40 in 1998 and to 
19.28 in 2001 before decreasing to 13.54 in 2007 (Gallagher 2014). The increasing value of LSq 
between 1993 and 2001 was caused not only because Senegal used an electoral system that 
increases disproportionality, but also more importantly because it used a Party Block Vote (PBV) 
formula to allocate the plurality seats in multi-member districts (Vengroff 2008).24 While the 
plurality seats were allocated by using a PBV formula, the PR seats were distributed by a 
“Largest Remainder Method with the Hare formula” (Vengroff 2008: 109). By definition, the 
Largest Remainder Method (LRM) is designed to ensure that smaller parties are represented in 
                                                           
24
 With Party Block Vote formula, voters vote for parties rather than casting their ballots for candidates. The party 
with the most votes carries out all seats in the multi-member electoral district.  
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the parliament. But during the 2012 legislative elections, the value of LSq has increased one 
more time from 13.54 in 2007 to 19.80 (Gallagher 2014). This increase in the value of LSq 
suggests that a dominant party system has been institutionalized in Senegal with use of its mixed 
(MMM) electoral system.    
In the 1993 National Assembly elections, opposition parties were able to collect 36 seats 
out of 120, leaving the ruling Socialist Party (PS) a landslide victory with 84 seats.  Out of the 36 
seats won by the opposition, only six were plurality seats. The 44 remaining plurality seats went 
to PS.  In all, the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) of Abdoulaye Wade came second with 27 
seats followed by Jappoo Liggeeyal Senegal Coalition and Democratic League-Labour Party 
Movement (LD-MPT) with three seats, respectively. Other smaller parties such as Independence 
and Labour Party (PIT) and Senegalese Democratic Union-Renovation (UDS-R) won two and 
one, respectively (IPU 1993).  
In 1998, the total number of seats was increased by 20 seats. The ruling PS was again 
able to maintain its majority by winning 93 seats out of 140. With the division within the 
opposition, the PDS lost four seats of 27 it previously won in the 1993 elections. In 2001, despite 
the use of the Parallel system in Senegal, the Sopi Coalition (which brought Wade to power) 
reversed the course of things and ended the PS rule by winning 89 seats out of 120 (formerly 140 
seats). One might think that the Parallel mixed system, which Wade was very critical of while 
serving as the leading figure of the opposition, would be replaced when he gained power. 
Surprisingly, he embraced the system and used it in the 2007 National Assembly elections, 
which the Sopi Coalition won handily with 69.21 percent of the votes. With that percentage, Sopi 
Coalition gained all the 90 plurality seats and won 41 PR seats (IPU 2007).  
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Although the value of LSq decreased from 19.28 in 2001 to 13.54 in 2007 (Gallagher 
2014), the number of seats collected out of 150 by the opposition parties was insignificant 
compared to their share of seats in previous National Assembly elections. Additionally, the value 
of EffNs of 1.31 obtained in 2007 is an indication that the party system in Senegal is moving 
toward a two-party system.   
Guinea also used a mixed electoral system (Parallel or MMM) but with different electoral 
formulas to translate votes into elected seats. The electoral law enacted on December 23, 1991, 
established the mode of designation of the 114 Deputies of the National Assembly.  According to 
that law, 38 seats out of the 114 must be directly elected by plurality in single-member electoral 
district, and the remaining 76 seats must also be directly elected but by proportional 
representation and using a Hare quota formula by dividing the total valid votes by the total 
number of PR seats, in this case 76. What is interesting about the way Guinea uses its Parallel 
system is that parties that do not have the most votes also are awarded seats if there are unfilled 
seats after the process of applying the Hare quota formula to PR seats (IPU 1993-2013).   
The first time this variant of the Parallel system was used in Guinea was in the 1995 
National Assembly elections. The ruling Party for Unity and Progress (PUP) won the 
parliamentary majority with 71 seats in which 41 are PR seats and 30 are plurality seats. The 
Rally of the Guinean People (RPG) came second with 15 PR seats and 4 plurality seats. The 
Union for the New Republic (UNR) and the Renewal and Progress Party (PRP) won each nine 
PR seats and two plurality seats. The Union for the Progress of Guinea (UPG) obtained only two 
PR seats, and smaller parties won the remaining four PR seats after the process of Hare Quota.     
However, no single opposition party was able to win a plurality seat in the 2002 National 
Assembly elections in Guinea. The PUP, with its supermajority in 1995, was able to use the 
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system to its advantage. It swept all the 38 plurality seats and won a landslide victory in the 2002 
elections with 85 seats out 114 (IPU 1996-2010). In a comparative perspective, while the Parallel 
system used in Senegal tended to establish a two-party system, the Guinean Parallel system 
institutionalized a dominant party system. This point is very important because it helps us 
explain the question why democracy failed to emerge in Guinea and why the country 
experienced high level of electoral conflict between 1990 and 2010 as compared to its 
counterpart, Senegal.  
In all, democracy tends to flourish more in countries such as Benin, Ghana, and Senegal 
where the levels of electoral conflict were relatively low than it does in countries such as Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, and Togo where the levels of conflict were high. Given that these three low level 
conflict countries used different electoral systems [majority/plurality system in Ghana and Togo, 
PR systems in Benin and Guinea-Bissau, and mixed systems (MMM) in Guinea and Senegal] in 
the last two decades, this analysis shows that electoral systems are not the main determining 
factors of conflict. Additionally, as revealed by the Round 5 Afrobarometer survey, 72 percent of 
Africans believed that democracy is better than any other form of government despite the 
occurrence of periodic electoral conflicts in many African states. But there are variations when it 
comes to support for democracy in individual African countries. For instance, support for 
democracy remains very high (87 percent in Senegal, 82 percent in Ghana, 77 percent in Guinea 
and Togo, and 76 percent in Benin) (Afroborometer 2012). These observations indicate that there 
no link between electoral systems and support for democracy.  
With the consequences of electoral systems and the rules of electoral game are being 
discussed in this chapter alongside the role of CSOs and traditional authorities, the democratic 
qualities of elections and the effect of political institutions, the next chapter concludes with 
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possible recommendations regarding how to prevent electoral conflicts in Africa and beyond and 
discusses the limitations in this study.     
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In this chapter, I discuss the impact of electoral systems on conflict management and 
resolution with a particular emphasis on the prevention of post-election conflicts. Using the 
discussion of the effects electoral systems have on the democratization process in Africa, the 
chapter lays out and discusses a series of policy implications and recommendations. These need 
to be looked at when it comes to finding ways to prevent post-election conflicts across Africa. 
Based on past electoral improprieties in Africa’s elections, chapter 6 discusses elections as 
learning experiences and suggests a variety of approaches for promoting “true” democracies 
across the continent. The chapter concludes with the discussion of the limitations of the study 
and establishes the ground for further inquiry into post-election conflicts beyond Africa. 
 
6.1. Electoral Systems and Conflict Prevention 
As Reynolds et al. (2005) put it, “It is clear different electoral systems can aggravate or 
moderate tension and conflict in a society” (p. 6). The quantitative regression analysis of this 
thesis supports that claim. Even though the results of the study are not as significant as 
hypothesized, they suggest that some electoral systems are more prone to electoral conflict than 
are others, at least in the context of African elections.  
It is important to emphasize that majoritarian electoral systems generally allow only 
stronger parties to win elections. Proportional representation systems and to some extent mixed 
electoral systems allow for greater representation of parties, women and minority groups. But it 
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is troubling to observe that in many African countries where majoritarian systems were used 
during the period between 1990 and 2010, a myriad of political parties tended to enter electoral 
races ignoring (and/or in most cases without knowing) the impacts their electoral systems might 
have on electoral outcomes. Or they entered the race for other reasons such as the hope of being 
brought into the winning coalition. For instance, in Togo where the levels of electoral conflict 
were often high, over 20 political parties competed in the 1994 election, and more than 35 parties 
participated in the 2007 legislative elections. In contrast, in Ghana where the level of electoral 
violence was relatively low, an average of six political parties and some independent candidates 
contested parliamentary elections since 1992.  
Additionally, there is a strong relationship between majoritarian electoral systems, party 
systems, and social cleavages in these countries.  In Ghana, the issue of socio-political cleavage 
has been a major concern for many Ghanaian scholars including Ayee (2006) and Drah (2006). 
These scholars examine electoral behaviors in different constituencies in the 2004 elections. 
Ethnicity appears to play a major role in politics in Ghana. Using the case study of the Akan, 
Anlo, and Keta electoral districts (all three located in the Volta Region), Ayee (2006) finds that a 
strong majority of votes in all three constituencies went for the NDC in the 2004 elections. These 
results confirm the dominance of the NDC over its counterpart (the NPP) in the Volta Region 
since 1992. But Drah’s (2006) study of voter participation in the Okaikoi South and Ayawaso 
constituencies (both located in the Greater Accra Region) shows that “over four-fifths of 
respondents in Okaikai South (OS) and a little under half in Ayawaso Central (AC) opted for 
NPP followed distantly in OS but more respectably in AC by the NDC” (p. 135). These 
observations indicate that regardless of the incumbency status of the two major parties (the NDC 
and the NPP), most social groups in Ghana have been consistent in their voting behaviors. An 
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analysis of the 45 newly created constituencies in 2012 in the ten regions shows that while the 
NPP won handily in the Accra Region (five seats against two seats for the NDC), Eastern Region 
(five to null for the NDC), and Ashanti Region (seven to one for the NDC), in contrast, the Volta 
Region, the Brong Ahafo Region, the Northern Region, and the Upper East Region remain solid 
for the NDC. The distribution of seats in the recent elections in these newly created 
constituencies confirms the voting patterns of ethno-linguistic clusters in Ghana.  
In Togo for instance, the opposition parties tend to get the lion’s share of votes in the 
southern constituencies mostly populated by Ewe-speaking ethnic groups, which include Ewe, 
Ouatchi, Mina, Ehoue, Fon,  Adja, Pla, and Pedah. But most of the votes from the northern 
constituencies that are heavily dominated by Tem-Kabre ethnic groups (Kabye, Cotokoli, Losso, 
Lamba, Bassari, and Tamberma), and Paragourma (Moba, Gourma, Konkomba, Tchamba, and 
N’Gam Gam) and the majority of votes of Central Togo ethnic groups (Akposso and Akebou) go 
to the ruling RPT (the present day UNIR). Because of inability of the extremely fractionalized 
Togolese political opposition parties, which have their strongholds in the southern electoral 
districts, to coordinate their efforts for democratic change, they have created many opportunities 
for the ruling party to maintain its dominance in the political scene since 1990. This ethnic 
politics has been reinforced by the use of a majoritarian electoral system that institutionalized a 
dominant party system in Togo. As expected, when the cleavage element is included, electoral 
system type produces a specific type of party system. Both the dominant-party systems and the 
two-party systems observed in many African states are the immediate consequences of the use of 
majority/plurality systems or mixed electoral systems (especially, MMM) in which the plurality 
variant dominates the PR variant as is the case of Senegal and Guinea. 
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  Therefore, to minimize the occurrence of electoral conflict in majoritarian countries, 
especially in places that experienced a long period of hegemonic single-party rule as in the case 
of Togo, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, Zimbabwe, to name just a few, political leaders need to 
understand that creating multiple parties and presenting multiple candidates to contest elections 
instead of forming strong coalitions of parties are not the best ways to go. Because the 
majoritarian electoral system (which is the winner-take-all system) tends to discriminate against 
smaller parties, chances are high for deep-rooted ruling parties to always maintain their 
dominance in countries where these types of electoral systems are used. Post-election conflicts 
are likely results if losers are not willing to accept the legitimacy of electoral outcomes. 
It is equally important to note that the way a majoritarian system works in one country 
may not necessary be the same in other countries with different social and political conditions 
(Reynolds et al 2005). The case of Ghana confirms just that. The institutionalization or 
consolidation of a two-party system and the vibrancy of both the traditional authorities and the 
civil society have been very helpful in minimizing the negative consequences of the use of such 
an electoral system in the country. 
Proportional representation systems have been praised for providing room for including 
women and minority groups as in the case of Benin. However, it failed to provide expected 
results in Guinea-Bissau because of repeated military intervention and the establishment of the 
one dominant-party system, which was translated into high disproportionality measured by the 
least squares index (LSq) of 12.85 in the 1994 National People’s Assembly elections and by LSq 
of 13.15 in the 2008 legislative elections (Gallagher 2014). These rates are consistent with those 
for the First-Past-The-Post systems in general. MMM systems tend to produce results like those 
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of FPTP systems. The exclusion of these smaller parties in Guinea-Bissau had been at the core of 
periodic high levels of electoral violence in the country.  
Similarly, the mixed electoral system failed to include a variety of opinion in the 
legislature in Guinea because of protracted military and civilian dictatorship rule of Conté and 
his ruling PUP. However, it somewhat worked in Senegal not only because of the vibrancy of 
Sopi coalition, but also and most importantly because the ruling PS provided incentives for 
opposition parties to co-exist with it and actually compete in elections. This was a divide and 
rule strategy of the PS which backfired as the opposition parties learned how to play the game 
over time.  
In all, as Reynolds et al (2005) stated “Wherever possible, whether in divided or 
relatively homogenous societies, the electoral system should err on the side of including of all 
significant interests in the legislature” (p. 160). The inclusion of all stakeholders in decision-
making processes is a key factor to success of any organization. In the context of elections, post-
election conflicts are more likely to be prevented if all parties are fairly represented in the 
legislature than if they are excluded from the legislature. When it comes to the representation of 
parties in the legislature, PR systems, including MMP but not MMM systems do a better job than 
the two other types of electoral systems.   
 
6.2. Policy Implications 
With some isolated cases including Botswana and Ghana where post-election conflicts 
have been minimal since1966 and 1990 respectively despite their adoption of majority/plurality 
electoral systems, both the quantitative regression analysis and the in-depth comparative analysis 
of this thesis demonstrate that proportional representation systems are the best electoral systems 
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when it comes to mitigating and preventing post-election conflicts in divided societies such as 
the case in many countries in Africa.  
Just as an illustration of why proportional representation systems are the “best” electoral 
systems and the fact that mixed electoral is a combination of majority/plurality and proportional 
representative system, I purposefully used one legislative election held after the national 
conference in Benin and one legislative election held after political agreement in Togo for the 
calculation of disproportionality indices. In fact, normal practice suggests that at least three 
elections are required before these generalizations can be made. The main reason for using these 
two elections is that the national conference and the global political accord were held to increase 
the inclusion of all parties in political decision-making processes Benin and Togo, respectively. 
However, since the occurrence of these two political developments there were no major changes 
in Benin and Togo. Togo consistently used a majoritarian system with the ruling RPT/UNIR as 
the dominant party, which maintained over 60 percent of legislative seats in the National 
Assembly and Benin used a PR system with no change in electoral rule or formula. My findings 
suggest that the electoral systems in Benin and Togo are built in with low and high 
disproportionalities, respectively (see Table 6.1 and Table 6.4). There is also a higher level of 
representation in the legislative body in Benin than is the case in Togo (see Table 6.2 and Table 
6.5). In all, while Togo’s Freedom Score, which is the average of civil liberties score (4) and 
political rights score (5), is 4.5, Benin scores 2, with 2 as the civil liberties score and 2 as the 
political rights score (Freedom House, 2011). These freedom scores classify Togo and Benin 
partly free and free, respectively.  
The “free” status awarded to Benin is a result of many factors, including the 
constitutional and electoral reforms in the early 1990s and respect of constitutional guarantees of 
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freedom of press, speech, and freedom of assembly. These constitutional rights allow a myriad of 
news organizations to emerge and politicized Beninois press to be very critical of both the ruling 
coalition government and the political opposition leaders. Because of respect of freedom of 
assembly in Benin, “all political parties, regardless of ethnic or regional affiliation, operate freely 
throughout the country” (Freedom House, 2011). Since 1990, Benin has held six parliamentary 
elections using a party-list proportional representation system and five presidential elections 
using a majority popular vote Two-Round system. Both the parliamentary and the presidential 
elections were not only relatively peaceful but also free and fair. This feat has earned Benin a 
reputation as a stable democracy. 
 Unlike Benin, Togo is still struggling to meet democratic standards including free and 
fair elections. But based on its past history, the choice of the majoritarian electoral system did 
not allow the country to achieve that goal. The reason is that, in this electoral system, elections 
are always viewed in terms of the winner-take-all or what realists would refer to as zero-sum 
gains or win/lose situations. With this in mind, in most cases, parties use any means just to win 
elections without thinking of collective interests of their country. This situation has resulted in 
post-election violence in Togo since 1990 due to vote rigging, intimidation, and the repeated use 
by the regime in place of military and security forces to severely repress peaceful protests and 
demonstrations in the name of restoring security and order.  
The 1998, 2003, 2005 and 2010 post-election political unrest illustrates that well. In these 
elections, many voters felt that they were cheated and, therefore, their votes were nothing but 
wasted. An electoral system in which elections are viewed as win-win situations and allows for 
fair representation of various groups, including both social groups and political parties, would be 
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a better solution to prevent post-election conflicts that are undermining the prospect of 
democracy in Togo.  
 The 2007 legislative election results in Togo clearly show how smaller parties are 
discriminated against in the SMP majoritarian system (see Table 6.3).  Therefore, I recommend 
that Togo adopt a party-list proportional representation in multi-member constituencies for its 
legislative elections. To ensure that this PR system mirrors the Togolese population, the quota 
systems, preferably the Droop quota (DQ) can be used as a tool for transferring votes into seats 
(see Table 6.9 and 6.10). Smaller parties such as Democratic Convention of African Peoples, 
Patriotic Pan-African Convergence, Party of Democrats for Renewal, and many others that were 
not able to win seats under the SMP system, will gain seats when both the Hare Formula-Largest 
Remainder and the Droop quota (DQ) systems have been applied in the 2007 elections in Togo. 
The use of such formula and systems will also contribute to participation and increased support 
for small parties as voters realize that they are not wasting their votes by supporting them. 
To be more specific, Togo may now adopt the PR electoral system and use the Largest 
Remainder-Hare formula to allocate seats so as to prevent future post-election political instability 
(one of the main hindrances of democracy). The main reason is that, as Farrell puts it, “lower 
quotas result in more seats to parties receiving a full quota and fewer being allocated by 
remainders, and therefore somewhat less proportional results” (Farrell 2011: 69). Given that the 
Largest Remainder-Hare formula has the largest quota, smaller parties may not necessarily win 
seat(s) during the “full quotas” distribution stage, but they have another good chance of getting 
seat(s) allocated by the remainders. 
 Given that during the 2011elections (parliamentary and presidential), there were reports 
of minor irregularities and incidents, there is also a need for Benin to continuously seek to 
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improve its electoral system implementation. Comparing the results of how the two quota 
systems address the issue of equity in allocating seats using the 1991 parliamentary elections in 
Benin as an example (see Table 6.6 and Table 6.7), Benin will still be better off if it maintains its 
current Largest Remainder-Hare formula. In order to strengthen its democracy, there should be 
no immediate need for Benin to change its formula for translating votes into seats. However, it 
may want to look carefully at how elections are being monitored and managed so as to increase 
people’s trust in Beninois electoral institutions.  
6.3. Recommendations 
 Based on these specific findings, I recommend that a series of electoral conflict 
prevention mechanisms be put in place in African countries. First and foremost, African states 
may find ways to address the issue of unequal distribution of wealth, which is one of the many 
sources of socio-political conflicts across the continent. The most effective way of doing that is 
to adopt an electoral system that favors the representation of various socio-ethnic cleavages in 
the decision-making institutions, especially the parliaments or national assemblies. However, if 
such a policy recommendation is correctly implemented, it will help prevent a single ethnic 
group from dominating politics and, therefore, monopolizing the control of resources in many 
African states.   
Additionally, there ought to be a strong willingness and commitment of African leaders 
to realistic economic development programs to help sustain Africa’s emerging democracies. 
Indeed, “modernization theory,” which links democratization to economic development, seems 
to hold in many countries including South Korea, Taiwan, Argentina and Chile. In the context of 
Africa, countries that have embraced economic development agenda seem to be moving toward 
democracy and, therefore, experience fewer post-election conflicts. Benin, Botswana, Cape 
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Verde, Ghana, Mauritius, Namibia, Sao Tomé & Principe, and South Africa are palpable 
examples of African states that not only have experienced economic development in the last 
twenty years as revealed by their growth domestic product (GDP), which is measured in terms of 
their purchasing power parity (World Bank Database 2011), but also have been classified as full 
democracies (Freedom House 2012). However, one has to be cautious regarding the cause-effect 
relationship between democracy and economic development because the sequencing is 
important.  
Modernization theory does fail to explain change in countries such as China and India. 
Even though India is the world’s largest democracy, it is certainly not yet fully developed. While 
China’s economy has grown tremendously during the twentieth century and continues to grow in 
the twenty-first century, the country failed to meet minimum democratic standards. The 
modernization theory also does not apply in the case of Singapore, which is known for its 
economic boom. 
Second, if countries had been under military rule for so long as in the case of Guinea-
Bissau, Guinea, Ghana, Togo, to name just a few, there is a need to convene a sincere dialogue 
between the population and the military so as to improve civil-military relations before and after 
elections. This dialogue will also help to bring trust between civilians and security forces. Third, 
institutional reforms are much needed in many African countries now more than ever. Such 
reforms should also include the security apparatus, which should be trained as instruments of 
protection of populations rather than serving as tools for regime maintenance as they currently 
are in a number of African countries. In many African states, the dominant parties tend to co-opt 
the security apparatus as much as they can in order to perpetuate their powers. For that reason 
many dominant parties are skeptical of a true civil-military dialogue or any calls for military and 
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institutional reforms. True institutional reforms require inputs from all stakeholders including 
stronger and weaker parties who are willing to reach mutually acceptable solutions. The findings 
in both the quantitative research and the qualitative comparative analysis of this thesis suggest 
that majority/plurality electoral systems provide little to no room or opportunities of political 
participation and representation for smaller parties or representation of women and minorities 
whose contributions are essential not only for the survival of democracy but also for successful 
and lasting institutional reforms.  
Fourth, countries can review their constitutions through national forums and submit the 
amended proposals to their respective populations for approval through constitutional referenda 
rather than through legislative actions. In such constitutional proposals, the main tenets of 
democracy such as separation of powers among the branches of government and basic individual 
rights must be guaranteed and that the duties and responsibilities of each branch are clearly 
defined. The judicial branch, which plays a paramount role in the litigation of election-related 
disputes in many countries, can assume its tasks with a total independence if there is a separation 
of powers between the executive and the judiciary. Additionally, the constitutions should 
empower the judiciaries with the power of judicial review, which will allow them to declare 
whether certain presidential decrees or parliamentary acts are unconstitutional. The judicial 
review will serve as additional checks and balances on both the executives and the parliaments or 
National Assemblies. The use of judicial review has been prominent in many western countries 
including the United States where democracy was consolidated for over 200 years now. The 
constitutions should also limit the presidential terms in office. Putting a cap to the number of 
terms a president or a head of state can serve in office may not only guarantee democratic 
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alternations in a country, but also it may give opposition parties a hope that they too can come to 
power if all stakeholders play by the rules.  
Fifth, it may be apt to proceed with electoral reforms to insure greater permissiveness and 
representation of various social groups, including minorities (women, ethnic and religious 
groups, etc.). Increased representation is critical when it comes to preventing electoral conflict in 
plural and highly heterogeneous societies. In these societies, a multilateral approach should be 
given to the design of electoral systems. Such an approach, which puts emphasis on collaborative 
effort of all stakeholders or actors, will help create legitimate electoral systems acceptable to all 
actors. This approach is in line with one of the key pieces of advice that Reynolds et al (2005) 
provide to electoral system designers. According to Reynolds et al (2005: 161), 
All groupings which wish to play a part in the democratic process should feel that the 
electoral system to be used is fair and gives them the same chance of electoral success as 
anyone else. The paramount aim should be that those who ‘lose’ the election cannot 
translate their disappointment into a rejection of the system itself or use electoral system 
as an excuse to destabilize the path of democratic consolidation.  
 
In many African countries, losers in elections have difficulty accepting electoral outcomes as a 
result of not only the lack of trust in their electoral systems, but also because of the lack of 
confidence that such systems are built with fairness to provide transparent and acceptable 
outcomes. For example, in Benin, Ghana, and even post-apartheid South Africa where electoral 
systems are widely accepted by all parties, losers are more likely to accept defeat than in 
countries where the fairness of electoral systems is questioned. 
 Another reason for reforming electoral system is that plurality/majority system provides 
incentives to stronger parties to engage in “crude ethnic politics” (Ayelazuno 2011: 22). Because 
the plurality/majority electoral system facilitates the establishment of a (M+1) -party system, any 
of the main parties that emerge as a result of the use of such a system may use any available 
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resources to its advantage so as to win elections. In Africa, the most prominent resource that 
politicians often resort to in their quest for political power is arguably “ethnicity.” Ethnic cards 
have been played by political parties and their candidates in many electoral contests in Cote 
d’Ivoire, Kenya, Togo, Zimbabwe, and even in Ghana where the two dominant parties NDC and 
NPP have been locked in ethnic politics since 1996. Because of that, Ghana’s fledgling 
democracy almost collapsed after the 2008 elections although its electoral system seems to be 
working. I argue that things can go wrong at any time if the country’s electoral system is not 
carefully looked at.  
 Using Ghana as an example, I recommend that African countries that use a majoritarian 
electoral system (FPTP system, especially) overhaul their systems with an objective to de-
incentivize stronger parties that may want to use ethnic identity cards as a tool to gain political 
power. This can be done if these countries introduce an absolute majority formula instead of 
plurality or FPTP electoral rule. The absolute majority electoral rule provides opportunities for 
the runoff parties to coordinate strategically with minority parities whose voters may vote 
strategically for the party that have a chance of winning in the second round. A strategic alliance 
formation can help parties refrain from playing ethnic cards during political elections.      
Another example of country where the majoritarian electoral system has caused a major 
contention among key actors since 1990 is Togo. Despite a Comprehensive Political Agreement 
(an Accord Politique Globale reached between the ruling RPT and some key opposition parties 
in 2006), which stressed the necessity of institutional and electoral reforms before the 2007 
legislative elections, such elections were held without required reforms. 
It is unfair to charge the plurality/majority system as the only factor responsible for post-
election conflict in contemporary Africa. The mixed electoral systems (especially the MMM 
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variant) also can be blamed for Africa’s electoral problems. In the 1990s in Senegal, Abdoulaye 
Wade (then the leader of the Senegalese political opposition) and his PDS never accepted defeat 
in elections in part because according to him the Parallel system used in Senegal was not a fair 
electoral system (Vengroff 2005). If its other political institutions, particularly the military which 
stayed out of the process, were not strong, Senegal would have slipped into protracted electoral 
violence in the 1990s. Even though this was a rare incident, it was a wakeup call for leaders and 
electoral system designers to always opt for electoral systems that are built on the premises of 
inclusion of all socio-political cleavages.     
   Sixth, African countries that experience periodic electoral conflicts must revise the 
processes and procedures for selecting members of their election management bodies (EMBs) to 
ensure credibility and independence of the electoral institutions in charge of planning, 
administering and supervising all political elections. The independence of EMBs should be 
guaranteed by the constitution of each country as it is in Ghana. As the Article 46 of 1992 
Constitution of Ghana stipulates it, “‘In the performance of its functions, the Electoral 
Commission not be subject to the control or direction of any authority’ except as provided in the 
constitution or any other law not consistent with the constitution” (The Electoral Commission of 
Ghana 2012).   
Furthermore, in case of an eventual conflict that needs to be mediated by a third party, 
choose an impartial or a neutral third party mediator to address differences between parties 
taking part in elections prior to the actual elections. This choice will help avoid conflict of 
interest on the side of the mediator and increase the chance of success of the mediated accords or 
agreements. In addition, the mediator must not only be knowledgeable about democracy but also 
he/she must have prior experience when it comes to democracy and democratic elections. In this 
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regard, any president or head of state who comes to power through a military coup should not be 
considered to serve as a mediator in an electoral conflict. Because of the lack of impartiality in 
the mediation of many conflicts in Francophone Africa, including Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali 
and Togo, these conflicts had been put on hold for a time being instead of being resolved or 
managed. However, in places such as Senegal and Ghana where electoral commissioners appear 
to be independent or neutral, these commissioners have successfully played and continue to play 
the role of third party mediators in the mitigation of electoral crises.  
 
 6.4. Elections as Learning Experiences 
 The literature on elections as instruments of democracy suggests that for a democracy to 
emerge and sustain itself, it takes more than three consecutive successful free and fair elections. 
This fact is often ignored by many politicians across Africa where elections are viewed as the 
end of the world. Learning from mistakes and mastering the rules of the game remain key factors 
underpinning democratic success in Africa’s emerging democracies. In Lesotho, the first two 
foundational elections held in 1993 and 1998 under FPTP electoral system were catastrophic as 
they failed to provide opportunities for opposition parties to be represented in the parliament.  
However, with a series of mediations under the auspices of the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), the Lesotho government and its opposition parties were able 
to establish an Interim Political Authority (IPA). Arguably, the IPA created stronger and more 
democratic institutions (for example, MMP electoral system) for subsequent elections. Since 
2002, the MMP system has helped increase the representation of political opposition parties and 
moderate the consolidation of democracy in the country. It is also worth noting that alongside 
electoral systems that play a major role in influencing electoral behaviors in many African 
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countries, other institutions including civil society organizations and constitutions also shape 
electoral behaviors and electoral outcomes (Menocal 2014).  
 Other examples of African states that learned from experience include Benin, Ghana, and 
Senegal. As discussed in Chapters Four and Five of this thesis, these countries cultivated a long 
process of democratic culture and created political systems that earned the trust and confidence 
of their respective political actors. They adopted rigorous democratic constitutions with tighter 
amendment processes as a result of constitutional checks and balances. For instance, in Benin, 
according to the Article 154 of the constitution, a three-fourth majority of members of the 
National Assembly is required to approve the constitution revision proposed by the executive 
branch in consultation of the legislative branch. To become the law of the land, the amended 
constitution shall be ratified either by a national referendum or by a four-fifth majority vote of 
the legislators (Article 155 of the constitution of Benin). Given that the Beninois party system is 
characterized by an extreme pluralism, not only is it difficult to approve a proposal for a 
constitutional amendment, but also it is extremely difficult and nearly impossible to obtain a 
four-fifths majority vote of the members of the National Assembly for the ratification of the 
constitution.   
In Ghana, the complexity of the constitutional amendment process makes it very difficult 
for any single political party to alter the country’s constitution. As stated in the Article 290 of the 
Constitution of Ghana, to amend the entrenched provisions including, the sovereignty of the 
state, which shall be exercised by the people of Ghana, civil rights and civil liberties, and the 
Parliament’s limitations to enact policies that establish a one-party system, the bill shall 
• be referred by the Speaker to the Council of State who shall provide advice on it within thirty 
days of receipt of the bill; 
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• be introduced to the Parliament after being published in the Gazette for sixty days to allow 
voters to be acquainted with the content of the bill; 
• be approved by a national referendum of at least forty percent of voter turnout with over 75 
percent popular votes in support of the proposed amendment. 
In addition to this lengthy process, the Parliament shall pass the already approved bill at the 
referendum before the President signs it into law. However, when it comes to the amendment of 
any other provisions, it requires at least two thirds vote of the Parliament in favor of the bill 
before the President can sign it into law (Article 291 of the Constitution of Ghana). Having a 
complicated amendment process may serve to thwart the efforts of anti-democracy forces to 
change their country’s constitution when they come to power. 
Unlike Ghana where the amendment process is not only complex but also transparent, in 
Senegal, the process is simpler and less transparent. The amendment of the constitution can be 
approved by a referendum or a three-fifths vote of the National Assembly. Because of the 
dominant party system in Senegal, the ruling party or coalition was able to win more than three-
fifths seats in the National Assembly; therefore, three-fifths votes of members of the legislature 
required for the amendment of the constitution would not be difficult to get. But because of its 
past democratic experiences and its vibrant civil society, many constitutional amendment 
attempts by the Wade regime to perpetuate Wade’s power in Senegal failed.  
 Because vibrant civil society is known for promoting democratic cultures and values, it is 
an imperative for African policy makers and leaders of political parties to find ways to help 
increase labor unions and civil society organizations’ involvement in the process of 
democratization and democratic consolidation across the continent. And the most effective way 
to do so is to have not only constitutional guarantees of freedom of association and assembly to 
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citizens to freely form and participate in trade unions and other social and political organizations,  
but also and most importantly an electoral system, which allows diversity and pluralism given 
the pluralistic nature of many African societies.   
Democracy needs constructive allegiances that not only bind people together but also 
help them get involved in democratization processes. Civil society, defined in this thesis as a 
way society learns a culture of democracy, must be both vibrant and effective for a democracy to 
survive or to be consolidated. History has shown that in countries where civil society has been 
effective, there have been successful democratic transitions and democratic transfer of political 
power. Beyond the boundary of the African continent, one can cite Poland as a palpable example 
of a country that has an effective civil society. A success in Poland’s democratic process has 
been credited to the Solidarity Movement with impressive membership (over 10 million people 
claimed membership to Solidarity Movement within a short period of time in the late 1980s).  
In most countries in the Global South or developing countries, it is quite difficult to 
distinguish civil society organizations from political parties. For example, in Egypt, where civil 
society organizations are more likely to be ideological in orientation, the wave of democracy that 
swept throughout the country during the 2011 Arab Spring seems to be paling. In Tunisia, on the 
other hand, where the civil society organizations appear to be secular, the struggle for a 
democratic transfer of power by the Tunisians seems to be succeeding. In all, for a true 
democracy to survive in a country, civil society organizations should not only be separated from 
political parties, but also they must not be controlled by the government. Their independence will 
help them achieve their primary functions such as helping citizens participate in the democratic 
process, protecting human rights, and empowering women. 25   
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 The presentation by Ambassador Roland Rich, Executive Head of the United Nations Democracy Fund, under the 
auspices of the Humpty Dumpty Institute on 18 February 2014 at Savannah State University on the theme: 
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However, those who are skeptical of the association of electoral systems and electoral 
conflicts will argue that it does not matter what types of electoral systems a country chooses for 
allocation of seats and policy preferences. What matters though is the fairness of the system and 
the transparency in the entire electoral process. This thesis opines that the system that seems not 
only to mirror the social fabric of a country, but also to address the issue of fairness in political 
process is arguably the proportional representation system. Does the government control the 
media? Are there any opportunities for political participation? A lack of such opportunities 
remains one of the prime obstacles to political representation of parties and minority groups 
including women in parliaments or National Assemblies, and hence may be a source of post-
election conflicts in many African states and beyond. From the regression analysis (see Chapter 
3) and the comparative analysis (see Chapter 5), I find that the occurrence of post-election 
conflict increases in countries where citizens’ freedom of assembly and association are severely 
restricted compared to in countries where such freedoms are protected by governments. 
Additionally, the unfair distribution of legislative seats also remains a major explanatory factor 
of post-election conflicts across Africa. Furthermore, the results of the multivariate regression 
analysis (see Chapter 3) support the three hypotheses investigated in this thesis. Despite the fact 
that the results of the regression analysis are not as strong as hypothesized, one can carefully 
conclude that in Africa, (i) countries that use majoritarian electoral systems are more likely to 
experience post-election conflicts than are countries that use proportional electoral systems; (ii) 
countries that use majoritarian electoral systems are more likely to experience post-election 
conflicts than are countries that use mixed electoral systems; and  (iii) countries that use PR 
systems are less likely to experience post-election conflicts than are countries that use mixed 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
“Pathways to De Democracy: The Work of the United Nations Democracy Fund” enlightens this discussion on the 
relationship between vibrant civil society and democracy promotion.  
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systems, MMM, especially. However, more studies need to be done regarding the association of 
post-election conflict and electoral systems in contemporary Africa. 
 
6.5. Limitations of the Study 
 As in any research project, this study has some limitations. First and foremost, it heavily 
relies on secondary data, which may not be up-to-date. To minimize possible biases associated 
with the use of such data, I used multiple reliable sources as a way to cross-check for the internal 
validity of any pieces of information used in this thesis. However, the sample size N= 324, which 
includes 171 legislative/parliamentary elections and 153 presidential elections used in the 
quantitative phase of the study, and the sample of 25 legislative elections used in the in-depth 
comparative analysis, are not large enough to allow a greater inference or generalizability of the 
findings beyond the African continent. 
 Secondly, because of governments’ secrecy or the lack of transparency in election results 
in many countries in contemporary Africa, in most legislative elections investigated in this study, 
governments intentionally chose to only release the number of seats won by political parties and 
independent candidates rather than releasing both the number of votes and the number of seats 
won by parties that contested such elections. This state of things made the calculations of 
disproportionality indices, which are one of the key variables that help determine whether an 
electoral system ensures political representation of all sociopolitical cleavages in a country, 
extremely difficult.  
 Finally, in addition to the inaccessibility of data, another limitation of the study was the 
language barrier. Although the language issue was the least significant limitation of this study, it 
remains a critical one when it comes to gathering information on Guinea-Bissau where 
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Portuguese is the official language. My intermediary level of Portuguese was not enough to 
make a whole lot of sense of news published on Bissau-Guinean local websites. Therefore, I 
heavily relied on English and French translations, which may lack or misinterpret important 
details.  
Because of these limitations, further studies are needed on post-election conflict 
prevention in contemporary Africa and beyond. As a way forward, I will concentrate my future 
research agenda on the study of organization of political parties in the context of Africa, Middle 
East, and Asia. How parties are structured and funded may have consequences on both the 
promotion of democracy and the mitigation of electoral conflicts. Do political parties in 
developing countries have democratic structures? How are leaders of political parties selected? 
Are they democratically elected by members of their parties or societies? Or are they leaders 
because they are the founders of the parties? Are they life time leaders of their parties? Or do 
parties have constitutional term limits on party leaders? What qualities and skills do these leaders 
possess? How do opposition political parties relate to one another, to the society and to the ruling 
party or coalition? The nature of the relationship of parties may help ease or escalate conflict 
before, during, and after elections in these countries. 
Another critical area that needs to be researched is the organization of political 
oppositions in developing countries. Who shall be the leader of opposition parties in a given 
country, and how shall such a leader be selected? Although researchers such as Erdmann, 
Basedau and Mehler (2007), Gyimah-Boadi (2007), Bogaards (2003), Mozaffar, Scarritt and 
Galaich (2003), Mozaffar and Vengroff (2002) already ignited the debate on party systems and 
organization of African political parties, questions raised in this thesis for future research are yet 
to be answered to cover parties in all developing countries. As a way forward, I will investigate 
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these questions with a particular attention on the types of electoral systems used for the 
allocation of legislative seats and how both the organization and the funding of political 
opposition parties affect the likelihood of post-election conflict in developing countries with 
dominant-, two- and multiparty systems.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
Table 6.1: Calculation of Disproportionality in Benin 
Party/Coalition % of 
Votes 
% of 
Seats 
(% of 
Votes-
% of 
Seats) 
(% of Votes-% of 
Seats) squared 
Union for the Triumph of Democratic 
Renewal (UTRD) 
18.86% 18.75% 0.11 0.0121 
National Party for Democracy and 
Development-Democratic Renewal 
Party (PNDD-PRD) 
11.72% 14.0625% -2.3425 5.48730625 
Social Democratic Party-National 
Union for Solidarity and Progress 
(PSD-UNSP) 
9.84% 12.50% -2.66 7.0756 
National Rally for Democracy (RND) 12.08% 10.9375% 1.1425 1.30530625 
Our Common Cause (NCC) 10.13% 9.375% 0.755 0.570025 
National Movement for Democracy 
and Development-Movement for 
Solidarity, Union, and Progress-Union 
for Democracy and National 
Reconstruction (MNDD-MSUP-
UDRN) 
8.40% 9.375% -0.975 0.950625 
Union for Democracy and National 
Solidarity (UDS) 
7.08% 7.8125% -0.7325 0.53655625 
Rally of Liberal Democrats for 
National Reconstruction (RDL-
Vivoten) 
5.62% 6.25% -0.63 0.3969 
Alliance for Social Democracy-Bloc 
for Social Democracy (ASD-BSD) 
3.47% 4.6875% -1.2175 1.48230625 
Alliance for Democracy and Progress-
Democratic Union for Social Renewal 
3.76% 3.125% 0.635 0.403225 
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Table 6.2: Calculation of Effective Number of Parties in Benin 
Party/[Coalition] % of 
Votes 
(% of 
Votes)Squared 
 
Number 
of Seats 
(64) 
% of 
Seats 
 
(% of 
Seats)Squared 
Union for the Triumph of 
Democratic Renewal 
(UTRD) 
18.86% 0.03556996 12 18.75% 0.035156 
National Party for 
Democracy and 
Development-Democratic 
Renewal Party (PNDD-
PRD) 
11.72% 0.01373584 9 14.0625% 0.019768 
Social Democratic Party-
National Union for 
Solidarity and Progress 
9.84% 0.00968256 8 12.50% 0.015625 
(ADP-UDRS) 
National Union for Democracy and 
Progress (UNDP) 
3.07% 1.5625% 1.5075 2.27255625 
Popular Republican Union-National 
Labor Party (URP-PNT) 
1.99% 1.5625% 0.4275 0.18275625 
Democratic Union for Social and 
Economic Development (UDES) 
2.51% 0% 2.51 6.3001 
Builders and Managers of Freedom 
and Development (BGLD) 
1.49% 0% 1.49 2.2201 
Total 100 100  30.9860581 
D =  √ (1/2 ∑ (si – vi)2) = √1/2(30.9860581)=  
 
3.936118526 
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(PSD-UNSP) 
National Rally for 
Democracy (RND) 
12.08% 0.01459264 7 10.9375% 0.01196289 
Our Common Cause 
(NCC) 
10.13% 0.01026169 6 9.375% 0.0087890625 
National Movement for 
Democracy and 
Development-Movement 
for Solidarity, Union, and 
Progress-Union for 
Democracy and National 
Reconstruction (MNDD-
MSUP-UDRN) 
8.40% 0.007056 6 9.375% 0.0087890625 
Union for Democracy 
and National Solidarity 
(UDS) 
7.08% 0.00501264 5 7.8125% 0.00610351562
5 
Rally of Liberal 
Democrats for National 
Reconstruction (RDL-
Vivoten) 
5.62% 0.00315844 4 6.25% 0.00390625 
Alliance for Social 
Democracy-Bloc for 
Social Democracy (ASD-
BSD) 
3.47% 0.00120409 3 4.6875% 0.00219726562
5 
Alliance for Democracy 
and Progress-Democratic 
Union for Social Renewal 
(ADP-UDRS) 
3.76% 0.00141376 2 3.125% 0.009765625 
National Union for 
Democracy and Progress 
(UNDP) 
3.07% 0.0094249 1 1.5625% 0.00244140625 
Popular Republican 
Union-National Labor 
Party (URP-PNT) 
1.99% 0.0039601 1 1.5625% 0.00244140625 
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Democratic Union for 
Social and Economic 
Development (UDES) 
2.51% 0.0063001 0 0% 0 
Builders and Managers of 
Freedom and 
Development (BGLD) 
1.49% 0.0022201 0 0% 0 
Total (S)  
 
0.12359282  
 
 
 
0.126945481 
N=1/S  
 
8.09  
 
 
 
7.88 
 
 
LAAKSO-TAAGEPERA INDEX 
1. Effective Number of Parties 
a. LEGISLATIVE PARTIES (SEATS) N = 1/∑ si2 
N= 1/0.126945481 = 7.88 
b. ELECTORAL PARTIES   (VOTES)  N = 1/∑ vi2 
N = 1/0.12359282 = 8.09 
 
2. The Threshold of Exclusion 
a. Upper Threshold = 100% /(M + 1), with M = 13.8 
     = 100% /(13.8+1) 
    = 100%/14.8 
    =6.76% 
3. The Threshold of Representation (Inclusion) 
a. Lower Threshold = 100%/(2M), with M = 13.8 
= 100%/(2*13.8) = 100%/27.6 
= 3.62% 
 
4. The Effective Threshold (Teff) 
    Teff = (Upper Threshold + Lower Threshold)/2 
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= (6.76% + 3.62%)/2 
= 10.38%/2 
= 5.19% 
 
Table 6.3: The 2007 National Assembly Election Results in Togo 
Parties Votes % of 
Votes 
# of Seats % of Seats 
Rally for the 
Togolese People                 
922,636   39.4    50 61.73 
Union of Forces 
for Change                    
867,507   37.0    27 33.33 
Action 
Committee for 
Renewal                  
192,618   08.2     4 4.94 
Democratic 
Convention of 
African Peoples       
38,347   01.6     0 0 
Patriotic Pan-
African 
Convergence              
43,898   01.9     0 0 
Party of 
Democrats for 
Renewal                 
24,260   01.0     0 0 
Others 254,842   10.9     0 0 
Total 2,344,108          100 81 100 
Source: Psephos Adam Carr's Election Archive. Retrieved from http://psephos.adam-
carr.net/countries/t/togo/togo2007.txt  
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Table 6.4: Calculation of Disproportionality in Togo 
Parties % of Votes- % of Seats (% of Votes- % of 
Seats)squared 
Rally for the 
Togolese People 
-22.33 498.6289 
Union of Forces for 
Change 
3.67 13.4689 
Action Committee for 
Renewal 
3.26 10.6276 
Democratic 
Convention of 
African Peoples 
1.6 2.56 
Patriotic Pan-African 
Convergence 
1.9 3.61 
Party of Democrats 
for Renewal 
1 1 
Others 10.9 118.81 
Total  648.7054 
 
D =  √ (1/2 ∑ (si – vi)2) = √ (1/2 (648.7054) = 18.01 
D= 18.01 
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Table 6.5: Calculation of Effective Number of Parties in Togo 
Parties % of Votes (% of 
Votes) 
Squared 
% of Seats (% of Seats) Squared 
Rally for the 
Togolese People                 
0.394     0.155236 0.6173 0.38105929 
Union of Forces 
for Change                    
0.37    0.1369 0.3333 0.11108889 
Action 
Committee for 
Renewal                  
0.082     0.006724 0.0494 0.00244036 
Democratic 
Convention of 
African Peoples       
0.016     0.000256 0 0 
Patriotic Pan-
African 
Convergence              
0.019     0.000361 0 0 
Party of 
Democrats for 
Renewal                 
0.01     0.0001 0 0 
Others 0.109     0.011881 0 0 
Total 1 0.311458 100 0.494589 
 
1. Effective Number of Parties 
a. LEGISLATIVE PARTIES (SEATS) N = 1/∑ si2 
N= 1/0.494589= 2.02 
b. ELECTORAL PARTIES   (VOTES) N = 1/∑ vi2 
N = 1/0.311458= 3.21 
 
      2.  The Threshold of Exclusion 
  Upper Threshold = 100% /(M + 1), with M = 1 
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     = 100% /(1+1) 
    = 100%/2 
    =50% 
 
2. The Threshold of Representation (Inclusion) 
Lower Threshold = 100%/(2M), with M = 1 
= 100%/(2*1) = 100%/2 
= 50% 
 
3. The Effective Threshold (Teff) 
    Teff = (Upper Threshold + Lower Threshold)/2 
= (50% + 50%)/2 
= 100%/2 
= 50% 
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Appendix B 
 
The 1991 Parliamentary Elections in Benin 
 
HARE FORMULA - LARGEST REMAINDER 
Quota = Total Votes Cast/Seats, and the total number of seats = 64 
Quota = 1,030,017/64  
Quota = 16,094 
 
Table 6.6: Calculation of Number of Seats Using Hare Formula-Largest Remainder 
Party/(Coalition) Number of 
Votes 
Full Quotas Remainder Seats + 
Remainder 
Union for the 
Triumph of 
Democratic 
Renewal (UTRD) 
194,213 
 
12 
 
1085 
 
12 + 0 = 12 
National Party for 
Democracy and 
Development-
Democratic 
Renewal Party 
(PNDD-PRD) 
120,705 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
8047 
 
 
7 + 1 = 8 
Social 
Democratic 
Party-National 
Union for 
Solidarity and 
Progress (PSD-
UNSP) 
101,348 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
4784 
 
 
6 + 0 = 6 
National Rally for 
Democracy 
124,392    
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(RND) 7 11734 7 +1 = 8 
Our Common 
Cause (NCC) 
104,347 
 
6 
 
 
7783 
 
6 + 0 = 6 
National 
Movement for 
Democracy and 
Development-
Movement for 
Solidarity, Union, 
and Progress-
Union for 
Democracy and 
National 
Reconstruction 
(MNDD-MSUP-
UDRN) 
 
86,556 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
6086 
 
 
 
 
5 + 0 = 5 
Union for 
Democracy and 
National 
Solidarity (UDS) 
72,899 
 
4 
 
8523 
 
4 + 1 = 5 
Rally of Liberal 
Democrats for 
National 
Reconstruction 
(RDL-Vivoten) 
57,852 
 
3 
 
9570 
 
3 + 1 = 4 
Alliance for 
Social 
Democracy-Bloc 
for Social 
Democracy 
(ASD-BSD) 
35,700 
 
 
2 
 
 
3512 
 
 
2 +0 = 2 
Alliance for 
Democracy and 
Progress-
38,684 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Preventive Approach to Post-Election Conflicts in Contemporary Africa                           Edoh Agbehonou 
 
245 
 
Democratic 
Union for Social 
Renewal (ADP-
UDRS) 
2 6496 2 + 0 = 2 
National Union 
for Democracy 
and Progress 
(UNDP) 
31,601 
 
1 
 
15507 
 
1 + 1 = 2  
Popular 
Republican 
Union-National 
Labor Party 
(URP-PNT) 
20,490 
 
1 
 
4396 
 
1 + 0 = 1 
Democratic 
Union for Social 
and Economic 
Development 
(UDES) 
25,893 
 
1 
 
9799 
 
1 + 1 = 2 
Builders and 
Managers of 
Freedom and 
Development 
(BGLD) 
15,337 
 
0 
 
15337 
 
0 + 1 = 1 
Total 1,030,017 57 112,659 64 
 
 
DROOP QUOTA 
Quota = Votes/(Seats + 1) and  the total # of seats = 64 
   = 1,030,017/(64 + 1) 
   = 1,030,017/65 
   A= 15,846 
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Table 6.7: Calculation of Number of Seats Using Droop Quota System 
Party/Coalition Number of 
Votes 
Full Quotas Remainder Seats + 
Remainder 
Union for the 
Triumph of 
Democratic 
Renewal (UTRD) 
194,213 
 
12 
 
4061 
 
12 + 0 = 12 
National Party for 
Democracy and 
Development-
Democratic 
Renewal Party 
(PNDD-PRD) 
120,705 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
9783 
 
 
7 + 1 = 8 
Social 
Democratic 
Party-National 
Union for 
Solidarity and 
Progress (PSD-
UNSP) 
101,348 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
6272 
 
 
6 + 0 = 6 
National Rally for 
Democracy 
(RND) 
124,392 
 
7 
 
13470 
 
7 +1 = 8 
Our Common 
Cause (NCC) 
104,347 
 
6 
 
 
9271 
 
6 + 0 = 6 
National 
Movement for 
Democracy and 
Development-
Movement for 
Solidarity, Union, 
and Progress-
Union for 
86,556 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
7326 
 
 
 
5 + 0 = 5 
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Democracy and 
National 
Reconstruction 
(MNDD-MSUP-
UDRN) 
Union for 
Democracy and 
National 
Solidarity (UDS) 
72,899 
 
4 
 
9515 
 
4 + 1 = 5 
Rally of Liberal 
Democrats for 
National 
Reconstruction 
(RDL-Vivoten) 
57,852 
 
3 
 
10314 
 
3 + 1 = 4 
Alliance for 
Social 
Democracy-Bloc 
for Social 
Democracy 
(ASD-BSD) 
35,700 
 
 
2 
 
 
4008 
 
 
2 +0 = 2 
Alliance for 
Democracy and 
Progress-
Democratic 
Union for Social 
Renewal (ADP-
UDRS) 
38,684 
 
 
2 
 
 
6992 
 
 
2 + 0 = 2 
National Union 
for Democracy 
and Progress 
(UNDP) 
31,601 
 
1 
 
15755 
 
1 + 1 = 2  
Popular 
Republican 
Union-National 
Labor Party 
(URP-PNT) 
20,490 
 
1 
 
4644 
 
1 + 0 = 1 
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Democratic 
Union for Social 
and Economic 
Development 
(UDES) 
25,893 
 
1 
 
10047 
 
1 + 1 = 2 
Builders and 
Managers of 
Freedom and 
Development 
(BGLD) 
15,337 
 
0 
 
15337 
 
0 + 1 = 1 
Total 1,030,017 57 126,795 64 
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The 2007 National Assembly Elections in Togo 
 
Table 6.8: The 2007 National Assembly Election Results in Togo 
Parties Votes % of 
Votes 
# of Seats % of Seats 
Rally for the 
Togolese People 
922,636 39.4 50 61.73 
Union of Forces 
for Change 
867,507 37.0 27 33.33 
Action 
Committee for 
Renewal 
192,618 08.2 4 4.94 
Democratic 
Convention of 
African Peoples 
38,347 01.6 0 0 
Patriotic Pan-
African 
Convergence 
43,898 01.9 0 0 
Party of 
Democrats for 
Renewal 
24,260 01.0 0 0 
Others 254,842 10.9 0 0 
 
Total 2,344,108 100 81 100 
Source: Psephos Adam Carr's Election Archive. Retrieved from http://psephos.adam-
carr.net/countries/t/togo/togo2007.txt 
 
HARE FORMULA - LARGEST REMAINDER 
Quota = Total votes cast/seats, and the total number of seats = 81 
Quota = 2,344,108/81 
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Quota = 28,939 
 
 
Table 6.9: Calculation of Number of Seats Using Fare Formula-Largest Remainder in Togo’s 
2007 Election Results 
 
Parties Votes Full 
Quotas 
Remainder Seats + Remainder 
Rally for the 
Togolese People 
922,636 31 25,527 31 + 1 = 32 
Union of Forces 
for Change 
867,507 29 28,276 29 + 1 = 30 
Action 
Committee for 
Renewal 
192,618 6 18,984 6 + 1 = 7 
Democratic 
Convention of 
African Peoples 
38,347 1 9,408 1 + 0 = 1 
Patriotic Pan-
African 
Convergence 
43,898 1 14,959 1+ 0 = 1 
Party of 
Democrats for 
Renewal 
24,260 0 24,260 0 + 1 = 1 
Others 254,842 8 23,330 8 + 1 = 9 
 
Total 2,344,108 76 144,744 81 
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DROOP QUOTA 
Quota = Votes/(seats + 1) and  the total # of seats = 81 
Quota = 2,344,108/ (81+1) 
Quota = 28,586 
 
Table 6.10: Calculation of Number of Seats Using Droop Quota System in Togo’s 2007 Election 
Results 
Parties Votes Full 
Quotas 
Remainder Seats + Remainder 
Rally for the 
Togolese People 
922,636 32 7,884 32 + 0 = 32 
Union of Forces 
for Change 
867,507 30 9,927 30 + 0 = 30 
Action 
Committee for 
Renewal 
192,618 6 21,102 6 + 1 = 7 
Democratic 
Convention of 
African Peoples 
38,347 1 9,761 1 + 0 = 1 
Patriotic Pan-
African 
Convergence 
43,898 1 15,312 1+ 0 = 1 
Party of 
Democrats for 
Renewal 
24,260 0 24,260 0 + 1 = 1 
Others 254,842 8 26,154 8 + 1 = 9 
 
Total 2,344,108 76 144,744 81 
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